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One  of  the  main  developments  that  South-East
European (SEE) countries were faced with during
their  transition1 to  a  market  economy  was  the
influx of foreign banks into the domestic financial
system. This transition period saw foreign owner-
ship  and  control  of  domestic  credit  institutions
rise dramatically from 8% in 1994 to 52% in 1999
(IMF, 2000), a level which has been maintained to
date.  The  average  share  of  foreign  banks  rose
from 40% in 1999 to more than 60% in 2004. The
transition for SEE countries was marked by major
institutional changes in the domestic financial sys-
tems, frequently as a direct consequence of macro-
economic financial stress and its negative impact
on the stability of the financial markets, as well as
of severe banking crises.
Since the early 1990s, many countries in the region
have implemented financial liberalisation policies,
allowing foreign banks to set up branches, and for-
mer state-owned domestic banks to become pri-
vate  and  partly  foreign-owned.  In  recent  years,
significant  progress  has  also  been  made  in
restructuring and consolidating the banking sec-
tor. The implementation of institutional regulatory
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1 In  accordance  with  the  definition  adopted  by  the  European
Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the term tran-
sition refers to the process of establishing democratic institutions
and mechanisms in former communist states. changes and broader financial sector reform has
opened up the domestic banking sectors to direct
foreign participation.
The pattern and timing of foreign bank entry 
in emerging financial markets can be attributed 
to a number of factors (see Clarke et al., 2001):
(i)  developing  host  countries  are  likely  to  offer
substantial profit opportunities in the provision of
financial services, since foreign banks face rela-
tively less effective domestic competition and can
take advantage of the wider interest rate spreads
in these markets; (ii) foreign banks consider that
the SEE countries are likely to succeed in their bid
for EU entry and that macroeconomic conditions
will therefore improve; (iii) considering that finan-
cial  intermediation  increases  in  line  with  per
capita income,  retail  banking  is  expected  to
expand  in  the  host  countries  as  disposable
income  increases;  (iv)  foreign  bank  penetration
may accompany or help the entry of non-financial
firms; (v) lower host-country tax rates may have a
decisive impact on foreign banks’ decisions about
where to locate and what type of office to estab-
lish;  and  (vi)  credit  institutions  operating  on  a
multinational basis or whose country of origin has
more developed financial systems are considered
more capable —in terms of expertise and human
capital—  of  restructuring  relatively  inefficient
domestic banks.
Foreign banks have a number of ways of entering
a new market and can choose to acquire a domes-
tic credit institution, to set up a subsidiary or to
open a regional branch. Each mode of entry has
its  own  specific  advantages.  For  instance,  the
acquisition of a domestic credit institution usually
enables the acquirer to rapidly gain a large share
of the market. Moreover, in the case of the SEE
countries, the privatisation of domestic banks was
possible only as a result of their sale to a foreign
bank, since, in most cases, the cost of purchasing
the bank was prohibitively high and the govern-
ments needed new capital inflows to fund their
state budgets.
The  present  paper  analyses  the  development  of
the  banking  sector  in  the  SEE  countries  during
their transition to a market economy. We focus
particularly  on  the  position  of  foreign-owned
banks, which have been shown to play an impor-
tant role in the development of the domestic finan-
cial  systems.  More  than  half  the  banks  in  the
region  are  now  foreign-owned,  accounting  for
two-thirds of total bank assets. The rapid growth
of foreign control in the banking sector may raise
questions about foreign bank entry and its impli-
cations for domestic banks. Do foreign banks actu-
ally play a role in making domestic banks sounder
and more efficient? Does foreign bank entry con-
tribute to more robust domestic financial systems?
The international financial literature provides an
overall positive response to these questions, in
spite of some negative empirical findings and the
formulation  of  significant  counter-arguments.
This paper attempts to shed some light on the
issue by examining the costs and benefits arising
from foreign bank presence in local markets. In
particular,  we  elaborate  on  earlier  findings
regarding emerging market economies, exploit-
ing the recent experience of SE Europe. To this
end,  we  used  a  balance  sheet  indicator-based
analysis to investigate the advantages that foreign
banks  may  enjoy,  compared  to  their  domestic
competitors. Furthermore, using time-series data
from  individual  bank  balance  sheets,  we  per-
formed pooled time series regressions for each
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ences  across  domestically-  and  foreign-owned
banks  with  regard  to  loan  responsiveness  and
sensitivity to cyclical fluctuations in GDP.
The  rest  of  our  paper  is  structured  as  follows:
Section  2  gives  a  summarised  overview  of  the
advantages and concerns arising from foreign bank
presence, as described in the available literature.
Section 3 presents the characteristics of the finan-
cial system in SEE countries, with an emphasis on
the intermediary role of banks and their level of
financial development. In Section 4, we describe
the key characteristics of the foreign banks operat-
ing  in  the  region.  Section  5  examines  whether
there are major differences between domestically-
and foreign-owned banks in terms of lending sta-
bility, in order to determine whether foreign bank
presence has contributed to the consolidation of
the domestic banking system. Finally, our key find-
ings are summarised in Section 6.
2. Foreign bank presence: arguments for and
against
The economic literature mentions several chan-
nels through which foreign bank presence is likely
to affect the performance of the domestic banking
sector, either favourably or adversely (see Stiglitz,
1994, Berger and Hannan, 1998, Mathieson and
Roldos, 2001, Dages et al., 2000, Crystal et al.,
2002). There are five main arguments in favour of
opening up emerging market financial sectors to
foreign ownership.
First, foreign bank presence increases the amount
of funding available to domestic projects, by facil-
itating capital inflows. Such a presence may also
increase  the  stability  of  available  lending  to
emerging markets by diversifying the capital and
funding  bases  supporting  the  overall  supply  of
domestic credit.
Second,  foreign  banks  may  stimulate  domestic
ones to reduce their operating costs and increase
efficiency  through  competition.  Indeed,  some
contend that foreign banks improve the quality,
pricing  and  availability  of  financial  services
offered, both directly as providers of these ser-
vices and indirectly through increased competi-
tion with domestic banks (Levine, 1997). At the
same  time,  increased  competition  may  lead  to
lower interest rate spreads and to lower oligopoly
profits.
Third, foreign bank presence may have positive
spill-over  effects:  by  introducing  new  financial
services  and  new  banking  techniques,  foreign
banks  prompt  their  domestic  counterparts  to
adopt similar banking techniques in an effort to
maintain their market share. This enhancement of
the domestic banking system with new business
ideas can improve corporate governance, admin-
istrative  mechanisms  and  the  financial  support
structure, i.e. administrative accounting and trans-
parency,  organisation,  information  technology
and, above all, risk monitoring and management.
Foreign  banks  usually  import  their  parent  com-
pany’s supervisory systems, which, being backed
by  sophisticated  software,  more  than  meet  the
requirements of the local supervisory authorities.
All of these spill-over effects may help establish
more  efficient  domestic  banking  practices  and
cost control methods.
Fourth, the presence of foreign banks may improve
the  quality  of  human  resources  working  in  the
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attracting highly-skilled managers from the interna-
tional  market,  foreign  banks  transfer  consider-
able  know-how,  thereby  improving  the  practices
adopted by local executives working either for these
foreign banks or for their domestic competitors. In
addition, by investing in their human resources, for-
eign banks often improve the quality of the human
capital available not only to the financial sector, but
also to the domestic economy as a whole.
Finally, by increasing competition and enhancing
the role for private capital, foreign bank entry may
reduce  the  importance  of  financial  repression
policies (i.e. interest rate controls, directed credit
policies). It can also be decisive in reducing gov-
ernment over-reliance on the domestic banking
system and thereby improve local bank efficiency.
On the other hand, serious concerns have been
voiced about opening up the banking sector to
foreign ownership. First, many contend that for-
eign bank participation puts so much competitive
pressure on domestic banks that some may fail in
the short run, thus threatening to destabilise the
host  country’s  banking  sector  and  economy.
Considering  that  the  economies  under  review
have not yet reached maturity, there is a risk that
a macroeconomic imbalance in the host country
could be transmitted to the home country. Given,
however, that nearly all of the state-owned banks
in the transition economies have been put up for
privatisation, the penetration of foreign banks and
the ensuing increased competition are not consid-
ered likely to pose major destabilisation threats to
the domestic banking systems.
Second, foreign banks could be a cause of insta-
bility if they were to decide to reduce their expo-
sure during a time of crisis either in their host or
home country.
Finally, some contend that the rapid growth of
the domestic banking system as a result of for-
eign bank presence may significantly undermine
the role of the local supervisory authorities, given
that the regulatory framework in these countries
is not fully developed. However, there are two
reasons  why  this  concern  seems  unwarranted:
first,  some  of  the  SEE  countries  have  already
joined the European Union, in which case their
regulatory  obligations  are  determined  by  EU
directives; and, second, the remaining SEE coun-
tries that are not EU members must also meet
regulatory obligations as determined by co-oper-
ation memoranda.
Several  papers  have  already  empirically  investi-
gated the effects of increased foreign bank pres-
ence  on  domestic  banking  systems  (see,  for
example,  Barajas et  al.,  2000,  Claessens et  al.,
2001, Clarke et al., 2001, Demizer, 2000, Hermes
and Lensink, 2004a, b, Pastor et al., 2000, Naa-
borg et al., 2004). A finding common to all these
papers is that foreign bank presence affects the
performance of the domestic banking system by
increasing competition. However, to what extent
this also leads to greater efficiency is less clear.
Finally,  most  of  the  concerns  mentioned  above
are unsupported by empirical evidence.
Some studies have reported that costs for domes-
tic  banks  have  increased  significantly  since  for-
eign bank entry. Hermes and Lensink (2004a, b)
have  suggested  that,  at  least  in  the  short  run,
costs may go up depending on the host country’s
level  of  economic  and  financial  development.
Domestic banks are obviously faced with a trade-
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participation. In the short run, costs increase as a
result  of  the  investment  expenditure  needed  to
upgrade infrastructure and human resources, to
improve service and product quality and to intro-
duce new services and products. In the long run,
however,  previous  investment  costs  will  help
reduce costs and increase efficiency. As for the
impact that foreign bank presence has on the sta-
bility  of  domestic  financial  systems,  Demirgüc-
Kunt et al. (1998) have shown that foreign bank
entry is generally associated with an easier neu-
tralisation of local bank crises and an alleviation of
the domino effect.
3. Recent financial development
This section points out some of the basic features
of  the  financial  system  in  the  SEE  countries,
focusing on the intermediary role of banks and
on  the  cross-country  differences  in  financial
development.2
Three financial indices have been used in the liter-
ature  (see  Beck et  al.,  1999)  to  measure  the
degree of financial development and make cross-
country comparisons. The first index is the ratio of
deposit money bank3 assets to GDP, which reflects
the importance of the financial services provided
by  banks  relative  to  the  size  of  the  economy.
Chart 1 shows how this index has evolved in SEE
countries and in the euro area. As can be seen, the
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2 The literature available on the region’s banking systems is par-
ticularly sparse. For a recent study of the determinants of banking
profitability in the SEE countries, see Athanasoglou et al. (2006). 
3 Deposit money banks comprise commercial banks and other
financial institutions that accept deposits. Deposit money bank
data measure the stock of deposit money. According to the defin-
ition of the IMF, the accounts on the assets side are: reserves,
comprising  domestic  currency  holdings  and  deposits  with  the
monetary authorities; claims on monetary authorities, comprising
holdings of securities issued by the central bank; foreign assets
and claims on other resident sectors (domestic credit). ratio exhibits a steady upward trend from 1999
onwards,  even  though  the  rate  of  increase  is
rather  low.  However,  the  average  value  of  this
asset-to-GDP ratio is at least four times higher in
the euro area than in the SEE countries. The SEE
countries in question can be grouped into two cat-
egories  on  the  basis  of  their  long-term  perfor-
mance.  The  first  category  includes  Bulgaria,
Romania  and  Croatia,  which  have  recorded 
the  best  macroeconomic  performances  and  the
highest levels of per capita income. What is more,
both  Bulgaria  and  Romania  recently  joined  the
European Union. The second category includes the
four remaining countries (Albania, FYROM, Serbia-
Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina). Even though
the  degree  of  banking  intermediation  is  slightly
higher in the first of the two categories, the long-run
trend is the same for both.
A second index of financial intermediation refers
to the level of deposit money bank claims on the
private sector as a share of GDP. According to the
definition used by Beck et al. (1999), the numer-
ator captures all loans to the private non-financial
sector  of  the  economy.  This  ratio  shows  the
importance of one of the main functions of finan-
cial intermediaries, i.e. the channelling of funds
to investors.
Chart 2 plots bank claims on the private and the
public sectors as a percentage of GDP for the year
2004. As can be seen, the SEE countries do not
display  a  uniform  pattern  of  financial  develop-
ment. Private credit in relation to GDP is by far
highest in Croatia, the only country in the sample
with a financial sector somewhat comparable in
size to that of the euro area. Credit as a percent-
age of GDP amounts to 115% in the euro area, but
is more than 3 and 4 times lower in the SEE coun-
tries (35% and 25% respectively in the first and
second categories of the sample). Still, there are
major differences between these countries: bank
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GDP, ranges from a high of 57% in Croatia to a
low of 10% in Romania. However, all countries
exhibit an upward trend in private credit, whereas
the trend of public sector credit is decreasing. The
ratio of public sector credit to GDP amounts to
6%  in  Bulgaria,  13%  in  Croatia  and  28%  in
Albania, but to no more than 3% in the remaining
countries. By comparison, euro area public credit
in 2004 was 28%.
Private credit rose markedly in the period from
1993 to 2004. As the rate of economic growth in
these  countries  becomes  faster,  private  credit
also increases. The reason for this is simple: due
to the underdeveloped domestic credit systems
and the shallow domestic stock markets, the only
option  for  private  investors  to  cover  their
increased needs in money funds is bank lending.
Commercial banks are gradually becoming all the
more willing to finance private investment pro-
jects. Indeed, as can be seen in Chart 3, average
annual credit to the private sector, as a percent-
age of total bank credit extended by commercial
banks in the region, rose from 46% in 1993 to
75% in 2004. Meanwhile, the standard deviation
between countries fell significantly from 55% in
1996 to 26% in 2004, indicating that bank behav-
iour in the sample countries is becoming more
uniform over time.
The third index monitors the correlation between
financial development and per capita income. The
literature on finance and economic development
(see  King  and  Levine,  1993a,  b,  Levine,  1997,
Levine et  al.,  2000,  Khan  and  Senhadji,  2000)
suggests  that  the  volume  of  banking  activity
increases  with  rising  per  capita income.  As
shown  in  Chart  4,  countries  with  higher  per
capita income,  like  Croatia  and  Bulgaria,  have
more  developed  banking  systems.  By  contrast,
countries  like  Albania  and  FYROM  are  charac-
Foreign bank presence: the experience of South-East European countries
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of banking intermediation. However, this obser-
vation is not confirmed in all cases. For instance,
in Romania private credit as a share of GDP is
unexpectedly low, whereas the per capita income
is  higher  than  in  Bulgaria.  Similarly,  Bosnia-
Herzegovina posts the second highest credit to
GDP ratio in the sample, but along with Albania
has the lowest per capita income.
To  sum  up,  there  are  substantial  differences
between  the  SEE  countries  in  terms  of  their
banking sector development. Croatia, Bulgaria
and Bosnia-Herzegovina have more developed
banking systems, while Albania, Romania and
Serbia-Montenegro lag behind. FYROM has a
relatively low level of banking intermediation,
but is striving to catch up with its more devel-
oped counterparts in the region. Although the
differential with the euro area is still particu-
larly wide, all three indices used exhibit a long-
run upward trend, indicating that these coun-
tries are making efforts to build healthy bank-
ing sectors.
4. Foreign bank presence: key characteristics
Foreign bank entry in SE Europe began in the early
1990s when these countries started transitioning
to a market economy and, in fact, was one of the
determining  factors  in  the  transition  process.
Based on end-2003 and end-2004 data, foreign
banks in the region have a much stronger pres-
ence  than  their  domestic  counterparts,  both  in
terms of assets and network size. By the end of
2004, foreign investors had assumed control of
more than 50% of total banks in the sample coun-
tries, compared with just 8.6% at end-1995. The
average asset share of foreign banks rose from
40% of total bank assets at end-1999 to 66% at
end-2004. Based on data for the year 2004, for-
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in  Serbia-Montenegro  to  a  high  of  91.2%  in
Croatia.
Chart 5 illustrates the development over time in
the  relative  number  of  foreign  and  domestic
banks  (either  private  and  state-owned)  for  the
period  1995-2004,  while  Table  1  gives  the
absolute number of foreign banks in each coun-
try. In 1995, 21 foreign banks were present in our
sample,  accounting  for  8.6%  of  total  banks.  By
2004, the number of foreign banks had climbed to
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Table 1
Number of foreign-owned banks in SE Europe
* Bosnia-Herzegovina is not included due to a lack of data. 
Source: EBRD.
Croatia 1 21 24 23 19 15
Bulgaria 3 25 26 26 25 24
Romania 8 2124 24 21 23
Albania 3 12 12 12 13 14
Bosnia-Herzegovina – 14 20 21 19 17
Serbia-Montenegro 3 3 8 12 16 11
FYROM 3 7 8 7 8 8
Total 21 103 122 125 121 112
% of total number of banks  8.6 36.3 49.6 53.4 53.6 52.1
2002 2003 2004 1995* Countries  2000 2001112, accounting for more than 50% of the total.
By contrast, the number of domestic banks fell
from 222 (91%) at end-1995 to 103 (48%) at end-
2004. Apart from the developments over time in
the number of foreign and domestic banks, it is
also interesting to examine the differences across
countries.  The  number  of  foreign  banks  grew
much  faster  in  some  countries  than  in  others.
Foreign  bank  presence  is  strongest  in  Bulgaria,
Croatia, Romania and Albania.
According to Charts 6 and 7, which show foreign-
and state-owned bank assets as a percentage of
total bank assets, foreign bank penetration grew
significantly  between  1994  and  2004.  Foreign
banks control majority market shares in all SEE
countries, while the share of banking assets under
state control has substantially decreased.
More specifically, after examining the situation in
the financial sector of each of the sample coun-
tries, we can note the following: banking sector
consolidation,  via  mergers  and  acquisitions,
has  continued  at  a  vigorous  pace  in  Bosnia-
Herzegovina, with 33 banks in operation at end-
2004,  down  from  37  one  year  earlier.  Half  of
these banks are foreign-owned and some two-
thirds  of  total  bank  capital  belongs  to  foreign
shareholders. Confidence in the country’s bank-
ing system has been boosted and financial inter-
mediation  has  expanded  significantly  in  recent
years. Similarly, in Albania, the banking system
has undergone substantial changes and the bank-
ing sector is now the most important segment of
the country’s financial system. Fourteen of the
total 16 banks in operation at end-2004 were for-
eign-owned.  Since  the  sale,  in  the  first  half  of
2004, of the Savings Bank, the country’s largest
state-owned bank, practically the entire banking
sector  has  come  under  private  management.
FYROM’s banking sector continues to be marked
by  a  low  level  of  financial  intermediation  and
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banks. Further consolidation in the sector is nec-
essary, as several small banks are reported to be
in difficulty. Eight of the country’s total 21 banks
are foreign-owned, with an asset share of 47%.
Financial  intermediation  in  Serbia-Montenegro
has  progressed  significantly  and  confidence  in
the system has recovered. In Serbia, the banking
sector  has  consolidated  significantly,  after  the
sale  of  several  state-owned  banks  to  foreign
investors.  However,  the  banking  sector  is  still
“over-banked”, with more than 40 banks in oper-
ation at end-2004.
In Bulgaria, the privatisation of the banking sec-
tor, which began in 1997, has neared comple-
tion, with more than 80% of the country’s total
banking  assets  in  the  hands  of  foreign-owned
institutions. At the end of 2004, 24 of the 35
banks  operating  in  the  country  were  foreign-
owned. Competition in the sector is intense, and
an increasingly broader range of financial prod-
ucts and services is offered. Reform efforts are
now  focusing  on  establishing  the  bank  insol-
vency regime. In Croatia, the banking sector has
strengthened  and  its  creditworthiness  has
improved significantly. This has come as a result
of a radical capital restructuring effort, carried
out  primarily  by  foreign-owned  banks,  which
today account for more than 90% of the coun-
try’s banking assets. However, sector concentra-
tion is exceptionally high, with the top two banks
holding some 43% of total assets. The banking
sector  continues  to  expand,  thanks  to  strong
domestic  demand  for  bank  lending.  Finally,  in
Romania,  the  government  has  stepped  up  the
privatisation of state-owned banks. By end-2004,
only two banks out of a total of 32 were still
under state ownership and control, with a com-
bined  asset  share  of  8%.  Twenty-three  banks
were  foreign-owned  and  accounted  for  nearly
60% of total assets.
Foreign bank presence: the experience of South-East European countries
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indicators
In this section, we will examine the differences in
behaviour across domestic and foreign banks in
order to assess whether foreign bank entry has
contributed to more robust financial systems in SE
Europe. One approach to evaluating the sound-
ness of domestic and foreign banks focuses on
balance sheet and behavioural indicators.
5.1 Data analysis
So far, our analysis has been based on country-
aggregated statistical data.4 However, in order to
compare  the  behavioural  indicators  of  domestic
and foreign banks, we need statistical data for each
individual bank. The only source of bank-level data
series  in  a  comparable  form  is  the  Fitch  IBCA
BankScope  database,  which  provides  balance-
sheet  and  profit-and-loss  data  for  each  bank,  as
published in their annual reports but adjusted for
differences in reporting and accounting standards.
In order to meet the requirements of the present
study,  however,  certain  data  classification  prob-
lems needed to be resolved. First, the BankScope
database does not specify a bank’s home country,
i.e. whether it is domestically- or foreign-owned,
nor does it indicate when a bank became foreign-
owned. Second, the database does not always list
all the banks in operation in a domestic market,
whereas  it  sometimes  lists  banks  which  have
ceased operating due to bankruptcy or dissolution.
Third,  since  the  database  does  not  list  all  the
branches of a foreign bank present in the local mar-
ket, foreign bank presence may be underestimated.
For  the  purposes  of  our  study,  we  gathered
information from the financial statements of 101
banks in operation in the seven countries of SE
Europe  during  the  period  1999-2004.5,6 Our
sample  selection  procedure  was  designed  to
meet the following prerequisites: first, the banks
needed to have a presence of at least three con-
secutive years in the local market and, second,
their  financial  statements  had  to  be  in  accor-
dance with international accounting standards.
Therefore,  banks  in  operation  for  fewer  than
three consecutive years or no longer active due
to bankruptcy or liquidation were excluded from
the sample, as were banks which follow domes-
tic rather than international accounting standards
for  reasons  of  non-comparability.  Information
about the banks’ specific features (year of estab-
lishment, country of origin, domestic or foreign
ownership, the year they became foreign, name
change, etc.) was derived from the banks’ web-
sites  and  annual  reports,  as  well  as  from  the
respective  national  central  banks,  and  is  pre-
sented in table form in the Appendix. Recourse
to supplementary sources of information (such
as Euromoney Institutional Investors PLC) was
necessary in order to divide the sample banks
into  two  sub-samples:  domestic  and  foreign7
banks. Finally, domestic banks which have been
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4 Main  sources  of  macroeconomic  data  are  the  International
Monetary Fund, the EBRD and the national central banks. 
5 Accounting  data  were  used  for  banks  listed  as  “commercial
banks” and “savings banks”, in accordance with the categories
used in the BankScope database. All quantitative data were taken
from the updated November 2006 version. 
6 Because of the time lag before country-aggregated and bank-
level data are actually released, we decided that 2004 would be
our cut-off year. Due to this restriction, it was not possible to
extend the sample period to 2005, a year which saw a major influx
of foreign banks into the region, especially in Serbia-Montenegro. 
7 Beck et al. (1999) define a bank as foreign-owned if no less than
50% of its equity is owned by foreigners, and foreign-penetrated
if more than 5% but less than 50% of its equity is held by foreign
investors. This same definition was used in this study in order to
distinguish domestically-owned banks from their foreign-owned
counterparts. acquired by foreign investors were classified in
the  foreign  bank  sub-sample  only  the  second
year after their acquisition, i.e. only after their
annual financial statements had been published
for the second time under the new ownership
structure.  We  therefore  allowed  for  an  adjust-
ment period of more than 12, but less than 24
months, since the items are published at the end
of each year.8
5.2 Summary performance and risk measures
Commercial banks of different ownership (domes-
tic or foreign) may have different operating char-
acteristics. Claessens et al. (2001) provide empir-
ical evidence that foreign banks are more prof-
itable and efficient than domestic ones in devel-
oping  countries,  while  the  opposite  is  true  in
developed countries (see also Berger et al., 2000,
De-Young and Nolle, 1996).9 In order to deter-
mine to what extent foreign banks in SEE coun-
tries may be more efficient, both in terms of cost
and profit efficiency, we investigated a number of
performance indicators for both domestic and for-
eign banks.
More specifically, we chose to investigate: (i) the
return on assets (ROA), which equals net income
to average total assets;10 (ii) the return on equity
(ROE), defined as net income to average equity;
(iii) the equity-to-assets ratio, which corresponds
to  the  inverse  of  the  equity  multiplier;  (iv)  the
profit margin, which equals ‘after tax’ income to
total  income  (interest  plus  non-interest  income
before  expenses,  tax  and  provisions  for  loan
losses);  and  finally  (v)  asset  utilisation,  which
equals total income before expenses and taxes to
average total assets. All of these indicators reflect
a bank’s profitability.
The ROA measures bank profits per unit of assets,
whereas the ROE, which represents the aggregate
return  to  stockholders  before  dividends,  mea-
sures profitability from the shareholders’ perspec-
tive. The higher the return, the better for share-
holders, as banks can add more to retained earn-
ings and pay more in cash dividends when profits
are higher. The ROE is linked to the ROA by the
equity multiplier, which is given as the ratio of
average total assets to average total equity. The
equity  multiplier  —which  is  the  inverse  of  the
unweighted equity capital indicator, i.e. the ratio
of average equity to average assets unweighted
for risk— in fact measures financial leverage and
represents both a profit and risk measure. This is
because  a  bank’s  equity  multiplier  compares
assets  with  equity,  so  that  high  equity-to-asset
ratio  values  indicate  that  the  bank  has  a  large
amount of debt financing relative to stockholders’
equity. A low value of the equity-to-assets ratio,
on the other hand, means that the bank is operat-
ing with less equity and more debt. The ROE’s pri-
mary shortcoming as a measure of bank perfor-
mance is that it can be high because a bank has
inadequate equity capital.11 Thus, the ROA pro-
vides  a  clearer  accounting  measure  of  overall
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8 This assumption is likely to have had a significant impact on our
results. However, a sensitivity analysis of this assumption would
have been beyond the scope of our study. 
9 Differences in tax and regulatory regimes, customer bases and
informational advantages might have a differential impact on bank
profitability and efficiency. 
10 Net income equals total revenue less total operating expenses
and income tax. Total revenue equals the sum of interest income,
non-interest income and securities gains and losses. Average total
assets are defined as the average value of total assets at the end
of two consecutive years, as recorded in the banks’ financial state-
ments.
11 A bank with negative book equity (insolvency) and positive
profits would show a negative ROE, whereas a bank with negative
book equity and negative profits would show a positive ROE. For
a  discussion  of  the  shortcomings  of  the  ROE,  see  Koch  and
McDonald (2005, chapter 3) and Sinkey (2002, chapter 3).bank performance, in the sense that it measures
how profitably a bank’s on-balance-sheet assets
are employed.
The profit margin focuses on a bank’s ability to cap-
italise expenses, while asset utilisation expresses
total revenue per unit of assets. The greater the
asset utilisation, the greater the bank’s ability to
generate income from the assets it owns.
A  few  other,  commonly-cited,  aggregate  prof-
itability measures were computed for the purpose
of  our  study,  such  as  the  net  interest  margin,
overhead costs and the efficiency ratio. The net
interest margin, defined as the bank’s net interest
income to average total earning assets, is a sum-
mary measure of net interest return on income-
producing  assets.  It  signals  credit  market  effi-
ciency and is very important in evaluating a bank’s
ability  to  manage  interest  rate  risk.  As  interest
rates change, so does a bank’s interest income.
For instance, if interest rates increase, so will the
bank’s net interest income, given that some assets
and liabilities will be revalued at higher rates, i.e.
in line with the sensitivity of both sides of the bal-
ance sheet to interest rate changes. Variations in
the net interest margin indicate whether a bank
has  positioned  its  assets  and  liabilities  to  take
advantage of rate changes and namely whether it
has profited or lost from increases or decreases in
interest rates.
As  far  as  operational  efficiency  is  concerned,  a
bank’s overhead costs, defined as the ratio of its
non-interest costs to average total assets, provide
valuable information with which to make compar-
isons across different-sized banks. The numerator
includes personnel expense (salaries and benefit
payments), occupancy expense and other operat-
ing expenses. Non-interest costs may vary from
bank to bank depending on the composition of
the  banks’  liabilities.  For  instance,  banks  with
large amounts of saving accounts and transaction
deposits exhibit greater relative overhead costs.
The efficiency ratio is defined as the ratio of non-
interest costs to the sum of net interest income
and net non-interest income. It measures a bank’s
ability  to  control  non-interest  costs  relative  to
operating income. Conceptually, therefore, it indi-
cates how much a bank must “pay” in non-inter-
est expenses, i.e. in overheads, for each additional
unit of operating income. Bank analysts usually
expect larger-sized banks to keep this ratio below
55%. Banks use this ratio to estimate how effec-
tive  their  recent  efforts  to  control  non-interest
costs  have  been,  while  supplementing  earnings
by increasing fees on a wide range of transactions.
The smaller the efficiency ratio, the more prof-
itable the bank, ceteris paribus.
A third group of indicators analysed here involves
asset  quality.  The  two  measures  in  question
reflect the amount of existing credit risk associ-
ated  with  the  loan  and  investment  portfolio  as
well  as  with  off-balance-sheet  activities.  More
specifically, the first indicator measures a bank’s
loan loss reserves, based on the balance sheets,
as a percentage of total gross loans, while the sec-
ond indicator calculates the amount of loan loss
provisions based on the profit and loss account
(this sum on an accounting basis usually provides
an estimate of credit risk costs) as a percentage of
net interest income.
Finally, the position of the sample banks is exam-
ined in terms of liquidity. Ideally, liquidity should
reflect the adequacy of the credit institutions’ cur-
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 29  10/07 20rent and prospective sources of liquidity and fund
management practices. For the needs of the pre-
sent study, however, we used the standard net
loans (i.e. after loan loss provisions) to total assets
ratio to measure the ease with which banks can
liquidate their assets.
All of the aforementioned variables were directly
calculated using data from the banks’ financial
statements. More specifically, the sum of the net
interest income and non-interest income equals
profits, less overheads and loan loss provisions.
Changes in non-interest income, profit margins
and  overheads  affect  profits,  which  constitute
the residual variable in the banks’ financial state-
ments.
The indicator figures are presented in Tables 2, 3
and 4, and, in general, are characterised by inter-
nal consistency. The banks with lower net interest
margins and higher overhead costs (non-interest
expenses) typically have a lower ROA.
Tables 2 and 3 provide the average performance
indicators  separately  for  domestically-  and  for-
eign-owned  banks  over  the  period  1999-2004.
With  regard  to  the  domestically-owned  banks,
Serbia-Montenegro stands at one end of the spec-
trum, with the second highest net interest margin
after Romania. However, because of its particu-
larly high overhead costs, which are nearly double
the average of the other SEE countries, the advan-
tages  of  favourable  product  and  service  pricing
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Table 2
Summary profitability and risk measures (I: profitability – returns)
(End of year, 1999-2004 averages, percentages)
Note: Authors’ calculations. For Albania, the sample period is: 2000-2004. The total number of banks in the sample is as follows: Bulgaria 23, Romania 21, Croatia 23,
Albania 5, Bosnia-Herzegovina 11, FYROM 11, Serbia-Montenegro 7. For FYROM, the sample period for foreign banks is: 2001-2004. For Serbia-Montenegro,
the sample period for foreign banks is: 2002-2004. (*) 1999-2004, (**) 2001-2004.
Source: BankScope.
Domestic banks
Return on assets (ROA)   2.0 2.2 1.0 1.5 0.3 1.3 1.0
Return on equity (ROE) 12.8 12.0 9.7 54.3 1.5 6.9 3.4
Equity capital ratio 14.7 16.8 10.3 1.4 15.7 18.6 24.0
Profit margin 23.6 18.7 17.3 48.3 4.2 15.6 0.9
Asset utilisation  8.5 11.8 5.8 3.1 9.0 8.7 21.1
Foreign banks
Return on assets (ROA) 1.6 2.1 1.7 1.1 1.2 0.1 1.3
Return on equity (ROE) 11.2 13.5 16.9 11.7 10.2 -0.3 22.5
Equity capital ratio 13.8 15.1 9.6 10.8* 13.8 15.5 5.7**
Profit margin  22.3 20.5 26.2 21.5 12.0 0.4 18.2
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Table 3
Summary profitability and risk measures (II: efficiency)
(End of year, 1999-2004 averages, percentages)
Note: Authors’ calculations. For Albania, the sample period is: 2000-2004. For FYROM, the sample period for foreign banks is: 2001-2004. For Serbia-Montenegro, the
sample period for foreign banks is: 2002-2004.  
Source: BankScope.
Domestic banks
Net interest margin   6.4 10.5 3.9 2.7 5.5 6.0 8.0
Overhead costs 5.6 6.8 3.8 1.1 6.0 4.7 10.6
Efficiency ratio 66.158.2 66.2 36.5 66.8 55.5 55.2
Foreign banks 
Net interest margin  5.18.6 4.7 4.4 6.9 3.8 5.9
Overhead costs 5.16.2 3.8 2.9 6.6 4.7 5.3
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Table 4
Summary profitability and risk measures (III: Asset quality and liquidity)
(End of year, 1999-2004 averages, percentages)
Note: Authors’ calculations. For Albania, the sample period is: 2000-2004. For FYROM, the sample period for foreign banks is: 2001-2004. For Serbia-Montenegro, the




Loan loss reserves (LLR)
to gross loans   7.7 7.2 11.6 31.9 12.0 15.3 21.4
Loan loss provisioning (LLP) 
to net interest income  12.8 14.7 19.5 –0.1 50.2 65.2 123.8
Liquidity 
Net loans to total assets 39.7 31.6 44.7 0.9 43.9 37.6 42.9
B. Foreign banks
Asset quality
Loan loss reserves (LLR) 
to gross loans   6.14.2 8.6 6.5* 7.8 8.4 3.0**
Loan loss provisioning (LLP) 
to net interest income  3.6 10.2 21.3 41.4* 48.2 81.4 9.0**
Liquidity 




Herzegovina  Albania Croatia Romania Bulgariaare lost. As a result, the ROA is a mere 1.0% – the
second lowest ratio of all the SEE countries after
Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the other end of the spec-
trum  lies  Albania:  although  its  performance  in
terms of net interest margin is the poorest in the
region —either as a result of the competitive pric-
ing  conditions  in  Albania,  which  lead  to  lower
profits from interest bearing assets, or due to the
higher  costs  of  raising  capital—  the  country
nonetheless  enjoys  the  third  highest  ROA  after
Romania and Bulgaria, due to the fact that over-
head  costs  are  particularly  low  (the  indicator
stands at 1.1%, while the next best performance is
that of Croatia, at 3.8%).
Staying  on  the  subject  of  Albania,  particularly
interesting conclusions can be drawn from com-
paring domestic and foreign banks. Net interest
margins  are  much  higher  among  foreign  banks
(4.7%) than among domestic banks (2.7%), due to
the fact that it is cheaper for foreign banks to raise
funds than it is for their domestic counterparts,
since both categories will basically have the same
pricing policies. However, this does not mean that
foreign banks in Albania ultimately enjoy higher
profitability,12 since  their  better  performance  in
terms of net interest margins is more than offset
by the higher overhead costs indicator recorded
for foreign banks relative to their domestic coun-
terparts  (foreign  banks:  2.9%,  domestic  banks:
1.1%).13 This poorer performance of foreign banks
in  terms  of  overhead  costs  is  associated,  first,
with the fact that the time period under examina-
tion  was  one  where  most  of  the  foreign  banks
were just entering Albania and were, therefore,
faced  with  high  infrastructure  and  restructuring
costs when proceeding with acquisitions. Second,
the foreign banks were forced to pay considerably
higher  salaries  in  order  to  win  over  executives
from  their  domestically-owned  counterparts  or
from abroad. Foreign bank presence has, there-
fore,  clearly  enhanced  the  development  of
Albania’s domestic banking sector in a number of
ways: cheaper fund raising and fund inflows into
the country, competitive yield offers, the creation
of  new,  frequently  better  paid,  jobs,  and  high
infrastructure  investment.  From  a  macroeco-
nomic perspective, the combined outcome of all
these developments was an increase in domestic
consumption and investment and, consequently,
an increase in national income.
Of course, the high infrastructure and restructuring
expenses  initially  incurred  by  foreign  investors
when  acquiring  domestic  banks  make  it  difficult,
when limiting ourselves to the period covered by
the  present  study,  to  draw  definite  conclusions
about the efficiency of foreign banks. This explains
why,  in  most  instances  (except  for  Croatia  and
Bosnia-Herzegovina), the ratio of non-interest costs
to average total assets is higher for foreign banks
than it is for domestic ones.
Concerning portfolio quality indicators (see Table
4), foreign banks are clearly in a much better posi-
tion than their domestically-owned counterparts.
Reserves for loan loss provisions as a percentage
of gross loans are higher for domestic banks than
Foreign bank presence: the experience of South-East European countries
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 29  10/07 23
12 A factor widely commented on in the literature as a determi-
nant of profitability is bank size, which can affect profitability in a
number of ways, e.g. as a result of economies of scale and scope
or through oligopoly profits ensuing from a greater market share.
A further investigation of the correlation between bank size and
profitability  in  the  countries  under  examination  could  help
researchers interested in the role of foreign banks to statistically
isolate the bank size factor. 
13 The higher overhead costs borne by foreign banks are due, in
part, to the fact that the domestic credit institutions that were
acquired by foreign banks had particularly high overheads, chiefly
because of inflated staff levels. In fact, most of the acquisition
agreements reached contained explicit “no layoff” clauses. for foreign ones in all the SEE countries, implying
that foreign banks are far more certain to reap
future  profits.  The  ratio  of  provisions  for  loan
losses (recorded in the profit-loss accounts) to net
interest  income  is,  in  most  cases,  higher  for
domestic banks. This means that the credit risk
costs arising either from new loans or from nega-
tive developments associated with older loans are
higher for domestic banks, which explains why
the latter create higher reserves for such provi-
sions  on  their  balance  sheets.  Any  increase  in
“credit risk costs” implies that the return on inter-
est-bearing assets will not be sufficient to cover
the risk costs associated with these assets.14
Finally, it is worth noting that the net loans-to-
total assets ratio is higher for foreign banks in all
the SEE countries except for FYROM, indicating
that foreign banks have a stronger credit expan-
sion. In addition, the fact that foreign banks can
easily  secure  liquidity  from  their  parent  bank
abroad and can borrow at a lower cost from inter-
national capital markets because of their generally
higher international credit ratings means that it is
less imperative for them to hold a significant pro-
portion of their capital in liquid form.
5.3 Bank lending activity: Pattern comparisons
Lending patterns vary across domestically- and for-
eign-owned banks to the extent that there are cor-
responding differences in (i) bank lending motives
with respect to their customers; (ii) the quality of
bank balance sheets; and (iii) the banks’ sources of
loanable funds (see Dages et al., 2005, Crystal et
al.,  2002).  These  differences  can  influence  the
interest rate sensitivity of the loan supply and the
extent to which a bank expands or contracts lend-
ing in response to various local market signals. The
interest  rate  sensitivity  of  lending  is  likely  to  be
higher for banks with closer ties to international
capital markets and with wider access to profitable
investment  opportunities,  i.e.  banks  with  foreign
affiliates.  In  contrast,  state-owned  banks  are
expected to have the lowest interest rate sensitiv-
ity, since higher profitability is more of a motive for
private banks than it is for state-owned ones.
Lending  motives,  the  quality  of  bank  balance
sheets and the availability of loanable funds can
affect  bank  responsiveness  to  market  signals.
Analytically, through “transaction-based lending”,
improved economic conditions generate opportu-
nities for expanding production and investment.
Therefore,  bank  loans  expand  to  accommodate
part of this demand. Through “relationship lend-
ing”,  bank  lending  helps  established  customers
smooth over the effects of cyclical fluctuations on
consumption.  For  instance,  under  adverse  eco-
nomic conditions, lending expands to offset some
of the revenue shortfall of clients, whereas, under
favourable economic conditions, lending by banks
declines,  as  borrowers  pay  back  outstanding
loans. Therefore, “relationship lending” is coun-
tercyclical,  whereas  “transaction-based  lending”
is generally procyclical.
Healthy  foreign  bank  presence  fills  a  domestic
vacuum by providing finance for worthwhile local
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14 The above findings should be interpreted with caution. The
difference in the level of doubtful claims results from differences
in the distribution over time of older claims contained in the port-
folios of foreign and domestic banks, but is also affected by the
production of new loans. The foreign banks either set up direct
subsidiaries, which do not yet have mature portfolios close to the
“natural doubtful percentage”, or acquired domestic banks. In the
latter case, the low percentage of doubtful loans is an attractive
factor, since it entails less insecurity with regard to the true value
of net financial flows originating from the bank which is being
acquired.projects, since domestic banks, often due to their
more moderate performance and their difficulties
in raising loan capital, are not in a position to pro-
vide  adequate  funding.  Obviously,  the  more
heavily a bank relies on domestic deposits, the
more likely it is that domestic aggregate demand
shocks will lead to more volatile lending. Thus,
banks with narrower funding bases are, ceteris
paribus, more likely to present a greater degree of
lending cyclicality.
Finally,  the  quality of  bank  balance  sheets  can
influence bank responsiveness to market signals,
as banks focused on balance-sheet repair will con-
centrate  less  on  expanding  loan  availability  to
fund profitable investment plans and expand lend-
ing to meet increased total demand.
In this section, we will document some patterns
in bank lending activity across banks operating in
the SEE countries, focusing our investigation on
whether ownership per se may or may not be a
reason to expect differences in the lending pat-
terns of domestically- and foreign-owned banks.
The simple stylised facts we present provide fac-
tual evidence as to whether foreign banks have
deepened or diversified domestic loan supply and
whether or not easy access to lending has dimin-
ished the sensitivity of lending to market signals.
Diminished  sensitivity  means  less  bank  lending
volatility to local cycles.
Details  on  the  composition  of  bank  loans  by
owner type as a percentage of total bank lending
are presented in Table 5. It appears that foreign
banks are making robust efforts to increase their
share of the local market, while domestic banks
are  making  similarly  robust  efforts  to  maintain
their share. Generally, the strong presence of for-
eign banks is indicative of the significant role they
play in funding the local economy. Indeed, corpo-
rate and household credit from foreign banks has
increased  significantly  in  recent  years.  Between
1999 and 2004, foreign bank lending increased
two-fold  and  three-fold  in  Albania  and  Bosnia-
Herzegovina and as much as six-fold to nine-fold
in Bulgaria and Croatia, respectively. By contrast,
domestic bank lending decreased significantly.
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Table 5
Share of foreign banks in total lending by the sample banks, 1999-2004
(Percentages of total lending)
Note: Bank lending (loans and advances) to households and firms. Loans are net of loan-loss reserves. For Serbia-Montenegro and FYROM, the sample period is: 2001-
2004. 
Source: BankScope, bank balance sheets. 
1999  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.6 38.4 10.1 51.2 31.9 – –
2000  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28.4 44.7 40.188.9 32.2 – –
2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57.4 47.0 47.6 93.4 54.3 40.0 7.4
2002  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.5 45.0 48.4 97.5 75.9 40.4 9.9
2003  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67.0 48.2 81.7 98.1 86.6 47.6 20.2




Herzegovina  Albania  Croatia  Romania  Bulgaria  YearAnother  key  issue  is  whether  patterns  in  bank
loan issuance have become more stable over time
as foreign banks become more entrenched. Using
lending data from individual banks operating in SE
Europe,  we  computed  the  unweighted  and
weighted averages of net annual bank loan growth
rates (at constant prices). We also computed the
standard  deviation  of  the  loan  growth  rates
divided by their means. The unweighted numbers
reflect averages across banks. Namely, they mea-
sure  the  responsiveness  of  an  average  bank
regardless of its size. In contrast, the weighted
numbers measure differences between larger and
smaller banks. They reflect the overall availability
of loans from the respective categories of lenders
(domestically-  and  foreign-owned  lenders),  as
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Table 6
Average bank loan growth, 1999-2004
(Annual percentage changes, unweighted average across individual banks)
Note: The coefficient of variation is reported in parentheses. This relative measure of variability is defined as the ratio of standard deviation to the series’ mean.
Calculations use real balances of outstanding net loans of individual banks. Lending volumes are taken by deflating nominal values by the consumer price index
(CPI). For Serbia-Montenegro, the sample periods are 2002-2004 for foreign banks and 2000-2004 for domestic banks. For Albania, the sample period for for-
eign banks is: 2000-2004; only one of the five sample banks in Albania for which data were available was domestic. For FYROM, the sample periods are 2000-
2004 for domestic banks and 2001-2004 for foreign banks (in 2000 all of the FYROM sample banks were domestic). 
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on bank balance sheet data (BankScope). CPI data were obtained from the IMF and the central banks of Serbia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina (retail sales price index). 
A. Domestic banks
1999  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31.9 –26.2 –5.9 10.5 – –
(1.6) (–0.9) (–2.3) (3.4)
2000  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25.9 –18.5 –4.9 40.3 18.8 62.6
(3.5) (–0.9) (–2.8) (0.6) (0.9) (1.2)
2001  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79.6 –17.3 23.4 21.8 6.2 6.0
(1.5)  (–1.9)  (0.9)  (1.7)  (3.0)  (9.2)
2002  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37.6 157.7 37.7 46.6 37.6 57.2
(1.2) (3.1) (0.8) (0.4) (2.5) (1.5)
2003  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73.4 92.0 17.0 8.2 13.8 3.1
(0.5) (1.4) (0.3) (4.6) (2.2) (3.9)
2004  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37.5 37.6 9.6 12.1 47.1 16.7
(0.3) (1.3) (1.4) (1.3) (1.0) (1.4)
B. Foreign banks 
1999  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28.7 50.1 32.5 – 90.9 – –
(1.3) (1.4) (1.9) (0.8)
2000  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30.143.7 25.9 84.7 25.9 – –
(0.6) (2.8) (0.9) (0.3) (2.0)
2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33.3 3.4 42.2 9.8 84.4 5.3 –
(0.7) (13.7) (0.7) (2.4) (0.7) (6.3)
2002  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64.8 51.6 38.7 39.3 60.0 27.8 178.7
(0.9) (1.4) (0.6) (1.1) (1.1) (1.1) (0.8)
2003  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30.3 20.4 28.5 56.6 41.0 46.9 145.8
(1.0) (1.6) (1.4) (1.1) (0.7) (0.4) (0.5)
2004  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35.5 25.5 13.6 42.2 61.6 36.0 73.9




Herzegovina  Albania Croatia Romania Bulgaria Yearwell  as  bank  size.  The  results  are  presented  in
Tables  6  and  7.  The  domestically-owned  banks
exhibit relatively low average growth in loan port-
folios and high variability figures, whereas foreign
banks  generally  display  higher  and  less  volatile
real growth rates in lending volumes. The overall
picture does not change, either for foreign-owned
banks or their domestically-owned counterparts,
when the lending volumes are weighted by bank
size (see Table 7), i.e. foreign banks continue to
report higher and less volatile real loan growth
rates.  Furthermore,  when  comparing  the  loan
growth rates for each bank, one observes that the
larger  banks  have  more  loan  growth  than  the
smaller ones. The larger foreign banks show the
highest average loan growth.
Another  metric  of  lending  stability  controls  for
whether changes in loan volumes arise because of
differing responses to market signals, i.e. whether
changing  loan  volumes  might  be  random  and
whether  or  not  they  are  related  to  macroeco-
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Table 7
Average bank loan growth, 1999-2004
(Annual percentage changes, weighted averages across individual banks) 
Note: The coefficient of variation is reported in parentheses. Lending volumes are weighted by bank size, i.e. each bank’s share in the total loans of the sample banks.
See also note to Table 6.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on bank balance sheet data (BankScope). 
A. Domestic banks
1999  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 –1.7 –0.2 1.2 – –
(1.5) (–1.8) (–6.5) (2.9)
2000  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.7 –1.6 –0.1 4.2 1.6 14.3
(2.3) (–2.1) (–5.1) (0.6) (1.3) (1.7)
2001  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 –0.6 0.4 1.9 1.1 –2.9
(1.0)  (–2.5)  (1.5)  (1.7)  (2.1)  (–1.8)
2002  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 1.4 1.6 2.3 1.2 25.2
(1.6) (1.8) (1.9) (0.6) (1.3) (2.1)
2003  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 2.2 0.1 0.9 0.8 0.2
(0.8) (1.3) (1.1) (1.7) (1.8) (9.2)
2004  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.0 1.2 0.04 0.6 2.4 0.6
(1.5) (1.8) (1.8) (1.4) (0.8) (1.5)
B. Foreign banks 
1999  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 –0.1 2.0 – 5.6 – –
(1.4) (–29.9) (1.3) (0.4)
2000  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 –1.1 3.2 20.9 4.2 – –
(1.1) (–2.7) (1.4) (0.3) (1.9)
2001  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 –0.6 3.2 1.2 12.2 –1.7 –
(0.9) (–2.5) (1.2) (5.3) (1.7) (–3.1)
2002  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7 0.8 3.5 6.0 12.3 2.6 10.1
(1.0) (1.6) (1.2) (1.1) (1.1) (2.0) (1.0)
2003  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 0.9 2.9 11.2 5.6 6.2 17.9
(1.2) (1.9) (1.5) (0.9) (1.4) (0.7) (0.4)
2004  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 1.0 1.0 10.8 7.8 5.4 11.1




Herzegovina  Albania Croatia Romania Bulgaria Yearnomic fundamentals in the host country. Using
time-series  data  from  individual  bank  balance
sheets, we performed pooled time series regres-
sions  for  each  country  to  test  for  differences
across domestically- and foreign-owned banks in
loan  responsiveness  with  respect  to  real  GDP
growth rates. This responsiveness was estimated
alternately  using  unweighted  and  weighted
regressions.  The  weighted  regressions  make  it
possible to measure the total loan responsiveness
of a certain group of banks, thus enabling com-
parisons between larger- and smaller-sized banks.
The unweighted regressions, on the other hand,
measure the responsiveness of an average bank,
regardless of its size. The percentage change in
real net total loans (i.e. nominal loans deflated by
the  CPI)  was  regressed  against  the  percentage
change  in  real  GDP  and  bank-specific  fixed
effects. The purpose was to test for statistically
significant  differences  in  estimated  responses
across banks in relation to domestic and foreign
ownership on account of cyclical movements in
GDP. The results are summarised in Table 8.
In all the countries in the sample (namely, in four
of  the  seven  countries  in  the  region  for  which
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 29  10/07 28
Table 8
Bank loan sensitivity to GDP, 1999-2004
(Annual percentage changes) 
* statistically significant at the 5% level
** statistically significant at the 10% level
Note: T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions over the percentage change in real loans against the percentage change in real
GDP. Estimates of bank-specific fixed effects are not reported. Real GDP growth enters in the form of multiplicative dummy variables. The first dummy variable
takes a value of 1 in the case of a domestic-owned bank and 0 in other cases. The second dummy variable takes a value of 1 in the presence of a foreign-owned
bank. The last column reports the results of a Wald test used to verify whether the difference in the regression coefficients between domestic and foreign banks
was statistically significant.   
Sources: BankScope and EBRD. 
A. Unweighted elasticities
Bulgaria –6.267* –0.149 125 Different
(–2.135) (–0.030)
Romania 10.578** –6.488** 114 Different
(1.512) (–1.953)
Croatia 5.556* 5.373* 132 Same
(4.722) (3.453)
Bosnia-Herzegovina  –2.667** 6.267** 60 Different
(–1.867) (1.715)
B. Weighted elasticities
Bulgaria –0.199* –0.355 125 Different
(–2.480) (–1.245)
Romania 0.356* –0.220* 114 Different
(3.196) (–2.030)
Croatia 0.183* 0.503* 132 Same
(2.757) (3.645)
Bosnia-Herzegovina  –0.507 0.250 60 Same
(–1.143) (1.474)






banks Countriesthere was a satisfactory number of observations),
domestic  banks  were  shown  to  be  sensitive  to
GDP fluctuations. The coefficient of response is
statistically  significant  at  the  5%  or  10%  level.
More  specifically,  total  lending  in  Bulgaria  and
Bosnia-Herzegovina  has  been  countercyclical,
with a rise in real GDP growth by 1.0 percentage
point associated with a contraction of 6.0 and 3.0
percentage points respectively in bank lending by
the  average  domestic  bank,  and  with  a  much
smaller contraction in lending by larger banks. In
contrast, domestic bank lending in Romania and
Croatia  tends  to  be  procyclical,  driven  by  the
highly  procyclical  nature  of  “transaction-based
lending”.
As far as foreign banks are concerned, we found
that Bulgaria had a statistically insignificant coeffi-
cient of response, implying that changing lending
volumes  are  rather  random  and  unrelated  to
macroeconomic  fundamentals.  In  Romania,  for-
eign banks have a counter-cyclical pattern of lend-
ing, whereas in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina
foreign  bank  lending  has  been  procyclical.  The
hypothesis that both foreign and domestic banks
have identical lending responses to cyclical forces
can be accepted only in the case of Croatia, where
domestically- and foreign-owned banks appear to
be  similarly  reliant  on  sources  of  funds.  Even
though both types of banks exhibit credit cyclical-
ity in Romania and Bosnia-Herzegovina, they do
not respond similarly to market signals.
Overall, foreign-owned banks appear to present
greater, but less volatile, loan growth. However,
empirical  results  suggest  that  ownership  per  se
may not be a strong reason to expect differences
in the lending patterns of domestic and foreign
banks.
6. Concluding remarks
The purpose of this paper was to study the devel-
opment of the credit sector in the SEE countries
during  their  transition  to  a  market  economy.
Particular emphasis was given to the role played
by  foreign  banks  in  the  development  of  the
domestic banking systems. Our main conclusions
can be summarised as follows:
First, from the analysis we conducted based on
country-aggregated statistical data, we can con-
clude that the countries of SE Europe present sig-
nificant  differences  in  terms  of  banking  sector
development. Croatia, Bulgaria and Bosnia-Herze-
govina  have  the  most  developed  sectors.  Even
though the level of financial intermediation is at
least four times lower than in the euro area, all the
indicators used to measure the level of financial
development  show  a  steady  long-run  upward
trend.
Second, foreign banks have a significantly stron-
ger presence than their domestic counterparts in
terms of assets and network size.
Third, based on a comparative study of financial
indicators compiled using data from bank balance
sheets to measure performance and risk, foreign
banks were found to perform better in terms of
net interest margins, as they face lower fund rais-
ing costs. However, being subject to higher over-
head costs, they do not ultimately enjoy higher
profitability. Nonetheless, the presence of foreign
banks appears to have fostered the development
of the domestic banking market through cheaper
fund raising, greater expenditure on infrastructure
and competitive yield offers.
Foreign bank presence: the experience of South-East European countries
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 29  10/07 29Finally,  as  regards  bank  lending  patterns,  for-
eign  banks  generally  display  higher  and  less
volatile  real  growth  rates  in  lending  volumes.
However,  our  empirical  results  suggest  that
ownership  per  se is  not  a  strong  reason  to
expect differences either in lending patterns or
in  sensitivity  to  GDP  fluctuations  between
domestic and foreign banks. 
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Appendix
Data tables
Table A 1.   B u l g a r i a
Note: Alpha Bank’s branch in Albania is not included in the corresponding table because BankScope, our primary source of statistical bank-level information, does not
publish the accounts of all foreign bank branches. Alpha Bank AD Beograd and EFG Eurobank Beograd have been excluded from the sample because their finan-
cial statements are not published in accordance with international accounting standards. Vojvodjanska Banka has also been excluded because it had not been
part of the sample for the minimum required duration of three consecutive years.  
Sources: (for all Appendix tables): Bank balance sheets, national central banks and BankScope. 
Foreign participation (%)/year of































Foreign/Bank Austria Creditanstalt, member
of UniCredit Group






Foreign/EFG Eurobank Ergasias SA, Greece
Foreign/UniCredit Group, Italy 
Foreign/Alpha Bank, Greece




1. Bulgarian-American Credit Bank
2. United Bulgarian Bank-UBB
3. UnionBank Commercial Bank AD
4. Société Générale Expressbank 
5. Raiffeisenbank (Bulgaria) EAD
6. Piraeus Bank Bulgaria AD
7. Municipal Bank Plc
8. Investbank Bulgaria 
9. International Asset Bank AD
10. ING Bank NV
11. HVB Bank Biochim ad 
12. Hebros Bank 
13. First Investment Bank 
14. Emporiki Bank-Bulgaria EAD
15. DZI Bank AD
16. DSK Bank Plc
17. Commercial Bank Allianz Bulgaria AD
18. Bulgaria Post Bank JSC
19. Bulbank AD
20. Alpha Bank 
21. D Commerce Bank AD 
22. Corporate Commercial Bank AD
23. Nasarchitelna Banka-Encouragement 
Bank AD
Table A2. Romania
Foreign participation(%)/year of 


















Foreign/Piraeus Bank Group, Greece
Foreign/ Emporiki Bank, Greece
Foreign/Banca CR Firenze, Italy
Foreign/Roberts Family, USA
Foreign/Unicredito Italiano Spa, Italy
Foreign/OTP Bank, Hungary
Foreign/Sanaolo IMI Group, Italy












Foreign/foreign investors from Italy, Germany
and Belgium
Foreign/Alpha Bank, Greece
Foreign/ABN Ambro Bank, Netherlands
1. Piraeus Bank Romania 
2. Emporiki Bank Romania SA
3. Banca CR Firenze Romania SA
4. Romanian International Bank SA
5. UniCredit Romania SA
6. OTP Bank Romania SA
7. Sanpaolo IMI Bank Romania SA
8. Citibank Romania SA
9. Finansbank (Romania) SA
10. Romanian Savings Bank
11. BRD-Groupe Société Générale SA
12. Bancpost SA
13. Banca Transilvania SA
14. Banca Tiriac-Commercial Bank Ion Tiriac
15. Banca Romaneasca SA
16. Romanian Bank for Economic Revival
17. Banca de Credit si Dezvoltare 
Romexterra SA
18. Romanian Commercial Bank SA
19. Banca Comerciala Carpatica SA
20. Alpha Bank Romania 
21. ABN Ambro Bank Romania SAECONOMIC BULLETIN, 29  10/07 32
Table A3. Croatia
Foreign participation (%)/year of















Foreign/Unicredito Italiano Spa, Italy
Domestic
Domestic




Foreign/Hypo Alpe-Adria Bank, Austria 
Domestic 
Domestic
Foreign/Adria Consulting SRL, Italy





Foreign/Bank Austria Creditanstalt, Société
Générale 
Foreign/Hypo Group Alpe-Adria, Austria
Domestic
Foreign/Raiffeisenbank, Austria
Foreign/Banca Commerciale Italiana, Italy
Domestic
1. Jadranska Banka dd
2. Zagrebacka Banka dd
3. Credo Banka dd Split
4. Centar Banka dd
5. Gospodarsko Kreditna Banka dd Zagreb
6. Hrvatska Postanska Bank DD
7. Istarska Kreditna Bank Umag d.d.
8. Erste & Steiermarkische Bank dd
9. Hypo Alpe-Adria-Bank dd 
10. Karlovacka Banka d.d.
11. Kreditna Banka Zagreb
12. Kvarner Banka dd
13. Medimurska Banka dd
14. Nava Banka dd
15. OTP Banka Hrvatska dd
16. Partner Banka dd
17. StedBanka d.d. 
18. Splitska Banka dd
19. Slavonska Bank add, Osijek
20. Slatinska banka dd
21. Raiffeisenbank Austria dd Zagreb
22. Privredna Banka Zagreb Group
23. Podravska Banka
Table A 5 .   FYROM
Foreign participation (%)/year of

















1. Alpha Bank AD Skopje
2. Tutunska Banka A.D. Skopje
3. Stopanska Banka a.d. Skopje
4. Ohridska Banka ad Ohrid 
5. Makedonska Banka za poddrshka na
razvojot AD
6. Komercijalna Banka A.D. Skopje
7. Investbanka A.D. 
8. Internacionalna Privatna Banka a.d. 
9. Export & Credit Bank Inc-Izvozna I
Kreditna Banka AD
10. Radobank 
11. Stopanska Banka Ad, Bitola
Table A6. Bosnia-Herzegovina
Foreign participation (%)/year of







Foreign/UniCredito Italiano SpA, Italy
Foreign/T. C. Ziraat Bankasi
Foreign/Raiffeisenbank d.d., Austria
Foreign/ProCredit Holding AG, Germany
1. Upi Banka dd Sarajevo
2. Union Bank Sarajevo
3. Unicredit Zagrebacka Banka BH dd
4. Turkish Ziraat Bank Bosnia
5. Raiffeisenbank d.d. BH
6. ProCredit Bank (B&H)
Table A4. Albania
Foreign participation(%)/year of 






Foreign/Calik Seker Consortium, Turkey
Foreign/Raiffeisenbank, Austria
Foreign/Piraeus Bank, Greece
Foreign/Capitalia Spa, Italy, EBRD
Foreign/Procredit Holding, KfW, FEFAD,
Germany
1. National Commercial Bank-Banka
Kombetare Tregtare
2. Raiffeisenbank, Albania 
3. Banka e Tiranes Sha-Tirana Bank SA
4. Banco Italo Albanese
5. ProCredit Bank (Albania) Sh.AForeign bank presence: the experience of South-East European countries
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Table A6. Bosnia-Herzegovina (continued)
Foreign participation (%)/year of





Foreign/Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG, 
Austria
Foreign/NLB DD, Slovenia
Foreign/HypoAlpe-Adria Bank International 
AG-Hypo Alpe-Adria-Group, Austria
Foreign/Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG, Austria
Domestic
7. Nova banjalucka banka AD, Banja Luka
8. NLB Tuzlanska Banka d.d.
9. Hypo Alpe-Adria-Bank a.d., Mostar
10. HVB Central Profit Banka dd
11. Gospodarska Banka dd Sarajevo
Table A7. Serbia-Montenegro
Foreign participation (%)/year of




ProCredit Holding (Germany), 
Kommerzbank (Germany), EBRD (UK),
FMO (Netherlands), IFC (USA), 
KfW (Germany)
ProCredit Holding (Germany), Kommerzbank
(Germany), EBRD (UK), FMO 
(Netherlands), IFC (USA), KfW (Germany)
Domestic 




1. ProCredit Bank Serbia
2. ProCredit Bank Kosovo
3. Srpska banka ad
4. Piraeus-Atlas Banka ad Beograd 
5. Kulska Banka
6. Komercijalna Banka ad Beograd
7. Erste Bank ad Novi SadReferences 
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1. Introduction and conclusions
Introduction
Every year a number of young people leave educa-
tion1 and enter the labour market.2 Due, however,
to the difficulties youths encounter in finding a job,
as  manifested  by  inter  alia  the  length  of  time
needed for this transition together with the fact that
some young people are not economically active,
the youth labour force participation rate is low.3
The  fact  that  around  21%  of  individuals  who
graduated  from  upper  secondary  school  in
2001, and did not go on to further education,4
had not been employed until 2006 is indicative
of the length of the transition from education to
the labour market.5 The high youth (15-29 years
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* This paper reflects the views of the author and not necessarily
those of the Bank of Greece. The valuable comments of Professor
I.  Papadakis,  H.  Gibson,  K.  Kanellopoulos  and  I.  Sabethai  are
gratefully acknowledged. Thanks are also due to S. Zachariou, of
the NSSG, for his help with the LFS data. Any errors and omissions
remain the author's responsibility.
1 A description of the education system in Greece, as it stood in
2003, with reference to the points of exit to the labour market is
provided in a report of the Education Research Centre (2003).
2 For men over 18 years old it might be better to use the date at
which military service has been served as the point of entry into the
labour market. Such data are, however, not in general available.
3 According to the 2006 Labour Force Survey (LFS), around 72.7
thousand  15-29  year  olds  entered  the  labour  market  (either  in
employment or looking for a job). A further 26.5 thousand 15-29
year olds (14.5 thousand men and 12 thousand women) were not
economically active despite the fact that they were not studying.
4 It is possible that some of these individuals did proceed to fur-
ther education in the period 2001-2005 without completing their
studies. With the available information we cannot tell what per-
centage of individuals falls in this category, but, in any case, the
figures presented here do not include individuals who were study-
ing in 2005 or 2006.
5 This percentage was 10.7% for men and 32.1% for women. Table
A1 in the Appendix presents the percentages of men and women
who graduated from upper secondary school in 2000 and, although
they did not proceed to further studies, had not yet started working
in the years 2003-6. Figures are presented from 2003 onwards to
avoid overestimation of the length of the transition due to the oblig-
ation of Greek men to serve their military duty.old) unemployment rate (17.8% in the 2nd quar-
ter in 2006) together with the fact that a signifi-
cant proportion of the unemployed in this age
group have no work experience (57.2% in the
2nd quarter of 2006) is also indicative of the
length of the transition from education to the
labour market.
Alternatively, as evidence of the difficulty of find-
ing a job, one could refer to direct estimates of
this length of time, although the available esti-
mates differ significantly depending on the pre-
cise  definitions  followed  and  the  data used.
OECD estimates for 1996 suggest that in Greece
the average number of years that elapse between
the minimum age of completion of compulsory
education (14.5 years old) and the age according
to which, on the basis of the LFS, 50% of the pop-
ulation  is  employed  (23  years  of  age)  was  8.5
years.  The  average  estimate  for  other  OECD
countries was 7.4 years (OECD, 2000). This esti-
mate, however, does not take into account the
point in time in which youth actually complete
their education. More recent estimates for EU-15
countries by Quintini et al. (2007), again on the
basis of LFS data, show that in Greece the aver-
age length of time between the age in which half
of the population of 15-29 year olds complete
their education and the age by which half of the
population of this age group is working was 37.9
months  (3.2  years)  in  1997  compared  to  28
months (2.3 years) in other EU-15 countries. In
2005, this interval narrowed to 20.5 months (1.7
years) in Greece compared to 25.9 months (2.2
years) in other EU-15 countries.6
Young people themselves claim that the main rea-
son for which they cannot find employment is the
unavailability  of  jobs.7 In  other  words,  they
attribute the high youth unemployment rate to the
high overall unemployment rate. As Chart 1 sug-
gests, the youth unemployment rate is at a much
higher  level than  the  overall  unemployment  rate
but is in general closely correlated with it, although
the gap between the two rates varies over time.8
Firms, on the other hand, point to some mismatch
between the specific skills in demand and those
available.  Employers  are  looking  to  hire  young
individuals with communication and team-work-
ing  skills,  familiar  with  new  technologies,  with
sound knowledge of their subject and the ability
to acquire and apply new skills.9
A  couple  of  features  distinguish  younger  from
older individuals: (a) they have less professional
experience,  and  (b)  they  exhibit  higher  job
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6 Alternative  estimates  by  Quintini  et  al. (2007),  using  the
European Community Household Panel (ECHP), suggest that in
Greece in the period 1994-2000 the average length of time to
find a job was 21.3 months. The period for finding a job with an
indefinite length contract, however, was much longer, amounting
to 51.5 months. For 11 EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, UK) the
average length of time for the transition to a job (a job with an
indefinite  length  contract)  was  21.8  months  (39.6  months).
Excluding Spain, for which the respective figures are exception-
ally high, the average length of time for the other 10 countries
stood  at  20.6  months  and  37.9  months,  respectively.  The
authors, however, state that, due to the small size of the ECHP
sample, not too much emphasis should be given to the point esti-
mates for individual countries. The ranking of countries accord-
ing to this transition period, however, does provide some useful
information.
7 Eurobarometer  Special  Survey  on  Youth  2007 (Gallup
Organization, 2007). See Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix for
certain results from the survey.
8 The start of the period is determined by data availability; the
unemployment rate series contains breaks prior to 1983.
9 See SEV (2004) for the results of a survey conducted in the sec-
ond quarter of 2004 with a sample of 374, mostly manufacturing,
firms. The results of the survey suggest dissatisfaction of firms
with the education system because it does not equip young indi-
viduals with the knowledge and skills required. Basic cognitive
skills, such as for example following instructions and performing
simple  calculations,  are  becoming  increasingly  important  for
employee productivity and wage determination (see, inter alia,
Murnane, Willett and Levy, 1995).turnover. The question is whether the education
system can make up for these differences.10
The  present  study  defines  individuals  aged
between 15-29 as young.11 The lower limit of 15
years  of  age  is  set  by  the  legal  employment
age,12 while the upper limit of 29 years was cho-
sen since a high percentage of individuals aged
between 25 and 29 years old are still not eco-
nomically active because they are studying.13,14
While all individuals in this age group are con-
sidered as young in the present study, the group
is still not homogeneous; for this reason the evi-
dence presented next is analysed, where possi-
ble, further by 5-year age groups (15-19, 20-24
and 25-29 years old). In the rest of the docu-
ment, and following common practice and the
relevant European Council Directive,15 individu-
als younger than 15 years old are classified as
children, while individuals between 15 and 18
years as teenagers.
The  present  study  attempts  to  document  and
explain developments regarding young persons’
labour market and education activities using data
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10 Young people, however, are usually more eager to work, and
adapt easier to changes in technology. The extent to which these
features can compensate for their lower work experience depends
on inter alia the job, the ability of managers to exploit these advan-
tages and each individual's personality etc.
11 The definition of juveniles is contained in the first article of
Law 1837/1989 and the International Convention for childrens’
rights, ratified by Law 2101/1992.
12 See Law 1837/1989 (Article 2).
13 According to the 2001 Population Census, around 4% of 25-
29 year olds were studying. This percentage might have increased
since 2001 given that according to the LFS survey in the second
quarter of 2006 this stood at 5.5% compared to 4.7% in the 2nd
quarter of 2001.
14 Furthermore, many of the measures that have been applied in
the  context  of  active  and  passive  labour  market  policies  are
addressed to individuals up to 29 years of age (for example unem-
ployment  assistance  benefit  to  long-term  unemployed  20-29
years old with no previous work experience, special programmes
to enhance employability of unemployed young individuals up to
30 years old etc.).
15 See Council Directive 94/33/22.06.1994 on the protection of
young people at work, as incorporated into national law through
Presidential  Decree  62/1998  (“Measures  for  the  protection  of
young  people  at  work  in  compliance  with  Council  Directive
94/33”).from  mainly  4  sources:  (a)  Population  Census, 
(b) the Labour Force Survey (LFS), (c) the 2000 Ad
Hoc LFS on the “Transition from education to the
labour market” and (d) the 1995 and 2002 Structure
of Earnings Surveys.16
More specifically, the study attempts:
First, to investigate how the macroeconomic envi-
ronment and the industrial composition of eco-
nomic  activity  influence  the  choices  of  youth
regarding their decisions to participate in educa-
tion and the labour market.
Second, to  outline  which  institutional  factors
impact on labour demand and supply.
Third, to locate factors (e.g. education level, field
of study, labour market conditions etc.) which dif-
ferentiate the length of time required to find a job
among young persons.
Fourth, to document possible recent changes in
the relative cost of employing youth.
The remainder of this study is structured as fol-
lows:  the  next  section  looks  at  developments
regarding  youth  activities  over  time  in  Greece
and compares these to developments in the EU-
15. The third section investigates the length of
the transition from education to the labour mar-
ket  and  seeks  to  identify  factors  that  could
explain  divergences  between  individuals  as  to
the length of this transition. The fourth section
looks at the determinants of the cost of employ-
ing youths, age-earnings profiles and changes in
these over time. The last section summarises the
findings  and  suggests  issues  that  need  further
research.
Conclusions
Analysis  of  the  data  suggests  that  the  gap
between youth and adult unemployment is not
a  recent  phenomenon  in  Greece.  The  youth
unemployment  rate  during  the  post-1983
period  has  been  on  average  around  4  times
higher than that for individuals over 30 years
old. As the unemployment rate for those over
30  increased,  the  youth  unemployment  rate
reached  extremely  high  levels,  around  24%,
towards the end of the 1990s. The high youth
unemployment rate in Greece does not reflect
the frequent movement of individuals between
jobs; to the contrary, as is clear from the twin
facts of the high unemployment rate and the
high share of young unemployed without previ-
ous work experience, it is an indication of the
prolonged transition period from education to
the labour market.
The  data  suggest  two  distinctions  in  the  youth
population: by gender and by urbanity; the unem-
ployment  rate  of  young  women  is  significantly
higher than that of young men, and the unem-
ployment rate for women is even higher in rural
compared to urban areas.
The  decrease  in  the  total  unemployment  rate
since the end of the 1990s has been accompanied
by  an  improvement  of  the  relative  position  of
young individuals, perhaps because of the growth
of sectors (e.g. retail trade, hotels and restaurants)
in which they are primarily employed.
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 29  10/07 40
16 Some information on the last two sources is presented in the
third and fourth section of the present study and in the Appendix,
while  a  more  detailed  description  can  be  found  at  the  National
Statistical Service of Greece website (www.statistics.gr).Inspection  of  the  data  suggests  a  long-term
increase in the number of students. This is attrib-
utable  to  the  expectation  of  higher  wages;  the
lower probability of unemployment incidence for
individuals with higher education level; and the
lower opportunity cost of studying during periods
of high unemployment.
However, the increased enrolment in education
will lead to productivity improvements only if
individuals are subsequently employed produc-
tively.  The  paradox  is  that  even  in  2006,  and
despite the significant improvement in the level
of  youth  education17 and  the  decrease  in  the
unemployment rate of this age group, this rate
is still around three times that of those older
than 30, perhaps because the skills and qualifi-
cations  demanded  in  the  labour  market  have
been upgraded at an even faster rate than the
skills supplied. It is indicative that the available
wage data suggest that the relative earnings of
older individuals rise at an increasing rate com-
pared to the past, indicating that perhaps the
labour  market  attributes  more  importance  to
work experience.
Differences  between  young  individuals  in  the
length of the transition process are related to,
inter alia, the degree of urbanisation and the
level of education. The type of tertiary educa-
tion institution attended (Universities, Techno-
logical  Institutes)  and  the  field of  study  also
appear to make a difference. In particular, the
transition  period  is  shorter  for  graduates  of
schools where the content of studies is geared
towards  labour  market  participation.  Macro-
economic conditions have, as expected, a role
in explaining differences over time in the length
of the transition process.
Compared  to  the  EU-15,  it  appears  that  youth
employment rates in Greece are at a lower level,
particularly  because  of  the  lower  employment
rate of men and women in the 15-19 age group,
and even more so because of the lower employ-
ment rate of women in all age subgroups. The low
participation rate of 15-19 year olds is not related
to  the  age  limit  above  which  employment  is
allowed, or to the age at which young individuals
can leave education, since these limits are stricter
in most EU-15 countries compared to the respec-
tive limits in Greece.
The higher youth employment rate in the EU-15 is
not at the expense of their education, since a very
high percentage among them work and study at
the same time. In this way they gain work experi-
ence, which facilitates their transition from edu-
cation to the labour market.
2. Youth activities by gender and over time
In 2001 in Greece 48% (35%) of 15-29 year old
men  (women)  were  employed,  around  32%
(35%) were studying, while the remainder (30%)
were  unemployed  or  not  economically  active.
These  percentages  differ  substantially  between
the  5-year  age  subgroups  which  make  up  the
group of 15-29 year olds, while they also differ
further according to the degree of urbanisation of
the area of residence and have changed substan-
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17 According to Eurostat (2007), in 2005 the difference between the
percentage of 20-24 year olds who had completed upper secondary
education and the percentage of 25-64 year olds who had completed
upper secondary education was the largest in Greece compared to
all other EU-15 countries (Greece: 60.0% of individuals 25-64 years
old had completed upper secondary education, 84.1% for individu-
als 20-24 years old; EU-15 excluding Greece: 67.2% for individuals
25-64 years old, 76.4% for individuals 20-24 years old).tially  over  time.18 Institutional  as  well  as  eco-
nomic  and  social  factors  shape  participation,
employment,  unemployment  and  education
enrolment rates. Institutional factors include the
length  of  compulsory  education,  the  minimum
age  for  juvenile  employment,  the  existence  or
otherwise of youth sub-minimum wages, and the
recognition  of  occupational  rights.  Unemploy-
ment benefits are unlikely to deter labour market
participation of youth in Greece, as might be the
case in other countries e.g. Belgium19, since sig-
nificant  work  experience  in  the  previous  two
years prior to applying for the benefit is a prereq-
uisite for the payment of the unemployment bene-
fit.20,21 Macroeconomic performance, the indus-
trial composition of youth employment, and the
opportunity cost of not working are among the
economic factors. Social factors, which are how-
ever not investigated here, include issues such as
the extent of gender discrimination.
Tables  1-4,  around  which  this  section  evolves,
present  data  which  permit  the  investigation  of
long-term developments of labour market partici-
pation  and  enrolment  in  education.  Develop-
ments  reflect  the  factors  mentioned  above  but
also the ageing of individuals. More specifically,
Tables 1-4 present (on the basis of the 4 dicennial
population censuses in the period 1971-2001) the
participation,  employment  and  unemployment
rates as well as the education enrolment rates for
8 different cohorts,22 made up of individuals born
in 9 different 5-year periods in the period 1942-
86.23 In the remainder of this study the participa-
tion  and  employment  rates  are  defined  as  the
ratio of the labour force (employed and unem-
ployed) over the population and as the ratio of the
employed  to  the  population  respectively.  The
unemployment rate is defined as the ratio of the
number of unemployed to the labour force, and
finally the education enrolment rate is defined as
the proportion of students in the population.
The  following  main  conclusions  can  be  drawn
from Tables 1-4:
(a) The participation rate increases as individuals
grow older (see Table 1). This development mainly
reflects the completion of studies and family for-
mation, while for women the increased rate also
reflects a cohort effect due to a number of reasons
such as the equalisation of minimum wages across
genders,  the  growth  of  the  services’  sector,  in
which women are mainly employed etc. Deviations
from this trend, as, for example, the decline in the
participation rate of men aged 35-39 years old in
1991 from 97.4% in that year to 91.1% a decade
later, when these individuals were 45-49 years old,
could  be  a  reflection  of  the  specific  macroeco-
nomic conditions prevailing at the time.
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18 Tables A4-A6 in the Appendix give detailed information on
youth  participation,  employment  and  unemployment  rates  (by
gender and degree of urbanisation of the area of residence) for the
period 1971-2001.
19 See, inter alia, OECD, 2007d, for information on the impact of
regulations governing the payment of the unemployment benefit
on the transition from school to work in Belgium.
20 The  monthly  benefit  of  €73.4,  which,  according  to  Law
1545/1985, is awarded for 5 months to long-term unemployed
aged 20-29 with no previous work experience cannot be thought
of as deterring labour supply, due to its low level and the short
time period over which it is paid.
21 Being  registered  as  unemployed  for  a  period  of  over  18
months, however, gives one an edge when applying for a public
sector job.
22 The cohort here refers to individuals born in the same five-
year period. In particular, individuals born in the period 1942-46
constitute one cohort, whose members were aged 25-29 in 1971,
those  born  in  the  5-year  interval  1947-51  constitute  a  second
cohort, whose members were 20-24 years old in 1971 etc.
23 Karamessini (2006) also investigates the transition from edu-
cation to the labour market, but defines cohorts on the basis of
the year in which individuals complete their studies. This infor-
mation,  however,  is  only  available  through  the  Labour  Force
Survey (LFS) after 1999 and thus does not permit the study of
longer-term trends.In contrast to the increased participation rate that
comes  about  as  individuals  grow  older,  the
breakdown by age group suggests that the male
participation rate within each age group is on a
declining trend (e.g. the participation rate of men
aged  20-24  was  76.2%  in  1971,  while  for  the
same age group the participation rate was just
66.6% in 2001). This change reflects, on the one
hand, the increase in the number of students in
the same age group (see Table 4), and, on the
other  hand,  the  increase  in  the  percentage  of
men  who  are  not  economically  active.  For
women, however, the participation rate in each
age  subgroup,  with  the  exception  of  women
aged 15 to 19, increased over time despite the
increase in the number of students.
Notwithstanding the increased enrolment in edu-
cation, which no doubt was the most important
factor contributing to the decline in the participa-
tion of 15-19 year olds, another factor that might
have contributed to this decline is the increase in
the age limit above which employment is permissi-
ble.  From  1989  onwards,  according  to  Law
1837/1989, the age limit above which employment
is permitted is in general 15 years of age.24 Until
then,  in  most  jobs,  employment  was  permitted
above the age of 14, with the exception of certain
jobs for which employment of children aged 12-14
was allowed provided the children had completed
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24 There are certain jobs, however, in which due to health and
safety concerns the minimum age limit is 18 years of age.
Table 1
Labour market participation rate (%)1 by cohort,2 1971-2001
1 The labour market participation rate is defined as the ratio of the labour force (employed and unemployed) over the total population.
2 The participation rate for the age group indicated on the top-left hand side corner is presented in bold in a census year.  For example, in 1971 the participation rate
of 25-29 year old men was 93.0%, while in 2001 this rate for the same age group (not the same individuals) was 90.0%.  The participation rates for each cohort as
this grows older are presented in regular fonts; e.g. in 1971, 93.0% of men aged between 25 and 29 years old participated in the labour market, while a decade later
the participation rate of these individuals, then aged between 35-39 years old, had increased to 97.8%.
Source: NSSG, Population Censuses, 1971-2001.
15-19  1952-56 1962-66 1972-76 1982-86 15-19  1952-56 1962-66 1972-76 1982-86
1971 51.4 1971 28.7
1981 95.0 37.7 1981 37.7 23.3
1991 97.4 94.6 25.4 1991 48.4 54.5 17.4
2001 91.1 94.9 90.0 19.5 2001 51.5 62.0 67.0 11.8
20-24  1947-51 1957-61 1967-71 1977-81 20-24  1947-51 1957-61 1967-71 1977-81
1971 76.2 1971 37.1
1981 97.8 71.5 1981 33.7 39.3
1991 96.3 97.4 75.6 1991 40.8 51.3 48.8
2001 83.6 93.1 94.8 66.6 2001 39.8 58.4 64.3 52.1
25-29  1942-46 1952-56 1962-66 1972-76 25-29  1942-46 1952-56 1962-66 1972-76
1971 93.0 1971 32.7
1981 97.8 95.0 1981 31.0 37.7
1991 93.4 97.4 94.6 1991 33.3 48.4 54.5
2001 68.5 91.1 94.9 90.0 2001 26.0 51.5 62.0 67.0
Women
Year of birth Age Age Year of birth
Menprimary school (see, Dimitrakopoulos, 1981). Law
1837/1989  also  restricts  the  number  of  hours
which school-attending individuals over 15 years
can work for; individuals younger than 18 cannot
work for more than 6 hours per day and 30 hours
per  week.25 The  employment  of  individuals
younger than 15 years old is permitted only in fam-
ily businesses in the primary sector or in non-fam-
ily businesses related to artistic activities. In any
case, for all individuals younger than 18 years of
age overtime and night work (between 10:00 pm
and  6:00  am)  is  prohibited.26 Although  the  data
reported in this study only refer to the population
aged  15  years  and  older,  it  is  possible  that  the
changes in the legislation could have affected those
close to 15 years of age.
In Greece, the legal working age is lower than
that  in  most  other  EU-15  countries,  since  in
most other countries compulsory education has
not been completed at this age (see European
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and
Working  Conditions,  2007a).27 In  other  coun-
tries, children aged 15 are allowed to work only
in  very  specific  jobs  (e.g.  newspaper  distribu-
tion)  or  during  school  vacations.  In  any  case,
although legislation is more lax in Greece than in
most EU-15 countries, the participation rate of
individuals aged 15-19 is lower in Greece (10.2%
in Greece, 27.3% in EU-15).
Despite the prevailing legislation, there is still evi-
dence of illegal child work in most countries (ILO,
2002).  Even  though  the  quantification  of  illegal
child labour is difficult, there is some ad hoc evi-
dence that in the last few years the number of
children working illegally has increased both in
Greece and in other European countries in which
there was a significant inflow of migrants.
(b) For all birth cohorts the employment prospects
of  youth  in  the  labour  market  improve  as  they
become older. Indicatively, the employment rate of
men (women) in the 1972-6 birth cohort increased
from  19.0%  (9.9%)  in  1991  (when  they  were
between 15 and 19 yeas old) to 78.2% (56.2%) in
2001 (when the same individuals were between 25
and 29 years old). Similar changes are documented
for individuals in all birth cohorts. This improve-
ment  reflects  the  completion  of  studies  and  the
lower unemployment rate for 25-29 year olds com-
pared to 15-19 year olds.
The male employment rate for every age sub-group
was on a downward trend during the period 1971-
2001. The decline in primary sector activity con-
tributed to this downward trend for 20-29 year olds
(see Table A6 in the Appendix, which shows that
the decline in the employment rate of 20-24 year
olds was much more pronounced in rural areas).
Thus, while in 1971 the male employment rate of
20-24  year  olds  was  71.7%,  in  2001  this  had
declined to 50.2%. On the contrary, the employ-
ment rate of 20-24 year old women increased from
34.8% in 1971 to 38.1% in 2001, while the increase
for 25-29 year olds was even larger (31.6% in 1971
to 56.2% in 2001).
For  the  youngest  individuals  (both  men  and
women), i.e. those aged between 15 and 19, the
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25 See Article 2 of Law 1837/1989 “On the protection of youth at
work and other provisions”.
26 See Presidential Decree 62/1998 “Measures on the protection
of youth at work in accordance to European Council Directive
94/33”. More specifically, paragraph 6 of article 3 deals with over-
time work, while article 8 deals with night work.
27 According to European Council Directive 94/33, Member States
“...shall ensure, under the conditions laid down by this Directive,
that the minimum working or employment age is not lower than
either the minimum age at which compulsory full-time schooling as
imposed by national law ends or 15 years in any event.”employment rate declined significantly during the
period 1971-2001, a development due mainly to
the increased enrolment in education, as can be
seen from the increase in the unemployment rate
(see Table 3)28 and the change in the percentage of
the student population (see Table 4).
In  comparison  with  other  EU-15  countries,  the
employment rate in Greece is significantly lower
for  15-24  year  old  men,  while  for  women  the
employment rate is lower in all ages, although the
gap for women aged 25-29 years old is relatively
narrow  (see  Table  5).  Note  also  that,  while  the
female  employment  rate  is  lower  than  the  male
employment rate in all EU-15 countries, the gender
employment gap is substantially wider in Greece.
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Table 2
Employment rate (%)1 by cohort,2 1971-2001
1 The employment rate is defined as the ratio of the number of individuals employed to the population.
2 See footnote 2 to Table 1.
Source: NSSG, Population Censuses, 1971-2001.
15-19  1952-56 1962-66 1972-76 1982-86 15-19  1952-56 1962-66 1972-76 1982-86
1971 48.0 1971 26.1
1981 89.5 32.2 1981 35.6 18.2
1991 94.3 85.7 19.0 1991 45.7 46.9 9.9
2001 86.6 88.6 78.2 11.1 2001 47.6 56.5 56.2 6.0
20-24  1947-51 1957-61 1967-71 1977-81 20-24  1947-51 1957-61 1967-71 1977-81
1971 71.7 1971 34.8
1981 95.2 62.1 1981 32.7 33.4
1991 93.7 92.7 61.2 1991 25.2 39.0 35.4
2001 78.7 88.6 87.0 50.2 2001 36.4 53.7 56.9 38.1
25-29  1942-46 1952-56 1962-66 1972-76 25-29  1942-46 1952-56 1962-66 1972-76
1971 90.1 1971 31.6
1981 95.9 89.5 1981 30.4 35.6
1991 90.9 94.3 85.7 1991 31.9 45.7 46.9
2001 63.3 86.6 88.6 78.2 2001 23.6 47.6 56.5 56.2
Women
Year of birth Age Age Year of birth
Men
28 The  decline  in  the  employment  rate  cannot  be  attributed  to
demographic developments (i.e. to an increase in the population of
this age group) given that the share of the population aged 15-19 has
decreased over time (see Table A10 in the Appendix and Bagavos,
1997). In a number of countries the decline in the employment rate
in  the  1970s  and  1980s  was  explained  through, inter  alia,  the
increase in the size of youth population due to the rise in the birth
rate  following  WWII  and  up  to  1965  (see  Freeman,  1979).
Individuals born in this period who turned 18 in the period 1960-80
entered gradually in the labour market increasing youth labour sup-
ply. In Greece, however, there was no similar development. The
number of births from the mid-1950s was significantly lower than in
the 1930s, while from 1955 and until the end of the 1970s the birth
rate did not change much. From the beginning of the 1980s the num-
ber of births is declining but this has not as yet shown up as a decline
in the total number of 15-29 year olds. Two are the main reasons for
this development: first, the inflow of immigrants and, second, the
gradual entry into the labour market of individuals born in the 1980s.
On the basis of data on completed fertility by generation, the youth
population will start decreasing because of the decline of the fertility
rate below the figure which ensures population replacement (i.e. 2.1
children per woman). As this decrease in the fertility rate is recorded
for the generation of women born after the mid-1950s, the decline
in the youth population will become evident in the 2011 Census if
this is not counterbalanced by immigrant inflow.(c) Despite the decline in the participation rate of
men in the period 1971-2001 as described above,
the unemployment rate29 for youth in all age sub-
groups  increased  during  the  period  1971-2001
(see Table 3). The deterioration in this period was
even  more  pronounced  for  women,  for  which
there was a very significant increase in the partic-
ipation rate (see Table 1).30 Recent LFS data give a
more  encouraging  picture  showing  that  in  the
period since 1999 the unemployment rate is on a
declining trend (see Chart 2).
Table 5 suggests that the unemployment rate of
youth is higher in Greece than in the EU-15. For
15-19  year  olds,  however,  the  size  of  the  gap
could be attributed to the small size of the labour
force.  When  the  number  of  unemployed  is
expressed  as  a  percentage  of  the  population
rather than of the labour force, it appears that this
ratio  is  lower  in  Greece  than  in  the  EU-15.  Of
course the inactivity rate for this age group con-
tinues to be much higher in Greece than in the
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29 The  unemployment  definition  followed  in  the  Population
Census is different to that used in the LFS. More specifically,
the 2001 Population Census considers as unemployed those
who declare they are looking for a job and have taken some
action to this effect, while, according to the LFS, individuals are
unemployed if they do not work for even one hour during the
reference week, are searching for a job during the 4 weeks prior
to the reference week and to this effect take specific actions
which they report.
30 For 15-29 year old women, the deterioration was especially
large during the period 1981-1991, when the unemployment rate
increased  by  10.6  percentage  points  (see  Table  A4  in  the
Appendix),  while  during  the  period  1991-2001  the  decline
recorded was only marginal. The unemployment rate for 15-29
year old men increased both during the 1981-1991 and during the
1991-2001 period.
Table 3
Unemployment rate (%)1 by cohort,2 1971-2001
1 The unemployment rate is defined as the ratio of the number of unemployed to the labour force (employed and unemployed).
2 See footnote 2 to Table 1.
Source: NSSG, Population Censuses, 1971-2001. 
15-19  1952-56 1962-66 1972-76 1982-86 15-19  1952-56 1962-66 1972-76 1982-86
1971 6.6 1971 9.1
1981 5.8 14.6 1981 5.6 21.9
1991 3.2 9.4 25.4 1991 5.6 13.9 43.1
2001 4.9 6.6 13.1 42.8 2001 7.6 8.9 16.2 48.8
20-24  1947-51 1957-61 1967-71 1977-81 20-24  1947-51 1957-61 1967-71 1977-81
1971 5.9 1971 6.3
1981 2.7 13.1 1981 2.9 15.0
1991 2.7 4.9 18.9 1991 4.5 7.9 27.5
2001 5.8 4.8 8.2 24.6 2001 8.5 8.0 11.5 26.8
25-29  1942-46 1952-56 1962-66 1972-76 25-29  1942-46 1952-56 1962-66 1972-76
1971 3.1 1971 3.6
1981 1.9 5.8 1981 1.8 5.6
1991 2.7 3.2 9.4 1991 4.1 5.6 13.9
2001 7.6 4.9 6.6 13.1 2001 9.3 7.6 8.9 16.2
Women
Year of birth Age Age Year of birth
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Table 4
Participation rate in education (%)1 by cohort,2 1971-2001
1 Defined as the percentage of students in the population.
2 See footnote 2 to Table 1.
Source: NSSG, Population Censuses, 1971-2001.
15-19  1952-56 1962-66 1972-76 1982-86 15-19  1952-56 1962-66 1972-76 1982-86
1971 45.1 1971 37.4
1981 2.6 58.7 1981 1.0 47.9
1991 0.1 3.3 71.9 1991 0.1 1.9 66.9
2001 0.06 0.4 4.0 72.5 2001 0.05 0.3 3.6 79.8
20-24  1947-51 1957-61 1967-71 1977-81 20-24  1947-51 1957-61 1967-71 1977-81
1971 18.6 1971 8.1
1981 0.3 19.6 1981 0.1 9.8
1991 0.0 0.5 21.8 1991 0.0 0.3 19.9
2001 0.0 0.1 0.9 23.7 2001 0.0 0.1 0.8 29.1
25-29  1942-46 1952-56 1962-66 1972-76 25-29  1942-46 1952-56 1962-66 1972-76
1971 3.5 1971 1.2
1981 0.1 2.6 1981 0.1 1.0
1991 0.0 0.1 3.3 1991 0.0 0.1 1.9
2001 0.0 0.06 0.4 4.0 2001 0.0 0.05 0.3 3.6
Women
Year of birth Age Age Year of birth
MenEU-15 (89.7% in Greece compared to 72.7% in
the EU-15).
As expected, the youth unemployment rate is cor-
related with the overall unemployment rate. In fact,
in  most  countries  the  youth  unemployment  rate
appears to be especially sensitive to changes in the
overall unemployment rate. Thus, a change in the
overall  unemployment  rate  by,  for  example,  one
percentage point, leads to a much larger change in
the  youth  unemployment  rate  (OECD,  1996).
Young individuals are expected to be the first to be
affected by a change in the overall unemployment
rate because they have less work experience and
thus in a slowdown of economic activity are the
first to be laid off, while during a boom they consti-
tute a main source of inflow to the labour market.
A  low  responsiveness  of  the  youth  unemploy-
ment  rate  to  the  unemployment  rate  of  those
who are older might, however, be due to the dis-
couraged  worker  effect.  Low  responsiveness
could also be an indication of structural short-
comings  (e.g.  low  youth  productivity)  which
hamper the hiring of young individuals (see, inter
alia, Clark and Summers, 1990) or specific fea-
tures  relating  to  the  structure  of  the  economy
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Table 5
Employment rate, unemployment rate and percentage of unemployed in the population by gender
and age group in Greece and the EU-15 (2nd quarter of 2006)
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey.
∂U-15 Greece ∂U-15 Greece ∂U-15 Greece
Employment 
rate (percentages)
Unemployed as a percentage




Total 7.0 21.7 32.0 20.7 3.3 5.6
Men 9.4 23.4 26.8 20.4 3.4 6.0
Women 4.6 19.8 40.4 21.0 3.1 5.3
20-24 year olds
Total 40.5 57.3 23.2 14.0 12.2 9.3
Men 48.5 61.6 15.4 13.7 8.8 9.7
Women 32.1 52.9 32.9 14.4 15.8 8.9
25-29 year olds
Total 72.9 75.1 13.8 9.7 11.7 8.1
Men 81.9 80.7 9.8 9.3 8.8 8.3
Women 63.2 69.4 19.0 10.2 14.8 7.9
30-54 year olds
Total 75.8 79.6 6.8 6.2 5.5 5.3
Men 91.6 88.3 4.0 5.5 3.8 5.2
Women 60.1 70.8 10.8 7.1 7.3 5.4(e.g.  absorption  of  the  macroeconomic  shocks
through hirings by the public sector).
A first estimate of the responsiveness of the youth
unemployment rate to the overall unemployment
rate  in  Greece  suggests  that  during  the  period
1983-2006 a change of one percentage point in the
unemployment  rate  of  individuals  older  than  30
leads, in general,31 to a change in the youth unem-
ployment rate by over one percentage point.32 The
correlation  is  higher  in  the  more  recent  period
(from the mid-1990s onwards), perhaps due to the
fact that the decline of the unemployment rate was
accompanied  by  growth  of  wholesale  and  retail
trade, where youth are predominantly employed,
and also due to the increased, in comparison with
earlier  times,  female  participation  in  the  labour
force. Furthermore, the gradual slowdown of hir-
ings in the public sector, which in the past con-
tributed  to  insulating  the  labour  market  from
macroeconomic  shocks,  resulted  in  a  higher
responsiveness of the youth unemployment rate to
the macroeconomic environment.33
Thus,  besides  macroeconomic  developments,
the industrial composition of economic activity
also impacts on the employment and unemploy-
ment rate of youth, given that young individuals
in  most  countries  are  concentrated  in  specific
sectors  of  economic  activity.  Important  differ-
ences in the distribution of youth across sectors
compared to the distribution of older individuals
are an indication of segmentation of the labour
market. In most markets youths work predomi-
nantly  in  the  trade  sector  and  in  hotels  and
restaurants (OECD, 1996). The sectoral distribu-
tion  of  youth  in  Greece  is  similar.  The  2001
Population  Census  data,  not  presented  here  in
detail, suggest that for men there is higher con-
centration  of  youth  in  the  following  sectors:
hotels, restaurants, construction and manufactur-
ing.34 For  women  the  highest  concentration  is
observed in activities of a social nature, trade and
business  activities.  The  sectoral  distribution  of
youth  employment  has  changed  slightly  over
time. The most important observed changes were
in manufacturing, were the percentage of youth
decreased, while the reverse took place in trade.
With the exception of manufacturing, however,
the sectors in which more young individuals are
employed have exhibited higher growth recently.
As an indication note that in the period 1991-
2001  employment  in  trade,  hotels  and  restau-
rants increased at an average annual rate of 2.4%,
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31 An exception is the estimate for 20-24 year old women, for
which the correlation is lower than one, perhaps because of the
significant  increase  in  the  percentage  of  students  in  this  age
group.
32 The following specification has been estimated:  ujt = ‚1*u30t +
‚2*t + ‚3*t2 +Âjt where ujt is the unemployment rate of age sub-
group j in year t; u30t is the unemployment rate of individuals older
than 30 in year t; t and t2 are a time-trend and its square, while Âjt
is the error term. This specification has been estimated separately
for  each  gender.  Estimates  using  the  specification:  ¢ujt = · +
Á1¢u30t + Á2*t + Ëjt, where ¢ujt is the annual change (in percentage
points)  of  the  unemployment  rate  of  age  group  j, ¢ u30t is  the
annual change (in percentage points) of the unemployment rate of
individuals over 30 years old and Ëjt is the residual, have also been
performed.
33 In 1983-1994 the elasticity of the youth unemployment rate
with respect to the unemployment rate of older individuals is one,
being lower than in most other OECD countries. The weaker cor-
relation  suggested  by  the  OECD  estimates  compared  to  that
found in the current study is probably due to the fact that OECD
estimates do not discriminate by gender. Note, however, that,
even  when  we  discriminate  by  gender,  the  correlation  before
1994 is weaker than that found for the whole period. In the same
OECD study, however, the overall unemployment rate appears to
have  an  impact  on  the  percentage  of  non-economically  active
youth.
34 The degree of industrial specialisation (what the OECD, 1996,
calls youth employment coefficients) is the ratio of two percent-
ages: the share of young workers' employment by industry over
the share of young workers in total employment over the share
of  older  workers'  employment  by  industry  over  the  share
of older workers in total employment: Si =
(yi/Ni)/ (y/N)
(oi/Ni)/ (o/N)
where y, o, N, i are youths, older workers, total employment and
the specific industry respectively. Values of the index (Si) over one
suggest that i is a youth-intensive industry.although the increase was not uniformly distrib-
uted  within  the  decade.  More  recent  LFS  and
National Accounts data show that this trend has
continued past 2001. The importance of the com-
position of economic activity is also evident from
the  differences  in  the  unemployment  rate  by
degree of urbanisation. In rural areas, due to the
decline in primary sector activity, the unemploy-
ment  rate  is  higher,  especially  for  women  and
marginally  for  men  compared  to  that  in  urban
areas (see Tables A5 and A6 in the Appendix).
(d) The  percentage  of  students in  all  age  sub-
groups is increasing over time for both genders
(see Table 4). This increased demand for educa-
tion services is reflected in the education level of
the population; in 1971 around 41.9% of individ-
uals aged 15-19 were secondary education grad-
uates (29.9% graduates of lower secondary edu-
cation and 12.0% of upper secondary education),
while in 2001 this percentage had increased to
around  85.4%  (50.8%  graduates  of  lower  sec-
ondary  education,  29.5%  of  upper  secondary
education and 5.1% graduates of vocation profes-
sional schools). The percentage of those in this
age group who had only completed primary edu-
cation was 50.1% in 1971 compared to 11.8% in
2001.35 The LFS data, which reflect more short-
term  developments,  show  that  the  increasing
trend of participation in education is continuing
as exhibited from the decline of 17 year olds who
have  completed  their  studies  (11.9%  in  2001,
6.2% in 2005).36
The improvement in educational achievements is
also due to the expansion, since the beginning of
the 1980s, of the length of compulsory education
in Greece from six to nine years.37 More specifi-
cally, from the academic year 1980-81 education
is compulsory until the completion of lower sec-
ondary school or until 16 years of age. Despite
this restriction, however, there is still a number of
students,  as  suggested  by  the  above  data  and
studies of the Pedagogical Institute (e.g. Ministry
of Education and Religious Affairs – Pedagogical
Institute, 2006), who leave school without com-
pleting compulsory education (school dropouts).
The  percentage  of  school  dropouts  from  lower
secondary  school  (i.e.  the  number  of  students
who  left  school  without  completing  lower  sec-
ondary school as a percentage of all those regis-
tered in the first class of lower secondary school
in a specific year) declined from 17.6% for those
who registered in the first class of the lower sec-
ondary school in the academic year 1982-1983 to
6.1% for those who registered in the first class in
the academic year 2000-2001 (see Lariou-Drettaki,
1993,  and  Ministry  of  Education  and  Religious
Affairs – Pedagogical Institute, 2006). The school
dropout rate is much higher in rural areas com-
pared to urban and semi-urban areas, while the
school dropout rate is much higher for boys com-
pared to girls. The typical reason for which chil-
dren abandon compulsory education is to assist
their  family,  while  dropouts  are  highest  among
students  with  low  academic  achievements.  As
students who have not completed their studies
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35 The rest of the population of this age group had either gradu-
ated from post-secondary education (0.1% in 1971, 1.4% in 2001)
or had not completed primary school being either literate (6.1% in
1971, 0.6% in 2001) or illiterate (1.8% in 1971, 0.8% in 2001).
36 This (2005) is the last year for which this percentage can be
calculated on the basis of LFS data, since in the 2006 and 2007
LFSs there is no question as to whether the interviewee has com-
pleted his/her studies.
37 See Law 309/1976 (Article 26, par. 2) and Presidential Decree
739/1980, which provided for the implementation of this law from
the 1980-81 academic year. Law 1566/1985, which replaced Law
309/1976, did not alter the length of compulsory education (see
Article  2,  par.  3),  but  penalises  non-attendance  of  compulsory
education.themselves declare (see Paleocrassas et al., 1997)
and as Population Census data show, the unem-
ployment rate for those individuals is higher than
for the population of the same age group.38 As
expected, prematurely leaving school can lead not
only  to  one  or  more  unemployment  spells  but
also to limited career prospects.
Comparisons of dropout rates between countries,
usually based on the percentage of 18 to 24 year
olds  who  have  not  completed  lower  secondary
school, show that, according to Eurostat data, in
2006 this percentage in Greece is 15.9%, similar
to that in the EU-15 (17.0%).39
Even beyond secondary education it seems that a
significant improvement in the level of education
has taken place. While in 1971 only 2.3% of 20-24
year olds were university graduates, this percent-
age has more than doubled by 2001 (5.4%).
The  decision  of  youths  to  continue  their  studies
after completing upper secondary education is influ-
enced by inter alia the expected returns of alterna-
tive activities and the macroeconomic environment.
As for the correlation between wages and educa-
tion level, it should be noted that many sectoral
and occupational collective pay agreements deter-
mine the levels of minimum wages depending on
inter alia the education level. Contractual wages of
university graduates with no previous work expe-
rience  employed  in  industry  are  around  37%
higher  than  those  of  Technological  Education
Institute (TEI) graduates. Increases due to tenure
are also steeper for university graduates than for
TEI  graduates.40 Firm  or  individual  level  agree-
ments  introduce  further  dispersion  in  wages.  A
concise picture of differences in wages by educa-
tion level is presented in Table 6, which shows
deviations of monthly and hourly wages for 20-35
year  old  men  by  level  of  education  attainment
from  the  wages  of  high-school  graduates.  The
sample includes full-time men in enterprises with
10 or more individuals in the private sector. By
including  sector  and  occupational  dummies,
these estimates take into account to some extent
the  differences  due  to  collective  agreements.41
The estimates presented in Table 6 suggest that
male TEI graduates employed as service workers
in the trade sector receive 11% higher earnings
compared to high-school graduates employed in
the sector. The estimates confirm the positive cor-
relation  between  education  and  earnings,
although the returns presented are not necessar-
ily  generalisable  to  the  population  as  a  whole,
since the data used concern individuals working
in large firms (with 10 employees or more), are
derived from a limited sample (7,000 individuals)
and the estimates presented are not weighted to
account for differences in sampling probabilities.
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38 The 2001 Population Census shows that the male (female)
unemployment rate of 20-24 year olds who have not completed
compulsory education was 7.7% (11.6%) compared to 7% (9.3%)
for all men (women) of this age group. This reflects the situation
in urban areas, while in rural areas the unemployment rate of
youth who have not completed their studies is less than the total
unemployment rate for this age group.
39 This index belongs to the group of Structural Indicators fol-
lowed in terms of the Lisbon process and is published at regular
intervals.
40 See Arbitration Decision 31/2006.
41 The following specification has been estimated:
69 7
lnyi = c + Σ‚1jSij + Σ‚2hoih + Σ‚3lEil + Âi ,
j=1 h=1 l=1
where yi are gross earnings of individual i, Sj are dummies for 6 sin-
gle digit NACE rev. 1 sectors, ohare dummies for 9 single-digit occu-
pational groups following the International Standard Classification
of Occupations, Et are the various education levels examined and Â
i
is the error term. The constant term, c, represents the average earn-
ings of an individual service worker employed in the trade sector.
This specification implicitly makes the simplifying assumption that
the education level of individuals, their occupation and the sector in
which they are employed are independent of each other.Furthermore, differences in tenure, marital status
and the size of the firm in which individuals work
are not taken into account here.
The magnitude of the increase in the demand for
education has differed by gender, as illustrated in
Table  4.  Furthermore,  due  to  a  much  larger
increase in the number of female students, the
percentage  of  women  enrolled  in  education  in
2001 was higher than that for men (e.g. 79.8% for
15-19  year  old  women  compared  to  72.5%  for
men). The higher number of enrolled women is
also perhaps due to the expected higher returns
for  women42 (see, inter  alia,  Papapetrou,  2007;
Magoula  and  Psacharopoulos,  2004),  although
expected returns do not take into account the fact
that  the  female  unemployment  rate  is  much
higher than the male unemployment rate.43
Another factor which at every point affects the
demand for education services are the macroeco-
nomic conditions and more specifically the prob-
ability of finding a job as this is proxied either by
the  overall  unemployment  rate  or  the  relative
unemployment rate (i.e. the ratio of the youth
unemployment rate to the unemployment rate of
older individuals). While the correlation between
macroeconomic conditions and education enrol-
ment is acknowledged in the literature, the direc-
tion  of  the  correlation  is  not  given  before-
hand. A rise in the unemployment rate could lead
to an increase in the demand for education due to
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Table 6
Monthly and hourly earnings1 by education level: deviations from the earnings of high-school gradu-
ates (in percentage points), October 20022,3
1 Earnings are gross of social security contributions and taxes.
2 The figures in the table represent the coefficients on the education dummies in a regression of gross earnings (monthly or hourly), which also controls for economic
activity (at the single-digit level) and for the occupation (at the single-digit level according to the International Standard Classification of Occupations).  The refer-
ence group is a high-school graduate employed in retail trade in a service-related occupation. Gross monthly earnings for this individual are €806, while gross hourly
earnings are €4.8.
3 The results refer to men aged between 20 and 35 who are employed in private sector firms with 10 employees or more in the following sectors of economic activ-
ity: Industry (mining, manufacturing), Retail and wholesale trade, Hotels and Restaurants, Transport, Storage and Communications, Financial intermediation and Real
estate, Renting and business activities.
Source: Calculations on the basis of the NSSG Structure of Earnings Survey for 2002. 
Primary school –8.4 –6.5
Lower secondary school –4.4 –3.5
Technical and vocational school –0.5 –1.6
Post-secondary education 7.7 6.9
Technological Education Institutes   11.4 10.6
University education  30.0 29.5
Education level
Deviation of gross hourly regular earnings 
(in percentage points)
Deviation of total (regular and overtime)
gross monthly earnings (in percentage
points)
42 Returns to a certain education level are defined as the pre-
sent value of the net benefits to education in terms of marginal
earnings.  The  net  benefits  are  defined  after  subtracting  from
marginal  (compared  to  earnings  from  the  previous  education
level) expected earnings either the private cost of education (pri-
vate returns to education) or the cost assumed by the public sec-
tor (social returns to education). The private returns to educa-
tion include not only tuition fees, books etc. but also foregone
income.
43 Higher returns to education for women are also observed in
other countries. Dougherty (2003) attributes this gender differ-
ence to, inter alia, the following two facts: (a) that women work in
general in sectors in which education is valued more, and (b) that
women with higher education achievements possess the produc-
tive features required to confront discrimination against them in
the labour market.the reduced opportunity cost of alternative activ-
ities.  On  the  other  hand,  however,  individuals
who would like to study might have to work due
to  the  bad  economic  situation  (Bradley  and
Nguyan, 2004).
In Greece, there are indications that the correla-
tion between the percentage of students (espe-
cially for the age subgroup 20-24) and the ratio
of the unemployment rate of this group over the
unemployment rate of individuals older than 30
years  is  positive;  an  increase  in  the  relative
unemployment rate is accompanied by a rise in
the  percentage  of  individuals  who  are  stu-
dents.44 Furthermore,  unemployment  rates  by
education  level  and  field  of  study  have  an
impact  on  the  field  of  education  followed  by
young people.
As a result of the increase in the enrolment rate of
15-24  year  olds,  the  student  enrolment  rate  in
Greece  exceeds  that  of  the  EU-15  (see  Table  7,
columns  1-2).45 At  the  same  time,  however,  it
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44 Estimates  are  derived  from  the  following  regression:
¢sjt = c + ‚1¢ (uj/u30)t + Âjt, where ¢sjt is the annual change (in
percentage points) of the percentage of students of age sub-group
j during year t, ¢ (uj/u30)t is the annual change (in percentage
points) of the ratio of the unemployment rate of age sub group j
(ujt) to the unemployment rate of individuals older than 30 years
(u30t), and Âjt is the error term. Estimates are derived from a rela-
tively small sample for the period 1993-2006, since data for the
period prior to 1993 are not in general available on a continuous
basis. Separate estimates have been produced by gender.
45 Specifically for 15-19 year olds, the percentage of students is
higher in Greece than the EU-15 average, although in Greece the
length  of  compulsory  education  is  shorter  and  individuals  can
leave school at a younger age. A student could complete compul-
sory education at the age of 14.5, while in most EU-15 countries
(following also the recent prolongation in the UK, Ireland, Spain
and  Italy),  compulsory  education  lasts  for  10  years  and  the
youngest age at which an individual can leave school is 16 years
(see European Commission, 2005, and OECD, 2006a).
Table 7
Participation rate % of young adults (15-29 year olds) in education, 2004 (for both genders)1,2
1 Countries are presented in decreasing order of the percentage of 20-24 year olds who are studying without participating in the labour market (column 2). 
2 OECD data are based on individual countries’ Labour Force Surveys.  
3 Individuals on apprenticeship schemes are also included; to give an indication of numbers attending such schemes, their percentages in the population are also indi-
cated separately in parentheses.  
4 Simple arithmetic average of the EU-15 countries for which figures are presented in the table.













Studying without participating in the labour market3 Studying but might also be labour market participants 
Germany 89.0 (18.5) 37.7 (14.1) 11.7 (2.0) 93.4 44.0 17.6
Italy 81.5 (1.3) 37.6 (4.7) 14.9 (4.3) 82.7 40.7 19.6
France 89.3 (5.9) 37.1 (3.7) 4.6 (0.6) 91.5 45.2 13.3
Greece 83.6 (1.4) 34.3 (2.6) 5.1 (1.8) 84.4 36.7 7.0
Belgium 89.1 (1.5) 34.1 (0.8) 2.9 (0.9) 92.1 38.8 6.0
Ireland 80.0 (11.8) 32.5 (12.7) 8.2 (4.7) 80.6 34.6 12.1
Portugal 72.6 (0.0) 31.7 (0.0) 5.4 (0.0) 74.4 37.8 11.4
Spain 72.2 (0.4) 30.7 (0.5) 6.0 (0.3) 75.9 38.7 11.3
∂U-154 73.9 (5.6) 30.7 (3.9) 7.1 (1.4) 84.6 42.3 17.7
Sweden 67.7 (0.0) 28.6 (0.0) 10.8 (0.0) 86.8 42.3 21.0
UK 40.4 (3.5) 24.1 (2.1) 4.4 (0.8) 69.1 36.3 13.2
Austria 78.9 (20.4) 23.2 (2.8) 6.3 (0.5) 83.3 30.3 13.0
Netherlands 42.5 (3.0) 16.6 (2.9) 4.4 (0.9) 89.1 46.1 16.7
Denmark – – – 91.2 61.8 45.4
Finland – – – 90.3 59.6 39.9seems that among full-time students the percentage
of those on dual apprenticeship schemes is lower in
Greece compared to the EU-15. Note, for example,
that only 1.4% of the population of 15-19 year olds
in  Greece  is  registered  on  dual  apprenticeship
schemes, while in Germany the corresponding per-
centage is over 18%. Furthermore, if we take into
account those who both study and work (not on
dual apprenticeship schemes), then the percentage
of students in Greece is around the EU-15 average
percentage for 15-19 year olds, while for the 20-24
year olds it is less than the EU-15 average (see Table
7, columns 4 and 5). For 25-29 year old individuals,
independently of whether they study and work at
the same time or not, the education enrolment rate
is  around  10  percentage  points  lower  in  Greece
compared  to  the  EU-15  average  (see  Table  7,
columns 3 and 6).
From the above it appears that the education pat-
tern followed in Greece is that of full-time studies,
while in most other EU-15 countries a significant
number of students either study and work at the
same  time  or  participate  in  dual  apprenticeship
schemes.  In  other  words,  it  appears  that  the
investment  in  human  capital  in  Greece  is  not
immediately  put  to  work.  Dual  apprenticeship
schemes have been found to improve the employ-
ability of individuals and their career path by, for
example, avoiding the negative impact (e.g. recur-
rent  unemployment  spells,  lower  earnings)  of
youth  unemployment  (see  inter  alia Naren-
dranathan  and  Elias,  1993;  Mroz  and  Savage,
1999). Firms are also more likely to hire individuals
who have gone through an apprenticeship scheme,
since this means that the firm does not have to
undertake the general training expenditure.
Tables 2 and 3 suggest that employment proba-
bilities  improve  as  people  get  older.  But  the
employment rates for youths have declined over
time in the period 1971-2001 either because of
higher  student  enrolment  rates  or  because  of
higher unemployment rates. Although in the last
few  years  both  the  macroeconomic  conditions
and  the  composition  of  economic  activity  have
shifted in favour of youth employability, it is not
clear whether this situation is cyclical and might
be reversed in the event of a slowdown in eco-
nomic growth.
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Table 8
Private and social returns1 to investment in education in Greece and OECD countries 
(Percentages)
1 Private returns measure the present value of the returns (earnings) from attending an additional level of education (net of the private cost for acquiring this level of
education).  Social returns differ from private returns because they also take into account state expenditure on education and not only private costs. 
2 Estimates for Greece refer to 1993, while the average rate for OECD countries is based on the average of estimates at different points in time.  
Source: Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004 (Tables 1 and ∞1).
Private returns
Greece2 – 8.3 8.1
OECD 13.4 11.3 11.6
Social returns
Greece2 – 6.5 5.7
OECD 8.5 9.4 8.5
Higher Secondary PrimaryYoung people enroll in education to improve their
earnings and employment potential and because
there is slack in the labour market. The improve-
ment in the education level of youth is significant
and on occasions there is talk of overeducation,
which is not, however, confirmed either through
comparisons with figures for the EU-15 (see Table
7)  or  from  the  returns  to  education  estimates,
which suggest that the returns to secondary and
tertiary education are still positive (see Table 8).
A higher education level is expected to lead to
better  employment  prospects.  The  unemploy-
ment rate of young individuals by level of educa-
tion  does  at  first  sight  seem  to  contradict  this
expectation  (see  Chart  3).  This  interpretation,
however, does not take into account the length of
time that has elapsed from the completion of the
highest level of education until finding a job, while
furthermore it also does not take into account that
earnings expectations are increasing with the level
of education completed. So, as presented in Chart
3 for 20-24 year old individuals who have com-
pleted upper secondary education, the time that
has elapsed since graduation is longer than for
university graduates.46 The length of the transition
from education to the labour market is the subject
of the next section.
3. The length of the transition from education
to the labour market
The  previous  section  presented  information  on
youth participation, employment, unemployment
and education enrolment rates. Despite the sig-
nificant increase in the level of education, as sug-
gested by the increased enrolment rates, finding a
job still appears to be a lengthy process in Greece.
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46 A similar picture emerges for 25-29 year olds.Indicatively,  in  2006  the  long-term  unemploy-
ment  rate  among  20-30  year  olds  was  53.8%,
while 64% of these long-term unemployed had no
previous work experience.
This section documents systematic differences in
the  length  of  the  transition  process  between
individuals with dissimilar demographic features
(e.g. marital status, nationality etc.) and socio-
economic  characteristics  of  the  family,  under
distinct  labour  market  conditions,  and  having
attained  different  levels  of  education  and  fol-
lowed diverse fields of study.
The framework
Job search theory and human capital theory pro-
vide a useful framework within which to study the
length  of  the  transition  from  education  to  the
labour market.
According to job search theory, the probability of
exiting from an unemployment spell is the product
of two probabilities: the probability of receiving a
job offer and the probability of accepting this (see
inter alia Mortensen, 1986; McKenna, 1990, for a
presentation  of  the  theoretical  framework,  and
Nickell,  1979;  Arulampalam  and  Stewart,  1995;
and Layard et al., 2005, for applications).
In general, the probability of receiving a job offer
depends on both macroeconomic conditions and
on the skills of the unemployed. Macroeconomic
conditions  are  in  general  proxied  either  by  the
local unemployment rate or the number of vacan-
cies  in  the  region  in  which  the  unemployed  is
located. Skills, and more generally the productive
features of the unemployed, are proxied through
their demographic features (age, marital status),
their  education,  their  previous  work  experience
etc. The probability of finding a job also depends
on the intensity of job search (e.g. search through
work agencies, applications to employers etc.).
On the one hand, the probability of accepting a
job offer depends on: (a) the wage offered relative
to the reservation wage, (b) the cost of searching
for a job, (c) income from alternative sources, and
(d) the size of the unemployment benefit.
The reservation wage is the wage below which the
unemployed would not be prepared to work and
depends on the person’s skills and on the opportu-
nity cost of the time spent searching or working
(e.g. child care).47 A ballpark figure for the reserva-
tion  wage  can  be  implicitly  inferred  from  the
amount of money (both directly and indirectly due
to income foregone) that the individual is prepared
to spend on his education. The use of this informa-
tion  is  consistent  with  the  human  capital  theory,
according to which education expenditures are an
investment in human capital, and as with invest-
ment in physical capital, have a declining marginal
return (see, inter alia, Becker 1993). The reservation
wage is not necessarily time invariant and in fact is
probably a negative function of time as the cost of
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47 The reservation wage can in some instances be proxied by
researchers.  In  the  European  Community  Household  Panel
(ECHP) individuals who are looking for a job are also asked for
their reservation wage. The LFS, on the other hand, asks only
those who declined a job offer for the reason for doing so. The
reasons  among  which  the  interviewee  can  choose  include  the
level of earnings offered. In the second quarter of 2006 unem-
ployed 15-29 year olds who declined a job offer (16.0% of the
total of the unemployed in this age group), 23.3% (41.6% for men
and 15.2% for women) declined this offer because the earnings
offered were not satisfactory. Other reasons put forward were:
the position did not offer career development prospects (21.3%:
14.3% for men, 24.4% for women), the position did not match the
formal qualifications of the interviewee and the hours of work
were unsuitable (13.8%: 7.5% for men, 16.6% for women).being jobless increases over time (since both the
psychological  cost  of  having  no  job  —see
Winkelmann  and  Winkelmann,  1998—  and  the
probability  that  the  savings/liquidity  constraints
become binding rises as time goes by). At the same
time,  the  expectations  of  the  unemployed  (or  in
general of the person seeking work) regarding the
probability of finding a job become more realistic as
the search process lengthens. The reduction in the
reservation wage increases the probability of finding
a job. This change does not, however, necessarily
imply that the probability of exiting from unemploy-
ment increases over time, since this probability is
also influenced by other factors already mentioned
in earlier sections (e.g. negative stance of employers
to  long-term  unemployed,  obsolescence  of  skills
etc. – see, for example, Pissarides, 1992).
Studies  on  the  education-to-work  transition  in
Greece
The relative long length of the transition from edu-
cation to the labour market has already been noted
in  other  studies.  The  most  recent  is  that  of
Karamessini (2006), who looks at the activity pat-
terns of recent (who graduated in 1999) school-
leavers for a period of 6 years following their grad-
uation. One of the main conclusions of the study
is that the unemployment rate of youth one year
after completion of their studies, independently of
the level of education achieved, is very high, but
this rate decreases with time. Another study on the
same issue is that of Kanellopoulos, Mavromaras
and Mitrakos (2004). Two are the main differences
between the two studies: first, Karamessini aims to
document the developments regarding the labour
market activities (participation rate, employment
rate and unemployment rate) in the period 2000-
2005 of graduates of one specific year (1999). The
study of Kanellopoulos et al., on the other hand,
looks  at  the  same  variables  in  a  single  year  for
those graduating in the two-year period 1996-8.
Another difference is that the Kanellopoulos et al.
study documents in more detail the level and field
of studies completed by individuals. This detailed
analysis suggests that the practical training which
students  attending  Technological  Education
Institutes (TEI) and higher technical and vocational
schools have to complete, contributes to a shorter
transition period between education and employ-
ment. Kanellopoulos et al. attribute the prolonged
transition period to the fact that the education sys-
tem is outdated and the curriculum is not in gen-
eral  suitable  for  the  preparation  of  high-skilled
white- collar workers.
The  issue  of  the  transition  from  education,  and
especially from general and vocational secondary
education, to the labour market is also investigated
in  studies  by  the  Pedagogical  Institute.  More
specifically,  a  field-study  conducted  in  1998
through interviews with individuals who graduated
in 1989 from upper secondary education and did
not continue with further studies shows that tech-
nical and vocational education is associated with
higher employment probabilities and a lower inci-
dence and duration of unemployment compared
to general education.48 Integrated Comprehensive
Lyceum  (Eniaio  Polykladiko  Lykeio)49 graduates
exhibit  the  longest  transition  period  (2  years),
those  who  attended  technical  and  vocational
schools the shortest (1 month), while general edu-
cation graduates experience unemployment spells
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48 Findings  from  this  study  are  summarised  in  Paleocrassas,
Rousseas and Vretakou (2002).
49 The Eniaio Polykladiko Lykeio, which has now been abolished,
aimed to link technical and vocational training with general edu-
cation.of length somewhere in the middle (1 year). In the
survey  year  the  technical  and  vocational  school
graduates exhibit the highest employment rates,
although  there  is  a  potential  composition  bias,
since most graduates from these schools are men,
for which employment rates are, in general, much
higher.
Other studies, of a smaller scale, refer to gradu-
ates of specific tertiary education establishments.
One of these studies is that of the Career Services’
Office  of  the  Technical  University  of  Crete
(Kouikoglou, B. et al., 2004), which shows that
the transition is very short for electronic and com-
puter engineering graduates.50
The results of most of the reported studies do not,
however, permit the systematic investigation of
the  demographic  characteristics  of  graduates,
while  the  results  are  not  comparable  because,
inter alia, the macroeconomic conditions prevail-
ing at the time of each survey were different.
Estimates from a transition model from education
to the labour market
The current study attempts a systematic analysis of
the  factors  that  can  explain  differences  between
young individuals regarding the transition process
from school to work using data from the ad hoc LFS
module on the “Transition from education to the
labour market”. This ad hoc survey was conducted
as part of the 2nd quarter LFS of 2000, with a ques-
tionnaire,  definitions  and  instructions  set  by
Eurostat. The sample in Greece consists of 7,656
individuals who in 2000 were between 15 and 35
years old and had completed their studies between
1991 and the 2nd quarter of 2000. The information
collected for these individuals pertains to the year
in which they concluded their studies, the highest
level of education achieved, the field of their stud-
ies and the year in which they started working.
In the analysis conducted here, a sub-sample of
5,530  individuals  were  used.  This  sub-sample
includes individuals who in 2000 were (a) labour
force members i.e. were working or were looking
for work, and (b) were aged between 15 and 30.51
Comparisons of the unemployment rate for this
sub-sample with the corresponding rate for the
population  of  individuals  between  15  and  30
years  old  in  the  2nd  quarter  of  2000  does  not
show significant differences.52
The dependent variable in what follows is the time
period which elapsed between the completion of
education53 and the first significant job. A signifi-
cant job is defined as one which started after the
individual completed his/her studies and lasted for
at least 6 months (i.e. vacation employment does
not qualify) with weekly employment of at least 20
hours.  Under  these  definitions,  the  survey  data
show  that,  for  individuals  who  started  working
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50 Another case of speedy transition was published recently; that
of  graduates  of  the  Department  of  Furniture  Technology  of  the
Technological  Education  Institute  (TEI)  of  Larissa.  Although  the
occupational rights of the graduates of this department were estab-
lished  only  recently  (through  Presidential  Decree  97/2006
“Establishment of occupational rights of TEI graduates”), the pub-
lished figures, on the basis of a survey (conducted by the Careers’
Office of the Karditsa Annex), show that around 70% of final-year
undergraduates of the Furniture Technology Department receive
job offers even before completing their studies. The monthly salary
offered on average (€850) is around the level of the collectively
agreed wage for TEI engineering graduates.
51 More  information  on  this  sub-sample  and  the  reasons  for
which it was selected are provided in the Appendix.
52 According to the 2000 2nd quarter LFS, the unemployment
rate of individuals aged 15-30 years was 22.0%, while the corre-
sponding rate for the sub-sample used here, which includes indi-
viduals  of  this  age  only  if  they  had  completed  their  studies
between 1991 and 2002, was 22.9%.
53 This refers to the level of education successfully completed
when leaving continuous education for the first time.after completing their studies, the average transi-
tion  period  between  education  completion  and
the start of the first significant job is around 31
months for women and 39 months for men. The
longer transition period for men is due to the mil-
itary service men have to complete.54 It should be
emphasised,  however,  that  this  particular  mea-
surement of the length of the transition process
arises  under  the  specific definitions  used  here.
Furthermore,  some  concepts  could  have  been
interpreted  by  interviewees  differently  than
intended; in particular, it is likely that the intervie-
wees  regard  as  significant  only  a  job  under  an
indefinite  length  contract.  It  is  indicative  that  a
very  high  percentage  (62%)  of  employees  reply
that their first significant job is the one they are
employed in at the time of the survey, while only
7% declare that they have left from their first sig-
nificant job, although it is known that youth show
high  job  mobility  (see  Tables  A7-A9  in  the
Appendix  for  evidence  to  support  higher  job
mobility  of  youth).  Since,  however,  the  interest
here is in the ranking depending on the length of
the  transition  process  and  not  on  the  absolute
length of the transition process, the assumption is
made  that  the  ranking  is  not  affected  by  these
shortcomings. The dependent variable, the length
of time from the completion of continuous educa-
tion until the start of the first significant job, is
expressed in months and its distribution is pre-
sented in Table A12 of the Appendix.55 The distri-
bution suggests that there is a wide dispersion in
the length of the transition process.56
The length of this transition period does not nec-
essarily, however, coincide with a period in which
individuals  were  unemployed,  for  two  reasons:
first, because it is possible that these individuals
were not actively looking for a job and, second,
because  men  have  to  serve  their  military  duty.
The  survey  also  includes  information  on  the
length of any unemployment spell until individu-
als find a job. This variable is, however, grouped
in wide intervals, the last interval is open and has
a lower bound of one year, while a very high share
of  interviewed  individuals  (over  20%)  did  not
reply  to  this  question.57 For  these  reasons,  the
variable studied here is the time that has elapsed
between  completion  of  education  and  until  the
start of a job which can be measured more accu-
rately. Separate models are estimated for men and
women,  since  men  have  to  serve  their  military
duty  and  because  potential  differences  in  the
reservation wage by gender could lead to differ-
ences  in  the  transition  process  (see, inter  alia,
Bradley and Nguyen, 2004).
The aim of the current work is to document dif-
ferences between young individuals in the length
of the transition process by demographic charac-
teristics,  socio-economic  features  of  the  family
etc., and to identify factors that could speed the
transition process and can be influenced by eco-
nomic and education policies.
The methodology followed in estimating variables
that measure the length of time that elapses until
a certain event occurs have their origins in med-
ical research and industrial engineering and a brief
presentation on the methodology can be found in
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54 See NSSG (2003).
55 Note, however, that this analysis does not take into account
individuals who are not active in the labour market. The percent-
age of individuals who are not economically active is high, espe-
cially for women, and differs significantly depending on the high-
est education level attained.
56 A certain number of individuals were still looking for a job
when the survey was conducted. These observations are known
as incomplete or censored.
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lthe Appendix. These models are usually applied to
explain differences between, for example, patients
in the length of time that elapses until recovery or
death, or the length of time that machines work
without a problem. These models are known as
hazard models58 and in the case under investiga-
tion here the “danger” is the prolongation of the
transition  period.  Estimates  from  a  model  in
which the baseline hazard follows a Weibull dis-
tribution  are  presented  together  with  estimates
from a Cox proportional hazards model. The two
sets of estimates do not differ significantly.
The  coefficient  estimates,  or  rather  their  expo-
nents, which show the impact of the explanatory
variables on the likelihood of finding a job, are
presented in Table 9. Coefficients which take a
value greater than unity signify that the likelihood
of finding a job increases with the value of the
explanatory variable. Descriptive statistics for the
variables used in the analysis are presented in the
Appendix (Table A13). As already mentioned, in
order to deal with a potentially different transition
process  for  men  and  women,  models  are  esti-
mated for each gender.
Starting from the variables which are related to
demographic features we note the following:
(a) The marital status of young individuals is here
proxied by a dummy to differentiate those who are
married. This dummy captures the marital status of
the individuals in the year of the survey (2000) and
not in the year in which education was completed
for which no data are available. Given this short-
coming, any association between the two variables
cannot be described as causal. The estimates sug-
gest that for married men the length of the transi-
tion is shorter, while for women there appears to
be  no  association.  It  should  be  noted,  however,
that the coefficient on this variable is sensitive to
the specification estimated perhaps because in the
age group studied here the percentage of married
individuals  is  low  (9.1%  for  men  and  22.1%  for
women,  compared  to  57.4%  and  63.6%  respec-
tively in the population of 15-64 year olds).
(b) Another variable often used in similar studies
is  the  nationality of  individuals  (see  e.g.  Leslie
and Drinkwater, 1999). Ex ante we would expect
that foreign citizenship might be associated with
a  prolonged  transition  from  school  to  work,
because non-natives have a disadvantage in the
use of the Greek language. Estimates from the
present study, however, show that male foreign
citizens  find  a  job  faster  than  Greeks,  perhaps
because the reservation wage of the latter group
is  higher,  and  because  foreign  citizens  do  not
have to do military service. For women, on the
other hand, nationality does not seem to differ-
entiate the length of the transition. This differ-
ence  by  gender  might  be  linked  with  gender
occupational and sectoral segregation.
(c) The urbanisation of the region of residence is
expected to impact on the length of the transition.
The  results  suggest  that  there  is  a  distinction
between urban and rural areas with male upper
secondary education graduates residing in rural
areas finding jobs faster than those in urban areas,
whereas the opposite is true for women. The data
do not suggest that there is a difference between
urban and semi-urban areas.
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58 The models are also referred to in the literature as survival
models, transition models or failure models. A detailed presenta-
tion of these models and of the methodology followed in their
estimation is done by, inter alia, Kiefer (1988) and McCullagh and
Nelder (1995).(d) The  age at  which  an  individual  completes
his/her studies also appears to have an impact on the
length of the transition from school to work.59 This
is captured through a dummy variable which distin-
guishes between individuals according to whether
studies were completed before or after individuals
turned 18. As expected, the results suggest that both
men and women who are more mature when they
complete their studies take less time to find a job.
Socio-economic  characteristics of  the  family  can
have an impact on the school-to-work transition,
since  they  determine  the  alternative  sources  of
income of young individuals, their reservation wage
and their ability to finance education. The direction
of the impact is not, however, known beforehand.
On the one hand, individuals from wealthy families
can afford to search for a job for longer, while on
the other hand their family status might imply bet-
ter networking in the labour market. The family’s
socio-economic status is usually proxied with fam-
ily income, or with parental education. The dataset
used here does not have information on parental
income, thus the education level of the parent with
the highest education level is used as a proxy. In
addition, the father’s occupation is used and a dis-
tinction is made between individuals depending on
whether their father follows some kind of entrepre-
neurial activity (self-employed with personnel). The
results  suggest  that  parental  education  does  not
have an impact on the length of the transition from
school to work, and thus it is not used in the speci-
fication estimated here. Entrepreneurial activity on
the father’s side seems, however, to speed up the
transition process.60
Labour market conditions
Labour  market  conditions,  proxied  here  by  the
annual change in the unemployment rate in the
year  in  which  the  interviewed  individuals  com-
pleted their studies, seem to have a substantial
effect on the length of the transition process. As
expected, an increase in the unemployment rate
leads to a longer transition process.
Education level and field of studies
Regarding  the  education  level  and  the  field  of
studies which usually are the focus of attention
in transition investigations, we note that com-
pared to high-school graduates, which are the
reference  group,  the  high-school  and  primary-
school  graduates  have  a  lengthier  transition
process.  Post-graduate  studies,  on  the  other
hand,  shorten  the  transition  process  for  both
men and women, although it should be noted
that the number of individuals with post-gradu-
ate qualifications is small.61
As for the field of study, the following main con-
clusions could be reached:
(a) For those who completed tertiary education,
the field of study appears to differentiate the prob-
ability of transition more for women than for men.
A possible interpretation of this result is that the
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59 This variable shows a high correlation with the highest level of
education  achieved  and  continues  to  be  statistically  significant
even when added to specifications that already include variables
for the level and field of education.
60 In the specifications presented in columns (3)-(4) and (7)-(8)
of Table 9, the number of observations is less than that used in the
rest of the specifications, since information on family features is
only available when the individual is still residing with his/her par-
ents. Because the percentage of married individuals in this sub-
sample is especially low, the marital status variable is not included
in these columns.
61 The percentage of 25-29 year olds with a post-graduate quali-
fication in the economically active population was around 1.8%
according to the 2001 Population Census.deviation of the reservation wage from the market
wage is lower for men than for women.
(b) Women graduates of technical and vocational
schools at the pre-tertiary education level find a
job faster than women high-school graduates (ref-
erence  group).  No  statistically  significant  differ-
ence  emerges  for  men.  The  result  for  women
could  be  due  to  the  limited  number  of  women
graduates from technical and vocational schools.
(c) Men  and  women  graduates  of  Technological
Education Institutes (TEI) find a job faster than indi-
viduals  in  the  reference  group,  a  result  which
appears to be true also for technical and vocational
school graduates (IEK) but does not hold for gradu-
ates of all tertiary institutes. This result could per-
haps be due to the fact that TEI graduates have to
complete a period of practical training while they are
studying, which could give them an edge since it
counts as work experience (see also Kanellopoulos
et al., who reach a similar conclusion).
(d) Between  university  graduates  (men  and
women),  graduates  of  technical  universities  and
medical schools find a job faster than high-school
graduates. On the other hand, men who have com-
pleted university-level humanities studies62 have a
longer period of transition compared to the refer-
ence group, perhaps because of occupational segre-
gation.  The  shorter  transition  period  for  women
graduates of economics and law schools is notice-
able. As for the results which show that for some
university school graduates the transition period is
longer than for high-school graduates, this could be
explained probably from the higher reservation wage
of the former individuals, since they need to justify
the investment in human capital they have paid for
in terms of direct costs and foregone income.
The  results  of  both  the  Weibull  and  the  Cox
models show that the likelihood of finding a job
increases  as  the  transition  period  becomes
longer, with the increase being steeper for men
than for women.
The distinction of tertiary institutions into those
from which the transition period is shorter (TEI,
Technical Universities) and the rest, from which
the transition process is longer, could be an indi-
cation  of  differences  in  the  efficiency  of  these
institutions and the degree to which students are
prepared for the labour market.
The  above  results,  which  in  general  were
expected, confirm the view that the way in which
teaching  is  organised  and  the  correspondence
between the curriculum and labour market needs
can make a difference to the successful transition
from education to the labour market.
4. The cost of employing youth
As mentioned in the Introduction, young individ-
uals have two distinctive features: limited work
experience and higher job mobility.63 These fea-
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62 Humanities include the following fields of study: Theology,
Social Theology, Pastoral and Social Theology, Literature, Greek
Literature,  History,  Archaeology,  Laography,  Philosophy,
Psychology,  Studies  in  Philosophy  and  Sociology,  History  and
Ethnology,  Musical  Studies,  Music  Science  and  Art,  Theatre,
Methodology of History and Science Theory.
63 Tables A7-A9 in the Appendix provide some indication of
labour mobility. Table A7 presents the distribution by age of
those who are looking for a job although they are already work-
ing. The data suggest that for youth this percentage is higher
and cannot be solely attributed to the fact that a high percent-
age of youth work on fixed-term contracts, since, as Table A8
suggests, a similar picture emerges for those working on indef-
inite length contracts. The percentage of those who resign their
job and do not work is also higher among youth (Table A9).tures are reflected in lower wages for youth or in
limited demand for young employees in case the
exogenously determined labour cost has been set
at a level higher than their productivity. In other
words,  the  impact  of  labour  cost  on  labour
demand does not depend on the absolute level of
wages but on the level of wages relative to pro-
ductivity.  Labour  productivity  of  youth  can  be
affected by inter alia the education system and on-
the-job training. Data on youth productivity are,
however,  in  general  not  available.  The  only
observable measure is the labour cost of youth. In
Greece the labour cost of youth is to a large extent
exogenously determined by institutions and this
section refers to these, while age-earnings profiles
at two points in time are also presented.
The two most important labour cost elements for
businesses  are  direct  remuneration and  social
security  contributions.  Direct  remuneration  is
affected by the minimum wage levels (by tenure
and  marital  status)  which  are  negotiated  at
national, sectoral or occupational level.
Deviations of actual from contractual wages can be
agreed in the context of firm-level agreements or
individual  contracts.  Data  from  the  Structure  of
Earnings  Survey (SES)  show  that,  among  private
businesses employing 10 individuals or more, the
share of firms with firm-level agreements is small.64
This seems to be even more so in sectors with a
high youth share (trade, hotels and restaurants).
Minimum wages
Some countries provide for sub-minimum wages
for youth.65 In Greece up to June 1989 inclusive,
the minimum wage of daily workers younger than
18  years  of  age  was  lower  than  the  minimum
wage of those over that age. Similar arrangements
held  for  salaried  employees  younger  than  19
years of age. More specifically, the wage for a 15-
year  old  blue-collar  worker  considered  as  an
apprentice amounted to around 75% of the wage
of a 18-year old blue-collar worker, while for 16
and  17-year  olds  it  amounted  to  between  85%
and 95% depending on the number of years of
previous work experience.66 With effect from the
end of June 1989, on the basis of Law 1837/1989,
individuals younger than 18 are paid, on a pro rata
basis, depending on the hours of work, with the
salary paid to a blue-collar worker or a white-col-
lar employee over 18 with no previous work expe-
rience.  This  regulation  does  not  impact  on  the
subsidies to apprentices which are determined by
a ministerial decision.67
Both  economic  theory  and  applied  economic
analysis are not clear cut as to the existence or
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64 The data are from the 2002 Structure of Earnings Survey con-
ducted by the NSSG and show that around 90% of businesses with
10 employees in Industry (manufacturing, mining and quarrying),
Wholesale  and  Retail  Trade,  Hotels  and  Restaurants,  Transport-
Storage-Communication and Financial Intermediaries did not have
a firm-level agreement.
65 According to the European Foundation for the Improvement of
Living and Working Conditions (2007b), in 2006 a sub-minimum
wage for youth existed in five EU-15 countries. These countries
and the percentage of the minimum wage to which the sub-mini-
mum wage corresponds are: Belgium (20 year-olds: 94%, 19 year-
olds: 88%, 18 year-olds: 82%, 17 year-olds: 76%, individuals 16
years old or younger: 70%), Ireland (18-year olds in the second
year of work: 90%, 18-year olds in the first year of work: 80%, 18-
year  old  apprentices:  75%,  younger  than  18  years:  70%),
Luxembourg (17- year olds: 80%, 15- and 16- year olds: 75%),
Netherlands (22-year  olds:  85%,  21-year  olds:  72.5%,  20-year
olds: 61.5%, 19-year olds: 52.5%, 18-year olds: 45.5%, 17-year
olds: 39.5%, 16-year olds: 34.5%, 15-year olds: 30%), and UK (18-
21 year olds: 83.2%, 16-17 year olds: 61.7%). In Spain, the sub-
minimum wage for youth (younger than 18), which amounted to
89% of the minimum wage for adults, was abolished in 1998.
66 See, for example, Labour Legislation Bulletin, 1989, 45:1091,
p. 590 (in Greek).
67 See, for example, Decision 40017/2004 of the Ministers of
Finance and of Employment and Social Security as published in
Government Gazette 111/µ/27.1.2004.otherwise  and  the  direction  of  the  correlation
between the level and the change of the mini-
mum wage and employment (see, inter alia, Card
and Krueger, 1995 and OECD, 2007b). In order
to study the impact of an increase in the mini-
mum wage for the economy as a whole there is
need  for  general  equilibrium  analysis (Johnson,
1969). In any case, the negative consequences
that could arise from an increase in the minimum
wage depend on the level at which this has been
set and on the number of employees who are
covered by the minimum wage. In Greece, the
binding wage for employers is that agreed in the
sectoral  or  occupational  collective  agreements
which set wages that are higher than the mini-
mum wage set by the National General Collective
Agreements  (NGCA).68 In  general,  however,
when  a  change  in  the  wage  affects  only  one
group, it is probable that this group will be sub-
stituted by another group; this is especially true
for  groups  of  unskilled  workers  (Neumark  and
Washer, 2006). It is thus likely that the increase
in the minimum wage for youth did contribute to
reducing employment of this age group. Between
1989 and 1993, the share of 15-19 year olds in
total  employment  decreased  (from  2.9%  to
2.3%),  while  the  number  of  unemployed
increased by 25%. In the same time period, the
share of 20-24 year olds increased (from 8.0% to
8.3%), although the number of unemployed from
this age group also increased by 18%. Perhaps
the  most  important  consequence  of  abolishing
the sub-minimum wage was that it limited oppor-
tunities for youth to gain work experience, which,
as indicated in a number of studies (see, inter
alia, Quintini et al., 2007, and OECD, 2007b), is
important  for  their  future  career  path.  In  any
case,  however,  as  already  mentioned,  what  is
important for labour demand is not the absolute
level of the wage, but whether the marginal pro-
ductivity condition holds.
Despite  abolishing  the  sub-minimum  wage  for
youth, the institutional framework is such that dif-
ferent minimum wage levels are set according to
tenure, while market forces also have an impact
on wages. Indeed, abolishing the youth sub-mini-
mum wage, apart from the direct consequence of
making 15-17 year olds more expensive than they
were before, did give increased value to previous
work experience.69
The  positive  association  between  wage  and
tenure  is  based  on  the  marginal  productivity
condition, since workers improve their human
capital  as  they  gain  more  work  experience.70
Human  capital  formed  by  employees  is  partly
the result of general training, which is useful in a
number  of  businesses,  and  partly  the  result 
of specific training (in other words it is useful
only  in  the  firm  in  which  it  was  obtained).71
Individuals continue to invest in human capital
up to the point at which the present value of
their future benefits is higher than the cost of
their  investment.  The  cost  of  the  investment
includes the cost of education prior to entering
the labour market as well as the cost of training
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68 Thus, although, for example, the gross salary according to the
NGCA for a single individual with no previous work experience
was approximately €626 on 1 January 2007, the corresponding
figure for receptionists in hotels, a sector in which a lot of young
individuals work, was €809.9, while the minimum wage for sales
personnel in retail stores was €764.7.
69 While in the past a 18-year old individual with no previous
work experience would receive a higher wage than a 17-year old
individual with two years of work experience, the abolishment of
the minimum wage led to the reverse.
70 The  theoretical  framework  for  the  analysis  of  age-earnings
profiles was presented by, inter alia, Ben-Porath (1967).
71 To this effect the NGCAs provide for work experience to be
counted independently of the employer at which it was acquired.while in employment (e.g. obtained through in-
firm training). The investment in specific training
thus depends on the length of time for which the
individual and the firm will continue to be part-
ners.  As  employees  approach  retirement,  the
investment  in  human  capital  decreases,  since
they will not manage to reap the benefits from
training  prior  to  retiring.  Employees  increase
their productivity at a fast pace at the beginning
of their working life, while the rate of productiv-
ity improvement slows down until wages reach a
peak and then begins to fall.
NGCAs in Greece specify that the minimum wage
of white-collar (blue-collar) workers increases due
to tenure by 10% (5%) every three years.72
In this framework, enterprises decide on wages
on the basis of, inter alia, productivity of employ-
ees and labour demand. The Structure of Earnings
Survey73 suggests that, as expected, the age-earn-
ings profile has the shape illustrated in Chart 4.
Age is used here due to lack of data on work
experience.
Using the 30-34 year olds as a reference group, it
turns out that in 2002 the wages of men aged 20-
24 years old amounted to 75.9% of the wages of
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72 See Labour Legislation Bulletin (2004), p. 942. The regula-
tion for salaried employees has been in place since the 1970s,
while that for workers on daily pay was enacted in 1977, when
an  increase  was  provided  for  after  the  first  three  years.
Increases  for  subsequent  three-year  periods  were  gradually
introduced (in 1979, 1982, 1996 and 2001). Experience gained
at any employer after the age of 19 counts towards total work
experience for salaried employees, while for workers paid at a
daily rate it is the experience obtained after 18 years of age that
counts.
73 Information on the Structure of Earnings Survey, which is con-
ducted in all European Union countries under the supervision of
Eurostat, are presented in the Appendix. In Greece, the National
Statistical Service of Greece (NSSG) conducted two such surveys,
in 1995 and 2002, while the 2006 survey is expected to start
soon.  The  survey  collects  remuneration  information  in  firms
which employ 10 people or more in specific sectors of economic
activity. An important sector excluded in both 1995 and 2002 was
the public sector.30-34 year olds, and those in the age group 25-29
years  old  amounted  to  87.6%  (see  Chart  4).
Relative wages appear to reach a peak when indi-
viduals are between 50 and 54 years old.74 For
women  the  respective  figures  were  79%  and
90.5% in 2002. In other words, the relative wages
of  young  women  are  higher  reflecting  their
increased education attainment. After the age of
34, womens’ wages improve at a much slower
pace compared to mens’ wages.75
The comparison between 1995 and 2002 illustrates
that there are no big differences in the slope and
the position of the age-earnings profiles, especially
for individuals younger than 34 years.76 There is,
however, a small shift of the curves upwards for
the ages over 34 years old, which is more notice-
able for women than for men and  shows that a
higher value is attached to previous work experi-
ence. Due, however, to the fact that the changes
over time are small and they could perhaps reflect
the extra premium attached to the 5th three-year
period introduced in 2001, it is not easy to be con-
fident that the estimates indicate a change in the
value placed on previous work experience.77
Employers’ social security contributions
The second most important labour cost element
for businesses are social security contributions,
which in Greece are high compared to the aver-
age  in  the  EU-15.  From  the  beginning  of  the
1980s and until 1994 employers’ contributions
increased  significantly  from  21.75%  of  the
employees’ gross wages in the period 1.2.1983-
31.12.1987 to around 28% today. At this level,
employers’  social  security  contributions  are
higher than average social security contributions
in the EU-15 (which for an employee with aver-
age  wages  were  23%,  see  OECD  2007e),
although  cross-country  variation  is  big.  The
increase of social security contributions can, in
general, be shifted at least to some extent onto
workers via lower wages. Social security contri-
butions cannot however be shifted onto workers
already paid at the minimum wage. For this rea-
son,  and  in  order  to  enhance  the  demand  for
unskilled labour, social security contributions for
those  paid  at  the  minimum  wage  are  in  many
countries lower than for the rest of the workers.
In EU-15 countries, lower social security contri-
butions for those paid at the minimum wage are
paid in Belgium (15.5% compared to 30.4%), in
France (17.6% compared to 42.3%), in the UK
(6.8% compared to 10.7%) and in Ireland (8.5%
compared to 10.8%).78
In this spirit, with the aim of enhancing youth
employment and complying with the provisions
of Laws 2874/2000 and 2972/2001, employers’
social  security  contributions  towards  the  main
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74 This decline is observed in both years for women, while for
men it is observed only in 1995. This decline does not reflect a
decrease in the absolute remuneration of workers but factors such
as less overtime hours worked by older workers compared to
those of younger workers, as well as the higher education level of
younger cohorts. Ideally, the age-earnings profiles should be stud-
ied for workers from the same cohort, although such data are not
in general available for Greece.
75 Data for the relative wages of youth in Greece compared to the
relative wages of youth in other European countries (France, Spain,
Netherlands),  as  presented  in  a  recent  OECD  study  (OECD,
2007b), suggest that for both genders the wage of 25-29 year olds
compared to the wages of 30-34 year olds is around the same level
in Greece as in other European countries, while for 20-24 year olds
the relative wage is higher in Greece.
76 A small increase in the relative wages of youth in 2002 com-
pared to 1995 might reflect, inter alia, the improvement in the
education level of youths.
77 The picture is similar if the analysis is repeated with regular
(i.e. not including overtime) hourly earnings to avoid the possibil-
ity that any change between 1995 and 2002 reflects the increased
overtime premium provided for by Law 2874/2001, since over-
time hour patterns differ by age.
78 See OECD (2007e), Table S4.pension fund were reduced in 2002 by two per-
centage points (from 13.3% to 11.3%) for those
receiving gross wages lower than €600. This rule
was in effect until 31.12.2005;79 since then, how-
ever, given that the minimum wage exceeds €600
and this limit has not been adjusted, it is no longer
in effect.80
It  is  possible  that  the  increases  in  employers’
social security contribution rates between 1987
and 1994 had a negative impact on the employ-
ment of unskilled workers (see tables in the sec-
ond  section  above,  which  clearly  illustrate  the
increase over time in the youth unemployment
rate  and  the  decline  in  the  youth  employment
rate), while the still prevailing high level of social
security  contribution  rates  could  be  negatively
affecting  the  employment  of  this  group.  Any
reduction in the social security contribution rates
goes against the need for fiscal consolidation, and
the  real  issue  is  whether  a  reduction  in  social
security contribution rates could be compensated
for by an increase in the number of those working
and thus liable to pay contributions.
5. Conclusions
The demand by young people for education ser-
vices  has  increased  significantly  in  the  last  few
decades, as evidenced by the significant rise in the
number of students and the continuously higher
levels of education attained. The trend has been
stronger for women and, as a result, the percent-
age of female students in the youth population is
now higher than that of male students, and the
average number of years of education completed
by young women exceeds that of young men. The
reasons behind the increased demand for educa-
tion services can be found in the expected returns
and in the prevailing high unemployment rate. The
results presented herein suggest that attaining a
higher education level can speed up the job search
process,  but  there  are  significant  differences
according to the field of studies followed.
The higher level of education attained by young
people has not, however, been used to increase
the economy's productivity, as witnessed by the
low  participation  rate  of  youth  and  their  high
unemployment rate.
Young  individuals  possess  two  distinctive  fea-
tures: (a) they have limited professional experi-
ence, and (b) they exhibit higher job mobility. It
appears that only certain segments of their educa-
tion  system  (Technological  Institutes,  Technical
Universities)  can  compensate  for  their  shorter
professional  experience.  The  relatively  worse
position of women in the labour market is more
difficult to explain on the basis of the data pre-
sented. A possible reason for the lower employ-
ment rate of women is the reluctance of firms to
invest in on-the-job training for women, because
family responsibilities might lead them to leave
their job. Another potential explanation for the
lower employment rate of women is the exten-
sive use of shift work in Greek businesses (possi-
bly as a result of the shortage of capital equip-
ment), which women do not prefer.
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79 The last extension, until 31.12.2005, based on the relevant
article of Law 2874/2000 was provided for by Ministerial Decision
33364 (Government Gazette 17µ/13.01.2004) of the Ministers of
Economics and Finance and Employment and Social Security.
80 It is possible that the rule which provided for the exemption of
employers  from  social  security  contributions  in  the  case  of
employees younger than 18 was also aimed at increasing youth
employment. This rule was, however, abolished in 1996 (Article 3
of Law 2335/1995).The limited participation of youth, who constitute a
source of innovative ideas and high-level skills, in
economic  activity  is  a  serious  shortcoming  for
young people themselves, for businesses and for
the economy as a whole. If no measures are taken,
the negative consequences of the low employment
rates of young individuals will become more seri-
ous for at least three reasons. First, because youths
constitute  a  source  from  which  to  expand  the
labour force in order to lessen the negative impact
of demographic developments related to the slow-
down in fertility and the increase in life expectancy.
Second, because youth unemployment can worsen
demographic developments since it is associated
with lower fertility and, finally, because non-partic-
ipation can lead to the obsolescence of the skills of
those in this group, thereby further reducing their
chances of finding a job.
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1. Labour market
1.1 Length of the transition from education to the labour market
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Table A 1
Percentage of upper secondary school graduates who have not been employed 6 years after their
graduation1
1 Percentage of men and women who graduated from upper secondary school in 2000, did not proceed to further education and have not been employed in any of
the years since.  The figures presented are two-year moving averages.  
Source: Calculations on the basis of the Labour Force Survey (LFS).
Men 28.6 22.6 17.6 10.7
Women 45.6 37.9 35.5 32.1
Total 39.2 30.3 27.3 21.3
2006 2005 2004 20031.2 Eurobarometer results: Views of youth on the obstacles faced with when looking for a job and on the qualities use-
ful in finding a job
Tables A2 and A3 present some of the results of the Eurobarometer survey on youth conducted in the 27 European
Union Member States at the beginning of 2007 in order to document the views of individuals aged between 15 and
30 on, inter alia, European integration, their labour market experiences, their participation in political life, and the
degree of their financial autonomy.
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Table A 2
Eurobarometer findings from the youth (15-30 years old) survey: 
difficulties in finding a job1
(Percentages)
1 Percentage of young adults aged 15-30 years looking for a job who mentioned one of the above factors as the most important reason for not being able to find a
job.  
2 Countries are ranked in decreasing order of the percentage of individuals who mentioned that the lack of job opportunities is an impediment to finding a job.
3 Percentages may not add up to 100.0 due to rounding.
Source: Gallup Organisation (2007), Table 39.
Portugal 63.3 12.7 6.4 9.5 2.8 4.2 1.2 100.0
Greece 54.0 15.3 14.3 9.3 2.8 3.4 0.9 100.0
Germany 46.3 17.0 7.8 16.4 3.2 6.5 2.8 100.0
Italy 43.1 18.6 13.2 15.5 2.7 5.4 1.5 100.0
Austria 38.9 21.9 6.7 9.5 3.2 15.6 4.3 100.0
Sweden 37.9 32.3 5.7 9.6 4.5 4.3 5.8 100.0
Spain 36.7 26.8 10.5 9.0 4.2 10.7 2.1 100.0
France 35.5 24.0 15.9 10.8 4.5 5.6 3.7 100.0
UK 33.2 27.2 7.9 16.7 3.9 4.1 7.0 100.0
Netherlands 27.1 25.3 7.3 4.3 8.7 23.6 3.7 100.0
Belgium 25.4 22.7 7.3 7.2 5.5 25.8 6.1 100.0
Ireland 24.6 38.2 13.1 11.8 2.7 4.8 4.8 100.0
Luxembourg 19.4 24.2 16.9 10.0 5.3 20.0 4.2 100.0
Finland 19.3 41.9 7.3 5.4 5.9 15.0 5.1 100.0
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Table A 3
Eurobarometer findings from the youth (15-30 years old) survey: 
useful qualities in finding a job1
(Percentages)
1 Percentage of young adults aged 15-30 looking for a job who identified one of the above factors as the most important quality in finding a job.  
2 Countries, except for Greece, are presented in alphabetical order. 
3 Percentages may not add up to 100.0 due to rounding.
Source: Gallup Organisation (2007), Table 43.
Greece 27.0 19.9 17.2 17.1 11.6 6.1 1.1 100.0
Austria 11.0 26.0 25.4 8.2 13.5 13.7 2.3 100.0
Belgium 9.6 24.1 16.7 10.3 22.5 12.9 4.0 100.0
Denmark 14.5 38.1 21.4 9.0 6.9 6.1 4.0 100.0
Finland 14.2 32.7 8.5 8.1 17.7 15.2 3.5 100.0
France 14.0 26.9 28.2 7.0 13.1 9.0 1.9 100.0
Germany 11.3 34.2 27.5 6.0 10.3 9.5 1.1 100.0
Ireland 20.8 32.3 24.1 10.7 4.8 6.9 0.4 100.0
Italy 29.6 17.0 12.2 10.8 25.0 4.2 1.1 100.0
Luxembourg 12.7 18.4 23.4 6.3 23.6 12.2 3.3 100.0
Netherlands 8.8 35.1 19.5 15.2 8.1 12.7 0.6 100.0
Portugal 24.2 14.2 34.1 9.0 11.9 5.5 1.1 100.0
Spain 13.1 24.1 25.7 11.7 14.7 8.5 2.2 100.0
Sweden 14.4 26.1 14.2 7.0 11.0 23.9 3.3 100.0
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Table A 4
Employment rate, labour market participation rate and unemployment rate by gender and age group,
1971-20011
1 Calculations have been performed on the basis of actual population figures. According to NSSG census definitions, actual population refers to those who for what-
ever reason on the census day were resident in the country either on a permanent basis or on a short-term visit.  
Source: NSSG, Population Censuses 1971-2001.
Total
Employment rate
15-19 36.9 25.1 14.3 8.7
20-24 49.9 45.8 47.7 44.4
25-29 59.4 62.1 65.9 67.5
15-24 42.7 34.9 31.4 27.8
15-29 47.7 43.9 42.6 41.8
Labour market participation rate
15-19 39.9 30.4 21.3 15.8
20-24 53.2 53.2 61.6 59.7
25-29 61.4 65.9 74.1 78.9
15-24 45.8 41.2 41.9 39.3
15-29 50.5 49.4 52.4 53.2
Unemployment rate
15-19 7.5 17.5 32.9 44.9
20-24 6.1 13.9 22.5 25.5
25-29 3.3 5.7 11.1 14.4
15-24 6.8 15.3 25.1 29.2
15-29 5.5 11.1 18.6 21.5
Men
Employment rate
15-19 48.0 32.2 19.0 11.1
20-24 71.7 62.1 61.2 50.2
25-29 90.1 89.5 85.7 78.2
15-24 57.5 45.4 40.4 27.8
15-29 67.5 60.5 55.4 41.8
Labour market participation rate
15-19 51.4 37.7 25.4 19.5
20-24 76.2 71.5 75.6 66.6
25-29 93.0 95.0 94.6 90.0
15-24 61.4 52.6 50.9 39.3
15-29 71.1 67.2 65.3 53.2
Unemployment rate
15-19 6.6 14.6 25.4 42.8
20-24 5.9 13.1 18.9 24.6
25-29 3.1 5.8 9.4 13.1
15-24 6.3 13.7 20.5 28.3
15-29 5.0 9.8 15.2 20.4
Women
Employment rate
15-19 26.1 18.2 9.9 6.0
20-24 34.8 33.4 35.4 38.1
25-29 31.6 35.6 46.9 56.2
15-24 30.7 25.8 23.0 23.2
15-29 30.3 29.0 30.7 34.9
Labour market participation rate
15-19 28.7 23.3 17.4 11.8
20-24 37.1 39.3 48.8 52.1
25-29 32.7 37.7 54.5 67.0
15-24 32.8 31.3 33.5 33.3
15-29 32.8 33.4 40.3 45.3
Unemployment rate
15-19 9.1 21.9 43.1 48.8
20-24 6.3 15.0 27.5 26.8
25-29 3.6 5.6 13.9 16.2
15-24 6.4 17.6 31.4 30.5
15-29 7.6 13.2 23.8 23.0
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Table A 5
Employment rate, labour market participation rate and unemployment rate by gender and age group
in urban areas, 1971-20011,2
(Percentages)
1 Calculations based on figures for actual population, for the definition of which see footnote 1 in Table A4.  
2 Including semi-urban areas.
Source: NSSG, Population Censuses 1971-2001.
Total
Employment rate
15-19 32.5 21.8 12.3 8.2
20-24 47.2 44.2 46.6 43.7
25-29 57.5 61.5 66.5 68.4
15-24 39.4 32.8 30.0 27.3
15-29 44.8 42.5 41.9 41.8
Labour market participation rate
15-19 35.2 26.9 19.0 14.8
20-24 50.5 51.6 60.3 58.2
25-29 59.6 65.4 75.2 79.7
15-24 42.4 39.0 40.3 38.1
15-29 47.6 47.9 51.7 52.8
Unemployment rate
15-19 7.7 19.0 35.2 44.3
20-24 6.5 14.4 22.8 24.9
25-29 3.6 6.1 11.5 14.2
15-24 7.1 16.0 25.6 28.4
15-29 5.7 11.4 18.9 20.8
Men
Employment rate
15-19 42.5 27.0 15.3 10.2
20-24 66.5 58.0 57.3 48.5
25-29 88.5 88.6 84.8 78.3
15-24 52.7 41.0 36.7 30.7
15-29 63.8 57.6 52.4 47.3
Labour market participation rate
15-19 45.5 31.9 21.2 17.9
20-24 71.1 67.1 71.0 64.1
25-29 91.6 94.4 93.8 89.9
15-24 56.3 47.8 46.5 42.6
15-29 67.2 64.1 62.0 59.1
Unemployment rate
15-19 6.6 15.4 27.8 42.8
20-24 6.4 13.6 19.3 24.3
25-29 3.4 6.1 9.6 13.0
15-24 6.5 14.2 21.2 27.9
15-29 5.2 10.1 15.4 20.0
Women
Employment rate
15-19 22.4 16.8 9.6 6.1
20-24 33.2 34.1 37.2 38.7
25-29 28.8 36.3 50.0 58.4
15-24 27.8 25.8 24.0 23.7
15-29 28.1 29.3 32.5 36.1
Labour market participation rate
15-19 24.8 22.1 17.0 11.5
20-24 35.6 40.3 50.9 52.1
25-29 30.1 38.7 58.3 69.3
15-24 30.3 31.6 34.8 33.4
15-29 30.2 33.9 42.4 46.2
Unemployment rate
15-19 9.9 24.0 43.7 46.7
20-24 6.8 15.3 27.0 25.6
25-29 4.1 6.1 14.1 15.8
15-24 8.1 18.2 30.9 29.0
15-29 6.9 13.7 23.4 21.9
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Table A 6
Employment rate, labour market participation rate and unemployment rate by gender and age group
in rural areas, 1971-20011
(Percentages)
1 Calculations based on figures for actual population, for the definition of which see footnote 1 in Table A4.  
Source: NSSG, Population Censuses 1971-2001.
Total
Employment rate
15-19 46.1 33.3 19.9 10.2
20-24 57.5 50.9 51.5 46.7
25-29 64.3 64.1 63.9 64.6
15-24 50.7 40.9 35.5 29.3
15-29 54.6 48.0 44.7 41.7
Labour market participation rate
15-19 49.7 39.1 27.8 19.0
20-24 60.5 58.3 65.7 64.4
25-29 66.0 67.1 70.9 76.2
15-24 54.0 47.4 46.5 42.8
15-29 57.5 53.4 54.4 54.5
Unemployment rate
15-19 7.1 14.9 28.4 46.6
20-24 5.1 12.7 21.7 27.4
25-29 2.6 4.5 9.9 15.2
15-24 6.2 13.7 23.7 31.5
15-29 5.0 10.2 17.8 23.5
Men
Employment rate
15-19 60.3 45.0 29.4 13.8
20-24 87.0 73.8 72.6 55.4
25-29 94.0 92.2 88.2 77.9
15-24 69.7 57.0 51.2 35.8
15-29 77.1 68.4 63.8 50.5
Labour market participation rate
15-19 64.5 52.1 37.5 24.3
20-24 91.6 84.0 88.8 74.0
25-29 96.4 96.8 96.6 90.2
15-24 74.0 65.3 63.4 50.6
15-29 80.8 75.6 74.7 64.4
Unemployment rate
15-19 6.6 13.5 21.6 42.9
20-24 4.9 12.2 18.2 25.2
25-29 2.5 4.8 8.8 13.6
15-24 5.9 12.8 19.2 29.2
15-29 4.7 9.5 14.6 21.6
Women
Employment rate
15-19 33.4 21.7 10.9 5.7
20-24 38.9 31.1 29.3 35.7
25-29 38.2 33.1 36.3 48.3
15-24 35.8 25.9 19.7 21.3
15-29 36.5 28.0 24.9 30.8
Labour market participation rate
15-19 36.3 26.3 18.6 12.7
20-24 41.1 36.0 41.5 52.1
25-29 39.3 34.3 41.6 59.0
15-24 38.4 30.6 29.6 33.1
15-29 38.6 31.7 33.3 42.2
Unemployment rate
15-19 8.0 17.6 41.3 55.0
20-24 5.2 13.6 29.4 31.4
25-29 2.7 3.5 12.8 18.2
15-24 6.7 15.5 33.3 35.7
15-29 5.6 11.8 25.4 27.1
2001 1991 1981 19711.4 Job mobility by age group
Youth participation in the Greek labour market: developments and obstacles
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 29  10/07 77
Table A 7
Percentage of individuals looking for a job while they are working, 2nd quarter 20061
1 Percentage of individuals who are both working during the survey reference week and have been looking for a job during the 4 weeks preceding the survey.  From
the available information it is not possible to exclude the individuals looking for a second job and not for a new job.  
Source: NSSG, LFS.
15-19 8.7 6.6 13.0
20-24 8.0 6.0 11.1
25-29 6.0 5.6 6.6
30-34 3.9 3.8 3.9
35-39 2.4 1.8 3.3
40-44 2.0 1.0 3.5
45-49 1.2 0.9 1.6
50-54 1.0 0.7 1.4
55-59 1.3 1.2 1.6
60-64 0.4 0.6 0.1
Women Men Total Age
Table A 8
Percentage of individuals looking for a job while working on an indefinite length contract, 
2nd quarter 20061
1 Percentage of individuals who are both working during the survey reference week and have been looking for a job during the 4 weeks preceding the survey.  From
the available information it is not possible to exclude the individuals looking for a second job and not for a new job.  
Source: NSSG, LFS.
15-19 6.0 2.1 13.8
20-24 3.4 2.1 5.4
25-29 3.0 2.6 3.5
30-34 2.3 2.8 1.6
35-39 1.2 1.1 1.2
40-44 1.0 0.4 2.0
45-49 0.5 0.1 1.0
50-54 0.6 0.4 1.0
55-59 0.8 0.3 2.0
60-64 0.0 0.0 0.0
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Table A 9
Percentage of individuals who are not working having quit from their previous job, 
2nd quarter 20061
1 Individuals who declared that they quit their job for personal or other reasons (not however because they are taking care of other family members, young or old) as
a percentage of all individuals who stopped working for whatever reason.  
Source: NSSG, LFS.
15-19 7.8 12.7 2.1
20-24 17.7 14.1 20.6
25-29 21.4 10.9 26.9
30-34 22.3 6.0 27.6
35-39 19.9 1.8 27.0
40-44 11.0 5.7 14.0
45-49 5.6 2.4 7.3
50-54 7.6 3.6 11.2
55-59 1.9 0.9 3.5
60-64 1.1 0.3 2.5
Women Men Total Age2. Demographic developments
3. Education statistics
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Table A 1 0
Percentage of youth in the population,1 1971-2001
1 Refers to actual population (the definition of which is presented in the footnote to Table A4).
Source: NSSG, Population Censuses 1971-2001.
Total
15-29 18.8 20.2 21.2 22.0
15-19 7.3 7.1 7.0 6.6
20-24 5.9 6.4 7.3 7.6
25-29 5.6 6.7 6.9 7.8
Men
15-29 17.7 19.5 20.8 23.2
15-19 7.3 7.1 6.9 7.0
20-24 4.9 5.6 7.1 8.1
25-29 5.5 6.7 6.9 8.1
Women
15-29 19.7 20.9 21.6 20.9
15-19 7.2 7.1 7.1 6.3
20-24 6.8 7.1 7.5 7.2
25-29 5.7 6.7 7.0 7.4
2001 1991 1981 1971 Age
Table A 1 1
Number of registered students in comprehensive and vocational upper secondary schools in the period
2001-20061
1 Figures for school years 2001-2 to 2004-5 refer to the number of students at the end of the school year. Figures for 2005-6 refer to the number of students at the start
of the school year.  
2 Students registered at technical vocational schools of the Manpower Employment Organisation (OAED) are included in these figures.






Technical vocational schools2 Comprehensive schools School years4. Brief description of two of the surveys used in the
analysis
4.1 NSSG survey on the transition from education to the
labour market
Following  Commission  Regulation  1925/1999  certain
questions pertaining to the transition from education to
the labour market were added to the LFS questionnaire
used in the survey for the second quarter of 2000.
The  sample  for  the  LFS  is  derived  from  a  two-stage
(area, household) stratified sampling procedure based
on the 1991 Population Census. The LFS sample size in
the second quarter of 2000 was 53,669 individuals 15-
64  years  old.  The  supplementary  questionnaire  was
answered by a subset of 7,656 individuals aged 15-35,
who had either completed their studies between 1991-
2000 or, if they were studying when the survey was
conducted, had some labour market experience having
interrupted their studies for a period longer than a year.
The information gathered through the survey includes: 
(a) The date (month and year) of leaving basic continuous
education,  defined  as  that  which  starts  from  primary
education and continues without a break,1 (b) the high-
est level of education successfully completed and the
school and department at which this was completed, 
(c) the date (month and year) in which the individual
started working in his/her first significant job (the first
significant job is defined as the job which started after
leaving basic continuous education, had a duration of at
least 6 months and the weekly hours of work were at
least 20), (d) the occupation of the individual in his/her
first significant job, and (e) parental education level.
The analysis in this paper uses only the sub-sample of
individuals younger than 30 years. The reason is that
individuals 31-35 years old in 2000 would have com-
pleted their education in the period 1983-87 and thus
only a few would be still studying in the period 1991-
2000.
The NSSG noted the following shortcomings in con-
ducting the survey:2
(i) The absence of a link between the main survey and
the ad hoc module, which meant that interviewers had
to revisit the answers provided in the main question-
naire to check for consistency.
(ii) The pen and pencil recording of answers during the
interview, and the conduct of quite a few interviews by
telephone.
(iii) The differences between the questionnaire of the
ad hoc module and the main LFS questionnaire in the
definition of a first significant job.
4.2 NSSG  survey  on  the  structure  and  distribution  of
earnings in firms
This  sample  survey  is  conducted  in  most  European
Union Member States through the use of a harmonised
questionnaire. The survey was conducted for the first
time in 1995 (following Council Regulation 2744/1995)
and  was  repeated  in  2002  (according  to  Council
Regulation 530/199), while from 2002 onwards it is to be
conducted at regular 4-year intervals. In Greece the sur-
vey was designed and conducted by the Employment
Statistics  Section  of  the  Division  of  Population  and
Labour Market Statistics of the NSSG.
The aim of the survey is to collect data on the level and
the structure of labour costs at the individual firm level.
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1 Interruptions of less than one year are included in this definition.
2 Details can be found in the quality report by Iannelli (2002).The sample selection is done through stratified sam-
pling, where the primary sampling unit is the establish-
ment belonging to a firm with average annual employ-
ment of at least 10 individuals. The sample is selected
from  the  NSSG  registry  of  businesses  stratified  by
region, economic activity (two-digit sectoral classifica-
tion on the basis of NACE, rev. 1) and the size of the
firm as defined by average annual employment.
The data collected include the following information on
the firm's side: sector of economic activity, total num-
ber  of  employees,  type  of  collective  agreement  fol-
lowed (e.g. company, sectoral, national etc.) and the
type  of  financial  control  of  the  company  (e.g.  state-
owned. The information collected at the level of the
individual employee includes the type of contract the
employee is on (e.g. indefinite length etc.), the hours of
work  (regular  and  overtime),  the  number  of  annual
days of leave, annual and monthly earnings and the
structure thereof (e.g. regular, bonuses, overtime etc.).
Both the 1995 and the 2002 surveys include firms from
the following one-digit NACE, rev. 1, sectors: Mining and
Quarrying (C); Manufacturing (D); Electricity, Gas and
Water Supply (E); Wholesale, retail trade and car repair
(G); Hotels and Restaurants (H); Transport, Storage and
Communication  (I);  Financial  Intermediation  (J).  The
2002 survey in addition includes firms from the follow-
ing sectors: Construction (F); Real Estate, renting and
business activities (K). Sectors F and K have, however,
been excluded in the analysis performed in the present
study when comparisons are being performed between
the two years.
The size of the sample in 1995 was 3,585 firms and
52,975 employees, while for the 2002 survey the sam-
ple  size  was  2,907  firms  and  48,763  employees.
Further  information  on  this  survey  can  be  found  at
NSSG website (www.statistics.gr).
5. Estimating transition models
The  estimation  methods  used  for  modelling  variables
measuring the time elapsed until a certain event occurs
have their origins in the area of medical research and
industrial engineering. In these sciences such models are
used to test, for example, the impact of drugs on the
probability of survival or differences in the time of unin-
terrupted  operation  of  machines.  These  models  are
known as hazard models. In the issue investigated here,
the “danger” is the prolongation of the period of transi-
tion from education to the labour market. An idiosyn-
cratic feature of these models which complicates their
estimation is that observed durations are often censored
in that they do not reflect the full record of the patient,
the unemployed or the machine, given that at the time of
recording the phenomenon under investigation is still in
progress. Observations are thus classified as uncensored
(complete) or censored (incomplete). Observations for
which the complete length of the unemployment spell is
known  are  uncensored.  Observations,  however,  for
those that are still unemployed at time t and for which
the total length of time over which they will be looking
for a job is unknown are censored.
Survival models are characterised by three related func-
tions: (a) the distribution function Ft = Pr(T<t), which
depicts the probability that the random variable T (e.g.
transition from education to the labour market) takes a
value less than t (i.e. shows the percentage of individuals
who have found a job by point t) (b) the survivor function
St=  1–F t= Pr(T≥t), which shows the probability that the
random variable T takes a value equal to or greater than t
(e.g. shows the probability that the length of the transition
period exceeds t) and (c) the hazard function (ht), defined
as the ratio of the density function ft
3 over the survivor
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3 Where ft = dFt/dt.function St i.e. ht = ft/S t. This function shows the proba-
bility of transition from one state to another (e.g. finding a
job, death, machine breakdown) given the time that the
person (or the machine) has already spent in the initial
state (e.g. looking for a job, receiving treatment etc.). For
the  issue  under  investigation,  the  hazard  function  ht
shows the probability of exiting from unemployment (or
alternatively of finding a job if we assume that there are
only two states). This function usually depends on the
length of time (t) the individual has spent as unemployed
as well as on other factors, some of which might also be
time-varying (e.g. macroeconomic conditions, family sta-
tus etc.). On the basis of the assumptions made about the
time-varying nature of ht, we distinguish between propor-
tional  hazard  models  and  the  accelerated  failure  time
models. In the former class of models, the probability of
exiting from unemployment is represented as the product
of the so-called baseline hazard Ït, which is itself a func-
tion of time, and the explanatory factors x, which in these
models change the position but not the slope of the haz-
ard function. To estimate this model we need to add an
error term i.e. a random variable Ó, which captures unob-
servable influences and is taken to be orthogonal to the
independent variables x. The hazard function to be esti-
mated could be succinctly presented as follows:
ht;x = Ó * Ït * exp{G(x;‚)} (1)
Usually a further assumption made is about the multi-
plicative  impact  of  the  explanatory  variables  so  that
equation (1) becomes:
ht;x = Ó * Ït * exp(‚x) (2)
Two important distinctions can be made in estimating
these models depending on: (a) the adoption or other-
wise of a specific statistical distribution for the baseline
hazard and (b) the distribution assumed for the random
variable  Ó.  Depending  on  the  distribution  function
regarding the baseline hazard, the models can be dis-
tinguished into parametric, non-parametric and semi-
parametric. In parametric models, the baseline hazard
is assumed to follow a specific statistical distribution
and the most commonly used distribution for model-
ling the exit from unemployment is the Weibull, which
includes the exponential distribution as a special case.
If  we  assume  that  the  baseline  hazard  follows  a
Weibull, then the 3 main functions (distribution func-
tion,  survivor  function  and  hazard  function)  can  be
written as follows:
Ft = 1 – exp(–Át·) (3)
ft = Áat·-1exp(–Át·) (4)
ht = Áat·-1 (5)
The adoption of the Weibull implies that the probabil-
ity of exiting from unemployment changes monotoni-
cally;  in  other  words,  as  the  unemployment  spell
lengthens,  the  probability  of  exiting  from  unemploy-
ment  continuously  moves  in  the  same  direction.
Specifically, depending on the value of ·, if ·>1 (·<1)
the probability of exiting from unemployment increases
(decreases) as the spell lengthens. If ·=1, we have a
special  case  where  the  probability  of  exiting  from
unemployment does not change over time. In this last
case, the Weibull distribution coincides with the expo-
nential  one.  Survival  models  are  estimated  by  maxi-
mum likelihood, and the likelihood function which is
being maximised is the following:
n+m
L = ™{wilnfi + (1–wt)lnSt} (6)
t=1
where n is the number of uncensored observations
which contribute by ft to the likelihood function and
m is the number of censored observations which con-
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takes the value 1 for uncensored observations and
the value 0 for the remainder.
When a specific distribution function for the baseline
hazard has not been selected, then semi-parametric
or non-parametric models are being estimated. The
most popular estimation method in the economics
literature  is  Cox's  proportional  hazards  method,4
where no specific function is adopted for Ït. In this
model  the  independent  variables  shift  the  baseline
hazard proportionately.
Youth participation in the Greek labour market: developments and obstacles
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 29  10/07 83
4 See Cox (1972).
6. Descriptive statistics of the sample used in the estimation of the transition model
Table A 1 2
Distribution of the school-to-work transition period by gender1
(Percentages)
1 Comprises only individuals who moved from school into a significant job.  A significant job is defined in the survey as a job which started after leaving continuous
education and had a duration of a minimum of 6 months with at least 20 hours per week.
Source: Calculations based on the 2000 LFS ad hoc module on school-to-work transitions.  
Up to 2 months (inclusive) 7.5 8.5
3-11 months 4.6 10.4
12-23 months 13.0 19.1
24-47 months 33.7 28.2
over 47 months 41.2 33.8
Total 100.0 100.0
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Table A 1 3
Means of the variables used in the school-to-work transition model1
1 The figures presented correspond to the sample under investigation.  Since the sample refers only to individuals 15-30 years old who completed their studies in the
period 1990-2000, the figures above differ from the corresponding figures for the population as a whole.  Specifically individuals with longer duration of studies (e.g.
medical and engineering school graduates) are over-represented in the sample.  
2 Agricultural schools, environmental and natural resources studies, physics and mathematics. 
Source: Calculations on the basis of the 2000 LFS ad hoc module on school-to-work transition.  
Demographic features
Percentage married  9.10 22.08
Percentage with foreign nationality  4.48 2.94
Percentage residing in urban areas  64.11 72.96
Percentage residing in semi-urban areas  13.62 10.77
Percentage residing in rural areas  22.27 16.27
Percentage of those who were over 18 when they completed 
their studies 52.17 66.14
Socio-economic features of the family
Percentage of self-employed 
with employees (%) 9.88 8.15
Education level and field of study
Percentage of students with a post-graduate qualification 0.53 0.57
Percentage of physical education graduates  1.26 0.86
Percentage of teacher education graduates 0.38 3.20
Percentage of humanities’ graduates  1.01 5.67
Percentage of social sciences graduates  0.25 0.86
Percentage of business and economics graduates  2.49 2.84
Percentage of law school graduates 0.49 1.33
Percentage of medical school graduates  1.01 1.01
Percentage of life, physical and mathematical sciences 
graduates 2 1.75 1.40
Percentage of engineering and architecture graduates 2.42 1.11
Percentage of Technological Education Institutes (TEI) graduates 5.08 7.61
Percentage of higher technical and 
vocational school graduates  12.53 22.01
Percentage of military training school graduates  1.40 0.18
Percentage of secondary technical and 
vocational school graduates  16.49 7.79
Percentage of upper secondary school graduates  31.09 32.85
Percentage of lower secondary school graduates  15.90 6.57
Percentage of primary school graduates  5.92 4.13
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The only function of economic forecasting is to












Forecasting inflation and macroeconomic devel-
opments in general is mainly a judgmental job, in
which personal assessment and information of a
non-purely quantitative nature play a decisive role
in shaping the final outcome. The lack of adequate
knowledge about the exact structure of the econ-
omy for a precise representation of the underlying
links between the fundamental variables under
consideration, the difficulty of knowing the cycli-
cal position of the economy in real time and,
chiefly, the non-stationary nature of economic
developments, which makes future shocks practi-
cally impossible to predict, largely explain the
importance of subjective assessment in the entire
forecasting process. At the same time, however,
economic forecasts must be comprehensible and
fully explainable both to the public (thus helping
to shape realistic expectations) and to policy mak-
ers (so that the forecasts can be taken on board in
decision-making). Furthermore, the importance of
transparency in the forecasting process should
not be underestimated, since it is directly linked
to the process’s credibility.
In recent years, the conduct of an effective mon-
etary policy by central banks and, to some extent,
the globalisation of inflation, have contributed to
the deceleration of inflation and, at the same
time, to the considerable reduction in inflation
volatility.1 Against this background, inflation has,
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* The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not
necessarily those of the Bank of Greece. Thanks are extended to
Isaac Sabethai for his valuable comments. Any errors or omissions
remain the authors’ own.
1 The standard deviation of inflation in Greece fell from 7.04%
during the period 1981-2001 to 0.3% during the period 2002-
2006.on one hand, become easier to forecast, since,
compared with the 1970s and 1980s, forecasting
errors have been significantly reduced. However,
seen from another perspective, inflation has in
fact become harder to forecast: in an environ-
ment of low inflation volatility, it is difficult to
improve upon a forecast that is based on simple
univariate  statistical  models,  by  using  more
sophisticated models that also take the determi-
nants of inflation into account.2
This paper poses the following two questions with
regard  to  short-term  inflation  forecasting  in
Greece:
1. Can forecasts, generated by simple benchmark
models, be improved by adding variables that
reflect economic activity, labour cost, oil prices,
the exchange rate, etc?
2. Are the suggested more sophisticated models a
useful  tool  in  the  forecasting  process?  And,
pursuing this logic further, can forecasts, to the
extent that they are an inherent part of deci-
sion-making, provide credible information for
the formulation of economic policy?
The answer to the first question is an unequivocal
yes, while the answer to the second one, and par-
ticularly the second sub-question, is also positive,
but subject to certain conditions.
The objective of this paper is to contribute to a
better monthly inflation forecast in Greece by cre-
ating  a  forecasting  framework,  which,  without
sacrificing methodological rigour, could improve
inflation forecasting by allowing the incorporation
of expert judgments. In other words, to the extent
that forecasts are an essential part of economic
policy decision-making, we shall attempt to com-
bine  fully  mechanical  econometric  projections
with  purely  empirical  evaluations,  and  to  make
the inflation forecasting process more transparent
and  comprehensible,  so  that  inflation  forecasts
can ultimately serve as an effective tool in formu-
lating  economic  policy.  It  is  our  belief  that  the
suggested price forecasting approach will help to
mitigate  the  widespread  scepticism  with  which
economic  policy-makers  usually  perceive  fore-
casting models, in terms of their usefulness for
formulating  scenarios  and  forecasts  in  the  eco-
nomic decision-making process. Moreover, it may
even help to refute Galbraith’s famous quote cited
at the very start of this paper!
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 pre-
sents the econometric framework for the short-
term monthly forecasting of the harmonised index
of consumer prices (HICP), the consumer price
index (CPI), as well as their main components.
The model consists of a set of short-term dynamic
equations,  designed  for  each  of  the  HICP  sub-
indices,  as  well  as  for  the  two  overall  indices
(HICP and CPI), so as to produce monthly infla-
tion forecasts for a horizon of up to 18 months
ahead.  Section  3  explores  the  central  question
posed  by  this  paper,  namely  whether  the  pro-
posed  price  model  can  achieve  more  accurate
forecasts than those generated by simple bench-
mark models. The potential improvement in infla-
tion  forecasting  achieved  with  the  suggested
model, relative to the benchmark models, is first
examined using a rolling out-of-sample forecast-
ing procedure with the underlying loss function
defined under two different statistical forecasting
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(2006).criteria  (root  mean  squared  error  and  mean
absolute error). In a second stage, formal statisti-
cal tests (mainly in-sample) are carried out. The
conclusion we reached is that the forecast gener-
ated by the simple forecasting benchmark models
can, at least in the short run, be improved upon
by incorporating variables concerning economic
activity, labour cost, oil prices, the exchange rate,
etc. Section 4 summarises the paper and suggests
how the inflation forecasting framework can be
implemented.
2. The short-term inflation forecasting model
The  short-term  inflation  forecasting  model
(henceforth  referred  to  as  the  STIF  model  or
STIFM)3 consists of a set of short-term dynamic
equations for the HICP sub-indices and the two
overall  consumer  price  indices,  namely  the  CPI
and the HICP. More specifically, apart from the
two overall inflation indices, forecasting equations
were also formulated for the main HICP sub-com-
ponents, namely non-energy goods (HEX),4 energy
goods  (HEG),  unprocessed  food  (UNPROC),
processed food (PROC) and services (SERV). The
specification of the model’s equations is data-insti-
gated rather than derived from a formal theoretical
model of price determination. The empirical for-
mulation of the model exploits the autocorrelation
structure of the data, as well as the key inflation
determinants. In this approach, the role of eco-
nomic theory is rather limited and serves only to
select  the  exogenous  variables  that  have  been
shown to play a decisive role in inflation develop-
ments in Greece. The exogenous variables used in
the model are the following: oil prices (POILU) in
US dollars, the US dollar/euro ($/€) exchange rate
(EXR),  foreign  prices,  in  US  dollars,  of  food
(COMFD)  and  non-food  (COMFDX)  commodi-
ties, the producer price index (PPI), the capacity
utilisation rate in industry (CAP), and total econ-
omy unit labour cost (ULC) or, alternatively, com-
pensation per employee (WUN).5
The  equations  for  the  model  were  selected
according to the standard practice in this type of
study  by  a  pseudo  real-time  forecasting  proce-
dure, while the goodness-of-fit of the equations
over the period under investigation and the plau-
sibility of their coefficients were also taken into
consideration. Given that the model is intended
exclusively  for  short-term  inflation  forecasting,
the specification of the dynamic equations does
not  include  long-run  equilibrium  relationships.
The estimation covers the period Jan. 1996-Dec.
2006  and  was  carried  out  with  non-seasonally
adjusted data. Seasonal dummies were added to
all the equations, based on the assumption that
the  seasonal  pattern  of  inflation  is  stable  over
time.
A  tabular  overview  of  the  specifications  of  the
price equations is provided in Table 1.6
The  model  can  be  used  to  perform  an  initial
benchmark  forecast,  relying  exclusively  on  the
model and the assumptions made about the pro-
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3 Similar  models  have  also  been  constructed  by  other  central
banks in the Eurosystem, as well as by the ECB for inflation fore-
casting at a euro area level (see Benalal et al., 2004, and Fritzer et
al., 2002).
4 More specifically: goods excluding energy and food.
5 It should be noted that the last two variables (ULC, WUN) are
expressed in annualised monthly rates of change. Projections of
the producer price index and the capacity utilisation index over
the forecasting period are based on auxiliary equations appended
to  the  model.  Values  for  the  other  exogenous  variables  were
drawn from various sources (mainly international organisations).
6 Full  estimation  results  are  available  from  the  authors  upon
request.`jected time path of the key inflation determinants.
This  projection  can  then  be  improved  and
enhanced with all of the relevant exogenous infor-
mation available, i.e. information that could not
be included in the model.
3. Evaluation of the model’s forecasting 
ability, a “horse race”
3.1 The benchmark models
This  section  examines  the  first  of  the  two  main
questions posed in this paper, namely whether the
proposed price model can improve upon the fore-
cast generated by simple linear benchmark models.
First, it should be noted that for a model to be
considered  a  good  benchmark  model,  it  must
contain a minimum number of properties, sum-
marised as follows:
a. Generally,  it  should  have  a  reasonably  good
forecasting performance.
b. It should be easy to estimate and produce fore-
casts from.
c. It should have parameters that are fairly constant
over time and a stable forecasting performance.
Recent research has shown that univariate, linear
autoregressive models meet these requirements
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Table 1
Explanatory variables included in the STIF model 
Definitions: Overall HICP: Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices, all items; Overall CPI: Consumer Price Index, all items; HEX: Non-energy goods; HEG: Energy
goods;  UNPROC:  Unprocessed  food;  PROC:  Processed  food;  SERV:  Services;  LDV:  Lagged  dependent  variables;  SD:  Seasonal  dummies;  DV: 
Dummy variables; POILU: Oil prices in US dollars; EXR: US dollar/euro ($/€) exchange rate; ULC: Total economy unit labour cost; WUN: Compensation
per employee; COMFD: Foreign prices, in US dollars, of food commodities; COMFDX: Foreign prices, in US dollars, of non-food commodities; PPI:
Producer price index; CAP: Capacity utilisation rate in industry. 
Note: Numbers between brackets are the lags included in the models. All variables were transformed into first log differences, with the exception of unit labour
cost (ULC) and wages (WUN), which are expressed as rates of change and were therefore transformed into simple first differences.
LDV LDV LDV LDV LDV LDV LDV
(1,5,6,12) (1,5,6,12) (1,2,4) (1,2) (1,2,4) (1) (1,2,3,10,11)
SD SD SD SD SD SD SD

















SERV PROC UNPROC HEG HEX Overall CPI Overall HICPrather well. By contrast, non-linear models, time-
varying  parameter  models,  models  allowing
smooth  parameter  evolution  across  “regimes”,
abrupt  switching-regime  models  or  threshold
models, though sometimes capable of producing
very  accurate  forecasts  for  a  specific  period  of
time, present the drawback of being highly sensi-
tive and dependent upon the estimation period
chosen, which makes them inappropriate for use
as benchmark models.7
The formulation of a generic forecasting model is:
t+h = f (Zt,£) + Ât+h (1)
where t+h denotes the inflation forecast over a
horizon of h steps ahead, f is the functional form
of the model, which describes both the inflation
forecasting model and the competing benchmark
models, Z is the vector of exogenous and prede-
termined variables, £ is the set of parameters and
Ât+h is the forecast error at horizon h.
In this exercise, the suggested inflation model is
assessed in terms of its forecasting ability against
a set of competing univariate benchmark models,
including autoregressive models of different order
(of one and three lags) and simple random walk
models under a different selection of exogenous
variables  (mainly  seasonal  dummies).  The  fore-
casting  performance  of  the  model  is  evaluated 
by a pseudo real-time forecasting exercise. Out-
of-sample model evaluation has become quite a
widespread practice for model selection since the
influential work of Stock and Watson (1999). Out-
of-sample  comparison  is,  generally  speaking,  a
stricter and, in one sense, a more robust model
evaluation and selection practice, since the out-
of-sample data have not been used in the estima-
tion; conditions are therefore more suitable and
closer to actual forecasting conditions. The loss
function is determined on the basis of two crite-
ria: the root mean squared error (RMSE) and the
mean absolute error (MAE). Moreover, formal sta-
tistical tests, based on the encompassing principle
(see Mizon and Richard, 1986) are carried out,8
while  the  statistical  significance  of  the  forecast
improvement is tested, using the statistical test of
equal predictive ability proposed by Diebold and
Mariano (1995).
3.2 The results of the pseudo real-time forecasting
exercise
The  forecasting  performance  of  the  STIFM  is
compared  with  that  of  competing  benchmark
models  over  the  period  Jan.  2003-Dec.  2006.
The  pseudo  real-time  forecasting  exercise  is
implemented as follows: First, we estimate the
price model for the period Feb. 1997-Dec. 2002,
leaving a period of four years (48 observations)
for the assessment of the forecast performance.
A dynamic 18-step ahead forecast is then drawn
from  the  model.9 The  procedure  is  repeated,
adding an extra observation each time, estimat-
ing  the  model  anew  and  executing  the  18-
period ahead dynamic forecast. The procedure
is sequentially repeated until the entire sample
of observations has been exhausted. The same
exact procedure is repeated for all the compet-
ing models, as well as for all the respective vari-
ables (overall indices and sub-components). In
An operational framework for the short-term forecasting of inflation
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 29  10/07 93
7 These  issues  have  been  extensively  analysed  by  Marcellino
(2006) and Kapetanios (2006).
8 These tests are performed mainly within the estimation period.
9 The selection of a horizon of 18 steps (months) ahead corre-
sponds to the longest period capable of being considered short-
term.all of the rolling forecasts (30) and for all the
forecasting horizons (18), but also for all the vari-
ables of the proposed price model as well as the
competing  models,  the  respective  RMSE  and
MAE are calculated by comparing the forecast fig-
ures with the actual values.
The RMSE and MAE are calculated using the stan-
dard formulas:
RMSE =  (2)
MAE = (3)
where t and 
∧
t respectively denote current and
forecast inflation and h is the forecast horizon.
Inflation  in  both  formulas  is  calculated  on  an
annual basis, since the discussion, as well as the
presentation  of  forecasts  by  the  Eurosystem’s
central banks, tend to focus on annual rates of
change.
The  rather  large  number  of  RMSEs  and  MAEs
obtained with the aforementioned process for all
the estimation periods and the forecasting hori-
zons make the results difficult to assess directly.
To overcome this problem, we therefore calcu-
lated the average value of the criteria in the fore-
cast periods, for each forecast horizon and each
endogenous variable in the models. In order to
make the results easier to understand and inter-
pret,  we  expressed  the  RMSE  and  MAE  values
derived from the proposed STIF model in relative
terms, by dividing them by the respective RMSE
and  MAE  values  obtained  with  the  competing
benchmark models. A value smaller than 1 sug-
gests that, based on the criteria used, the STIFM
has a better forecasting ability than the competing
benchmark models.
Tables 2 and 3 present the relative values of RMSE
and  MAE  for  the  STIFM  over  the  competing
benchmark models.10
As these tables show, the STIFM performs bet-
ter than the respective benchmark models up to
13  periods  ahead  for  the  HICP  and  up  to  10
periods  ahead  for  the  overall  CPI.  For  the
respective  sub-indices,  the  STIFM  performs
more accurately across all forecasting horizons.
Therefore, there is a definite forecast gain from
the  use  of  the  suggested  model  and,  what  is
more, the results do not depend on the choice
of the loss function.
3.3 Forecast encompassing
Broadly  speaking,  an  empirical  model  encom-
passes a competing rival model if it can account
for the properties and the characteristics of the
competing  model.  The  principle  of  parametric
encompassing was first introduced in the litera-
ture by Hendry and Richard (1982), Mizon (1984)
and  Mizon  and  Richard  (1986).  Chong  and
Hendry (1986) formulated a statistical test based
on the encompassing principle and applied it to a
forecasting environment. According to Chong and
Hendry,  an  empirical  model  encompasses,  in
forecasting terms, a rival model when the com-
peting  model’s  forecast  cannot  provide  further
information on the one step ahead forecast error
of the empirical model. This is due to the fact that,















10 The  absolute  RMSE  and  MAE  values  are  presented  in  the
Appendix, Tables A1 and A2.in a well-defined model, forecast errors are “inno-
vation  processes”  and  are  therefore  non-pre-
dictable on the basis of the information available
at the time of the forecast.




t+s= · + ‚ f
t+s (4)
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Table 2
Relative root mean square error (RMSE) values
Note: STIFM: short-term inflation forecasting model 
AR1: Autoregressive model of order 1
AR3: Autoregressive model of order 3
RW: Random walk model with seasonal dummies
RW2: Random walk model 
HICP
STIFM/AR1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8104 0.9009 0.9511 0.9714 1.0696
STIFM/AR3  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8065 0.8889 0.9436 0.9658 1.0652
STIFM/RW  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4604 0.3853 0.2878 0.1868 0.1638
STIFM/RW2  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1484 0.1018 0.0797 0.0519 0.0466
CPI
STIFM/AR1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8532 0.9224 0.9686 1.0393 1.1523
STIFM/AR3  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.7723 0.8999 0.9533 1.0276 1.1903
STIFM/RW  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5158 0.4307 0.3215 0.2291 0.2074
STIFM/RW2  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1754 0.1216 0.0982 0.0698 0.0646
HEX
STIFM/AR1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.9333 0.8790 0.8652 0.7933 0.7504
STIFM/AR3  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8537 0.8204 0.8373 0.8136 0.7840
STIFM/RW  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6194 0.4214 0.3250 0.2398 0.2223
STIFM/RW2  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1691 0.1050 0.0828 0.0614 0.0581
HEG
STIFM/AR1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5866 0.5749 0.4786 0.4130 0.4248
STIFM/AR3  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5971 0.5817 0.4804 0.4133 0.4275
STIFM/RW  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4593 0.3186 0.2106 0.1559 0.1589
STIFM/RW2  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4723 0.3223 0.2052 0.1460 0.1499
PROC
STIFM/AR1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8423 0.8829 0.8831 1.0133 0.9781
STIFM/AR3  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8259 0.8831 0.8986 1.0317 0.9885
STIFM/RW  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6902 0.5983 0.4857 0.3834 0.3373
STIFM/RW2  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8536 0.6383 0.4754 0.3566 0.3155
SERV
STIFM/AR1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8024 0.7141 0.9120 0.9450 0.9464
STIFM/AR3  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8525 0.7557 0.9471 0.9372 0.9298
STIFM/RW  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4607 0.2644 0.2229 0.1648 0.1561
STIFM/RW2  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4116 0.2506 0.2071 0.1508 0.1424
18-month horizon 12-month horizon 6-month horizon 3-month horizon 1-month horizon Modelswhere 
∧
Âk
t+s is the one step ahead forecast error of
model k at the forecasting period t+s, and  f
t+s is
the forecast of the competing model f at the same
period t+s.
Under the null hypothesis of correct specification
of model k, coefficient ‚ of the competing model
f in equation (4) should not statistically differ from
zero.  The  competing  model  f fails  to  improve
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Table 3
Relative mean absolute error (MAE) values
Note: STIFM: Short-term inflation forecasting model 
AR1: Autoregressive model of order 1
AR3: Autoregressive model of order 3
RW: Random walk model with seasonal dummies
RW2: Random walk model 
HICP
STIFM/AR1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8104 0.9441 1.0148 1.0151 1.1196
STIFM/AR3  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8065 0.9315 1.0064 1.0074 1.1119
STIFM/RW  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4604 0.3863 0.2793 0.1796 0.1549
STIFM/RW2  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1484 0.1030 0.0774 0.0500 0.0438
CPI
STIFM/AR1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8532 0.9492 1.0117 1.0415 1.1433
STIFM/AR3  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8288 0.9294 1.0009 1.0237 1.1247
STIFM/RW  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5158 0.4344 0.3180 0.2202 0.1972
STIFM/RW2  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1754 0.1240 0.0969 0.0673 0.0611
HEX
STIFM/AR1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.9333 0.8781 0.8690 0.7952 0.7445
STIFM/AR3  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8537 0.8217 0.8402 0.8185 0.7790
STIFM/RW  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6194 0.4133 0.3183 0.2353 0.2122
STIFM/RW2  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1691 0.1035 0.0807 0.0604 0.0552
HEG
STIFM/AR1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5866 0.5782 0.4623 0.4042 0.4106
STIFM/AR3  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5971 0.5786 0.4627 0.4037 0.4122
STIFM/RW  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4593 0.3217 0.2060 0.1527 0.1511
STIFM/RW2  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4723 0.3289 0.2010 0.1440 0.1432
PROC
STIFM/AR1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8423 0.8876 0.8685 0.9717 0.9710
STIFM/AR3  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8259 0.8879 0.8827 0.9913 0.9860
STIFM/RW  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6902 0.6031 0.4775 0.3773 0.3241
STIFM/RW2  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8536 0.6542 0.4770 0.3560 0.3032
SERV
STIFM/AR1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8024 0.7032 0.9275 0.9656 0.9183
STIFM/AR3  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6160 0.5910 0.7257 0.8452 0.9026
STIFM/RW  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4607 0.2553 0.2150 0.1614 0.1472
STIFM/RW2  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4116 0.2415 0.2011 0.1484 0.1346
18-month horizon 12-month horizon 6-month horizon 3-month horizon 1-month horizon Modelsupon the forecasts of model k and the assumption
that k is encompassed by f cannot be ruled out.
The forecast encompassing test statistics are the t-
statistics of coefficient ‚ in equation (4). The fore-
cast  encompassing  test  can  be  generalised  by
inserting the forecasts generated by a set of com-
peting models in equation (4). The statistical sig-
nificance of the constant in (4) implies a system-
atic error in the forecasts of the model under con-
sideration.
In  order  to  evaluate  the  suggested  STIF  model
with the forecast encompassing test, equation (4)
was  estimated  using  as  dependent  variable  the
one step ahead forecast errors of the overall HICP
and CPI equations over a horizon of 18 months.
Specifically,  (4)  was  estimated  over  the  period
June 2005-Dec. 2006 using as dependent variable
the forecast errors of the two overall indices and
as independent variables the respective forecasts
of  the  four  competing  models  over  the  same
period.  The  results  of  these  estimates  are  pre-
sented in Table 4.
As shown in Table 4, the competing models fail to
improve  upon  the  inflation  forecasting  perfor-
mance of the suggested price model. The compet-
ing models fail to reject the hypothesis of forecast
encompassing by the proposed forecasting model.
The same holds true either when estimates are per-
formed with separate regressions of the errors on
the forecast of the competing models or on the
forecast of the more general model which incorpo-
rates the forecasts of all the competing models.11
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Table 4
Forecast encompassing test1
1 Null hypothesis Ho: the competing models fail to encompass the STIFM in terms of forecasting ability. 
HICP
Model 1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.602 –0.258
Model 2  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.613 –0.183
Model 3  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.721 –1.666
Model 4  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.674
Model 5  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.269 0.322 –1.212 –0.894
CPI
Model 1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.705 –1.311
Model 2  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.703 –1.284
Model 3  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1.030 –1.615
Model 4  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.974













11 The results of the tests presented in Table 4 are based on the
estimates of errors and forecasts within the estimation period,
meaning that the models were initially estimated for the entire
period up to December 2006 (ex-post forecasting). The tests were
then repeated for the same period, but this time the initial models
were estimated only up to June 2005, so that the testing period
did  not  coincide  with  the  estimation  period.  Even  this  tighter
requirement did not modify the results, which we have chosen to
omit here for sake of brevity.3.4 The Diebold and Mariano (D-M) forecast 
accuracy test
The  forecast  accuracy  measures  (RMSE  and
MAE) analysed in Section 3.2 are descriptive and
comparative  forecast  accuracy  indices,  which
obviously do not provide answers to the statisti-
cal  inference  problem  as  to  whether  the  fore-
casting improvement is also statistically signifi-
cant in terms of a given loss function. Diebold
and Mariano (1995) proposed a formal statistical
procedure  for  testing  the  hypothesis  of  equal
forecasting  ability  of  two  competing  models,
using a selected loss function. In other words,
the  (D-M)  procedure  tests  the  validity  of  the
hypothesis that the forecasts generated by two
competing models k and f are statistically equal.
The “null hypothesis” of the test is that the antic-
ipated differential loss E{d} between the com-
pared models is zero:
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Table 5
Diebold-Mariano forecast accuracy tests, RMSE loss function   
(1st version)
* Indicates a rejection of the null hypothesis (Ho), i.e. of the equal forecasting performance of the compared models, at a significance level of ·= 5%.
HICP
Constant term  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –2.152* –2.123* –1.190 –22.120*
Constant term, with heteroskedasticity 
consistent covariances (Newey-West HAC) –1.403 –1.383 –0.778 –22.250*
CPI 
Constant term  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.031 1.032 1.339 –15.854*
Constant term, with heteroskedasticity
consistent covariances (Newey-West HAC) 0.639 0.640 0.831 –12.940*
HEX
Constant term  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1.866 –1.467 –6.390* –18.405*
Constant term, with heteroskedasticity 
consistent covariances (Newey-West HAC) –1.218 –0.948 –3.916* –13.419*
HEG
Constant term  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –15.234* –19.189* –10.169* –10.227*
Constant term, with heteroskedasticity 
consistent covariances (Newey-West HAC) –9.591* –12.075* –6.284* –6.337*
PROC
Constant term  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19.687* 15.709* –7.761* –8.241*
Constant term, with heteroskedasticity 
consistent covariances (Newey-West HAC) 13.298* 11.754* –4.586* –5.109*
SERV 
Constant term  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –2.266* –2.161* –9.221* –3.654*
Constant term, with heteroskedasticity 










t+s)} = 0 (5)
where Âk
t+s and Âf
t+s are the forecasts produced by
competing models k and f over an s steps ahead
horizon and L is the loss function.
The (D-M) testing procedure was applied in two dif-
ferent versions. In the first version, the regressions
were estimated using as dependent variable the dif-
ferences (between the proposed and the competing
models) of the 18 average values of the RMSE and
MAE functions calculated with the pseudo real-time
30-period  forecasting  procedure.  The  regressions
were carried out for all variables (overall and sub-
indices) and for all models (STIFM and benchmarks)
and cover all the forecast horizons. The results of
these tests are presented in Tables 5 and 6.
The results of Tables 5 and 6 show that for the
overall indices (HICP and CPI), the hypothesis of
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Table 6
Diebold-Mariano forecast accuracy tests, ª∞∂ loss function 
(1st version)
* Indicates a rejection of the null hypothesis (Ho), i.e. of the equal forecasting performance of the compared models, at a significance level of ·= 5%.
HICP
Constant term  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1.017 –1.002 –2.873* –23.281*
Constant term, with heteroskedasticity
consistent covariable (Newey-West HAC)  . . –0.652 –0.642 –1.908 –23.102*
CPI 
Constant term  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.519 0.504 0.731 –17.417*
Constant term, with heteroskedasticity
consistent covariable (Newey-West HAC)  . . 0.324 0.315 0.458 –14.731*
HEX
Constant term  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –2.823* –2.347* –6.707* –17.744*
Constant term, with heteroskedasticity
consistent covariable (Newey-West HAC)  . . –1.815 –1.493 –4.118* –12.502*
HEG
Constant term  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –15.692* –20.210* –10.301* –10.466*
Constant term, with heteroskedasticity
consistent covariable (Newey-West HAC)  . . –9.762* –12.545* –6.368* –6.476*
PROC
Constant term  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24.083* 20.954* –7.456* –7.875*
Constant term, with heteroskedasticity
consistent covariable (Newey-West HAC)  . . 15.483* 14.247* –4.586* –4.866*
SERV 
Constant term  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1.932 –1.403 –9.332* –3.629*
Constant term, with heteroskedasticity








t-statisticequal forecasting performance is rejected for the
“random walk” model, which produces forecasts
significantly  different  and  inferior  in  statistical
terms (on the basis of the results of the rolling
forecast procedure) to those of the STIF model.
This result holds for both loss functions. However,
the  competing  AR1  and  AR3  models,  which  in
RMSE and MAE terms provide more accurate out-
of-sample forecasts than the ones provided by the
STIFM for both overall indices, fail to reject the
equal forecast performance hypothesis within the
conventional  bounds  of  statistical  error.  For  the
HICP sub-indices, most of the results suggest that
the  STIFM  forecasts,  which  are  generally  better
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Table 7
Diebold-Mariano forecast accuracy tests, RMSE loss function 
(2nd version)
* Indicates a rejection of the null hypothesis (Ho), i.e. of the equal forecasting performance of the compared models, at a significance level of ·= 5%.
3-month horizon
HICP
Constant term  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1.145 –1.325 –3.758* –8.198*
Constant term, with heteroskedasticity 
consistent covariances (Newey-West HAC) –1.008 –1.176 –3.407* –9.672*
CPI 
Constant term  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.950 –1.305 –3.783* –7.715*
Constant term, with heteroskedasticity
consistent covariances (Newey-West HAC) –0.935 –1.328 –3.411* –8.879*
12-month horizon
HICP
Constant term  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.654 –0.801 –3.959* –5.795*
Constant term, with heteroskedasticity
consistent covariances (Newey-West HAC) –0.612 –0.717 –3.591* –8.697*
CPI 
Constant term  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.598 0.467 –4.031* –5.464*
Constant term, with heteroskedasticity
consistent covariances (Newey-West HAC) 0.467 0.348 –3.649* –7.914*
18-month horizon
HICP
Constant term  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.784 1.717 –4.036* –5.536*
Constant term, with heteroskedasticity
consistent covariances (Newey-West HAC) 1.342 1.238 –3.730* –8.50*
CPI 
Constant term  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.78* 3.491* –4.106* –5.215*
Constant term, with heteroskedasticity








t-statisticthan those of the competing models, are also sta-
tistically much more accurate.12 This result holds
for both loss functions.
In the second version, the testing procedure was
applied  to  the  differences  of  the  loss  functions
between the STIFM and the competing models,
ranked in forecast horizons of 3, 12 and 18 steps
ahead.  In  other  words,  the  test  was  conducted
sequentially for each of the selected forecast hori-
zons  by  calculating  the  differences  of  the  loss
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12 This result is, to a satisfactory extent, also valid for the auto-
correlation-corrected t-statistics.
Table 8
Diebold-Mariano forecast accuracy tests, ª∞∂ loss function
(2nd version)
* Indicates a rejection of the null hypothesis (Ho), i.e. of the equal forecasting performance of the compared models, at a significance level of ·= 5%.
3-month horizon
HICP
Constant term  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.621 –0.787 –3.552* –7.741*
Constant term, with heteroskedasticity
consistent covariances (Newey-West HAC) –0.565 –0.726 –3.312* –9.320*
CPI 
Constant term  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.605 –0.920 –3.587* –7.382*
Constant term, with heteroskedasticity
consistent covariances (Newey-West HAC) –0.579 –0.909 –3.268* –8.558*
12-month horizon
HICP
Constant term  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.252 0.128 –3.965* –5.812*
Constant term, with heteroskedasticity
consistent covariances (Newey-West HAC) 0.242 0.115 –3.606* –8.580*
CPI 
Constant term  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.528 0.341 –4.051* –5.467*
Constant term, with heteroskedasticity
consistent covariances (Newey-West HAC) 0.432 0.262 –3.667* –7.788*
18-month horizon
HICP
Constant term  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.423* 2.326* –4.026* –5.567*
Constant term, with heteroskedasticity
consistent covariances (Newey-West HAC) 1.918 1.740 –3.714* –8.447*
CPI 
Constant term  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.333* 2.231* –4.096* –5.229*
Constant term, with heteroskedasticity








t-statisticfunctions between the STIFM and the competing
models, as obtained with the 30-period sequential
procedure. The test was conducted for both over-
all indices, and the results of the relevant regres-
sions are presented in Tables 7 and 8.
The results of these last tests agree more or less
with  our  previous  findings.  Across  all  horizons
and for both loss functions, the forecasts from the
random  walk  models  reject  the  hypothesis  of
equal forecast performance. The STIFM forecasts
are significantly different in statistical terms and
more accurate (on the basis of the RMSE and MAE
functions) than the forecasts generated by the two
competing models.
At the 18-step horizon, the AR1 and AR3 models
produce more accurate forecasts than the STIFM
only for the CPI and the HICP. The equal forecast-
ing  performance  hypothesis  cannot  be  rejected
when the relevant regressions are carried out by
adjusting variances for heteroskedasticity (HAC).
At the 3- and 12-step horizons, the equal forecast-
ing  performance  hypothesis  cannot  be  rejected
when the AR1 and AR3 models are tested against
the STIFM.
Testing  the  models’  forecasting  performance
involves numerous forecasting horizons and sev-
eral  variables.  Therefore,  it  is  difficult,  if  not
impossible, to come up with one overall winner
that outperforms all rival models.13 However, the
results we obtained show that the STIFM outper-
forms the competing benchmark models in terms
of forecasting ability. Moreover, even in the cases
where it did not perform better, the superiority of
the rival models in terms of forecasting accuracy
was  usually  not  statistically  significant.  In  addi-
tion,  the  competing  models  failed  to  reject  the
forecast  encompassing  hypothesis  against  the
STIFM;  in  other  words,  the  competing  models
failed to improve upon the forecast generated by
the STIFM, at least at the horizons for which the
hypothesis was tested. The results obtained so far
support the operational usefulness of the STIFM.
4. Guidelines for the application of the 
inflation forecasting framework – summary
When Greece joined the euro area, part of the
responsibility  for  controlling  domestic  inflation
was  transferred  to  the  European  Central  Bank
(ECB), which conducts a forward-looking mone-
tary policy and pursues an objective of medium-
term price stability for the euro area as a whole, in
accordance with its own quantitative definition of
price stability. As monetary policy is implemented
at a euro area level, the national central banks are
obviously responsible for controlling and moni-
toring domestic inflation, and for providing credi-
ble and accurate inflation forecasts. The present
paper contributes to the attainment of this task by
presenting  a  framework  that  can  help  improve
short-term inflation forecasting in Greece, so that
these forecasts can play a role in the formulation
of domestic policies.14 The STIF model was com-
pared with simple competing benchmark models
and  seems  to  have  a  better  forecasting  perfor-
mance: in fact, even in the cases where it failed to
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performing” the respective random walk model in terms of fore-
casting ability is in itself an achievement and the STIFM is indeed
a “winner”. See the well-known examples for exchange rates pre-
sented by Meese and Rogoff (1983) and for the Phillips curve pre-
sented by Ohanian (2001).
14 Alan Greenspan once said: “Implicit in any monetary policy
action or inaction is an expectation of how the future will unfold,
that is, a forecast”.perform better, the superiority of the competing
models in terms of forecast accuracy was usually
not  statistically  significant.  Furthermore,  the
STIFM  performed  better  than  the  strictly  judg-
mental  forecasts.  Only  for  the  current  and  the
upcoming month were the forecasts, obtained by
judgmental methods, more accurate than those
generated by the STIFM. This overall conclusion is
encouraging with regard to the operational use-
fulness of the STIFM in inflation forecasting by the
Bank of Greece. Once again, however, it should
be stressed that there is no “single winner” that
systematically outperforms all competing models.
In the current juncture of low and rather steady
inflation, where time series contain little informa-
tion and inflation dynamics have changed consid-
erably, a very promising but much more sophisti-
cated strategy for accurate forecasting would be
to construct sets of models and to put them in
competition with each other, thereby transform-
ing  the  “horse  race”  into  a  contest  between
“horse stables”. We intend to deal with this issue
in a forthcoming paper.
That said and considering that the main purpose
of this paper was to achieve a judicious blend and
an  effective  conjunction  of  purely  judgmental
forecasts and mechanical projections which take
into  account  the  determinants  of  inflation,  the
STIFM could be used as follows:
The empirical results of the paper suggest that,
for  the  current  as  well  as  for  the  upcoming
month,  inflation  forecasting  is  more  accurate
when performed on a judgmental basis by price
experts.  However,  with  regard  to  the  energy
price component, it would be advisable to incor-
porate  data  from  the  European  Commission’s
“Oil Bulletin”15 into the experts’ judgmental fore-
cast. This judgmental forecast for the current and
the upcoming month could then be plugged into
the  STIF  model,  and,  based  on  the  agreed
assumptions, a mechanical projection could be
conducted for the overall indices and respective
sub-indices  over  a  maximum  horizon  of  16
months.  The  results  of  this  projection  would
need to be assessed by price experts, who could
then improve the forecast by providing additional
exogenous information that the STIFM could not
contain.  This  projection,  enhanced  with  judg-
mental interventions, could serve policy-makers
as a benchmark forecast and a basis for further
discussion. We believe that short-term inflation
forecasting within the suggested empirical frame-
work could make the business of forecasting eas-
ier  to  explain  and  understand,  not  to  mention
more transparent and, therefore, more credible.
The application of the suggested systematic pro-
cedure leaves room for an ex-post evaluation and
analysis of the forecasts: at this stage, the fore-
casting errors can be analysed, in order to deter-
mine whether they are due to errors in the for-
mulation of the initial assumptions, to errors in
judgment  or  to  the  impact  of  new  data.  The
framework is easy to use: a baseline forecast can
be quickly produced, after which the impact of
various  alternative  conditioning  assumptions
could be successfully evaluated.
An operational framework for the short-term forecasting of inflation
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Appendix
Table A 1
Root mean squared error (RMSE)
Note: STIFM: Short-term inflation forecasting model 
AR1: Autoregressive model of order 1
AR3: Autoregressive model of order 3
RW: Random walk model with seasonal dummies
RW2: Random walk model 
HICP
STIFM  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2100 0.3039 0.3486 0.3901 0.4237
AR1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2591 0.3373 0.3665 0.4015 0.3961
AR3  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2604 0.3419 0.3694 0.4039 0.3977
RW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4560 0.7887 1.2112 2.0880 2.5864
RW2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4151 2.9861 4.3759 7.5226 9.1008
CPI
STIFM  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2170 0.3168 0.3744 0.4545 0.5086
AR1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2543 0.3435 0.3865 0.4373 0.4414
AR3  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2810 0.3521 0.3927 0.4424 0.4273
RW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4207 0.7356 1.1643 1.9842 2.4528
RW2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2371 2.6056 3.8124 6.5164 7.8691
HEX
STIFM  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2608 0.3405 0.3960 0.5056 0.5809
AR1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2794 0.3873 0.4578 0.6373 0.7742
AR3  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3055 0.4150 0.4730 0.6214 0.7410
RW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4210 0.8080 1.2186 2.1081 2.6131
RW2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5422 3.2430 4.7858 8.2389 9.9930
HEG
STIFM  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2893 1.9278 2.0499 2.6214 3.3014
AR1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1982 3.3533 4.2830 6.3472 7.7724
AR3  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1593 3.3142 4.2672 6.3430 7.7227
RW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8070 6.0513 9.7320 16.8115 20.7808
RW2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7297 5.9820 9.9911 17.9580 22.0200
PROC
STIFM  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2553 0.4865 0.6802 0.9515 1.0656
AR1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3031 0.5510 0.7702 0.9390 1.0894
AR3  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3091 0.5509 0.7569 0.9223 1.0780
RW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3699 0.8132 1.4004 2.4817 3.1594
RW2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2991 0.7622 1.4309 2.6683 3.3770
SERV
STIFM  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2522 0.2800 0.3676 0.4918 0.5985
AR1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3143 0.3922 0.4030 0.5204 0.6325
AR3  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2958 0.3706 0.3881 0.5248 0.6438
RW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5474 1.0592 1.6492 2.9849 3.8344
RW2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6126 1.1174 1.7748 3.2608 4.2035
18-month horizon 12-month horizon 6-month horizon 3-month horizon 1-month horizon ModelsAn operational framework for the short-term forecasting of inflation
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Table A 2
Mean absolute error (MAE) 
Note: STIFM: Short-term inflation forecasting model 
AR1: Autoregressive model of order 1
AR3: Autoregressive model of order 3
RW: Random walk model with seasonal dummies
RW2: Random walk model 
HICP
STIFM  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2100 0,2763 0.3049 0.3338 0.3632
AR1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2591 0,2927 0.3005 0.3288 0.3244
AR3  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2604 0,2966 0.3029 0.3313 0.3266
RW   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4560 0,7153 1.0915 1.8587 2.3440
RW2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4151 2,6815 3.9397 6.6711 8.2933
CPI
STIFM  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2170 0,2907 0.3315 0.3878 0.4368
AR1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2543 0,3063 0.3276 0.3723 0.3821
AR3  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2618 0,3128 0.3312 0.3788 0.3884
RW   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4207 0,6692 1.0424 1.7610 2.2152
RW2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2371 2,3448 3.4197 5.7654 7.1548
HEX
STIFM  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2608 0.3008 0.3474 0.4414 0.5026
AR1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2794 0.3426 0.3997 0.5550 0.6751
AR3  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3055 0.3661 0.4134 0.5392 0.6452
RW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4210 0.7279 1.0914 1.8756 2.3691
RW2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5422 2.9076 4.3025 7.3105 9.1035
HEG
STIFM  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2893 1.7514 1.7836 2.2726 2.8375
AR1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1982 3.0289 3.8584 5.6228 6.9098
AR3  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1593 3.0268 3.8545 5.6294 6.8840
RW   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8070 5.4443 8.6604 14.8845 18.7844
RW2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7297 5.3253 8.8733 15.7802 19.8101
PROC
STIFM  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2553 0.4379 0.5877 0.8168 0.9012
AR1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3031 0.4933 0.6767 0.8406 0.9281
AR3  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3091 0.4932 0.6659 0.8240 0.9140
RW   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3699 0.7262 1.2308 2.1651 2.7810
RW2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2991 0.6694 1.2322 2.2946 2.9724
SERV
STIFM  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2522 0.2488 0.3210 0.4264 0.5069
AR1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3143 0.3539 0.3461 0.4416 0.5519
AR3  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4094 0.4211 0.4424 0.5045 0.5616
RW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5474 0.9748 1.4934 2.6415 3.4437
RW2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6126 1.0303 1.5967 2.8733 3.7653
18-month horizon 12-month horizon 6-month horizon 3-month horizon 1-month horizon ModelsReferences 
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The balance sheet channel of monetary policy transmission: evidence from the UK
Working Paper No. 53
Eleni Angelopoulou and Heather D. Gibson
The balance sheet channel is an additional mech-
anism  through  which  monetary  policy  can  be
transmitted to the real economy through financial
market  frictions.  Bernanke  and  Gertler  (1989)
argued that the existence of information asymme-
tries  implies  that  a  firm’s  (or  household’s)  net
worth is likely to influence investment (and more
generally  spending)  decisions.  The  implications
are profound. First, since net worth tends to be
procyclical,  this  will  cause  investment  to  move
procyclically  thus  generating  accelerator  effects
and magnifying the amplitude of economic cycles.
Second, shocks to net worth which are indepen-
dent  of  output  can  cause  fluctuations.  A  sub-
sidiary  consequence  of  this  is  that  even  small
monetary policy shocks could have large effects.
The majority of empirical papers in this area refer
to the US, although the presence of financial con-
straints on firm investment policy is well-estab-
lished for countries such as the UK. This paper
investigates the relationship between firm finan-
cial constraints and monetary policy for the UK,
using a panel of UK firms in manufacturing over
the period 1970 to 1991. In addition to examining
the impact of cash flow in different subsamples
based on company size or financial policy (divi-
dend payouts, share issues or debt accumulation),
we  also  investigate  the  extent  to  which  invest-
ment  becomes  more  sensitive  to  cash  flow  in
periods of monetary tightness. To this end, we
employ  a  monetary  tightness  indicator  con-
structed for the UK using the narrative approach
pioneered by Romer and Romer (1989).
The results provide support for the view that, using
firm size and firm financial policy to classify com-
panies, potentially financially-constrained UK firms
show greater investment sensitivity to cash flow.
Firms as a whole also show greater sensitivity dur-
ing periods of tight monetary policy and the effect
is greater on those that are potentially financially-
constrained. The results are fairly robust to alterna-
tive  classifications  of  constrained/unconstrained
firms and point to the possible existence of a bal-
ance sheet channel in addition to other possible
transmission  mechanisms  such  as  interest  rates,
the exchange rate or a bank lending channel. 
The implications of these findings are that, at least
for the period under consideration here, financial
accelerator effects were a determining character-
istic  of  UK  business  cycles.  At  the  same  time,
however, monetary policy was more effective at
influencing the cycle since it operated not only via
traditional channels such as the interest rate or
exchange rate, but also through its effect on firms’
net worth and hence spending decisions.ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 29  10/07 110
Identification of a loan supply function: a cross-country test for the existence 
of a bank lending channel
Working Paper ¡Ô. 54
Sophocles N. Brissimis and Matthaios D. Delis
Bernanke and Blinder (1988) developed a simple
structural model (BB model) to analyse the bank
lending channel, which became the benchmark for
future studies. They expanded the conventional IS-
LM model to include the loan market, dropping the
assumption of perfect substitutability between bank
loans  and  bonds.  In  this  framework,  loan  supply
shifts play a key role in the propagation of monetary
impulses, amplifying the effect on real output that
works through the interest rate channel. Previous
empirical work on the bank lending channel used
either (i) time series data and the theoretical pre-
dictions of the BB model (but faced the problem 
of the simultaneous determination of loan supply 
and demand, or (ii) bank-level data and indirectly 
tested for loan supply shifts through estimation of
reduced-form equations that examine the relation-
ship between bank lending, a monetary policy vari-
able and bank characteristics. Implicit in this latter
approach is the assumption that, when heterogene-
ity in bank characteristics is present, loan supply
shifts can be identified.
Given the limitations of this approach, we focus on
the direct identification of the loan supply function
from bank data, adopting the assumptions of the BB
model as regards the loan market. Thus, we derive,
at the individual bank level, a loan supply function
that is free of the simultaneity problem and offers
testable hypotheses pertaining to imperfect substi-
tutability between loans and bonds in bank portfo-
lios. In this context, perfect substitutability implies
that a loan supply function cannot be defined. In a
second  step,  we  assess  the  impact  of  individual
bank  characteristics  on  banks’  ability  to  supply
loans by augmenting the above model to include a
number of bank-characteristic variables (capitalisa-
tion,  liquidity  and  size)  and  examining  whether
these can modify the test results obtained prior to
their inclusion.
The proposed methodology was applied to a num-
ber of panel datasets corresponding to 16 OECD
countries for the years 1996 to 2003. Among the
countries examined, the lending channel plays a sig-
nificant role only in Japan and Greece. In the former
case this is mainly attributed to the financial distress
of  the  1990s,  while  in  the  latter  recent  financial
deregulation has not been fully absorbed by bank-
ing institutions during the sample period. A second
group of countries, where only weak evidence is
found for a lending channel, includes France, Italy
and Spain. The apparent absence of a bank lending
channel in the rest of the countries in our sample
suggests that the tendency towards increased mar-
ket-based finance has strengthened the degree of
asset substitutability. For countries like the US and
the  UK,  where  financial  systems  have  been  pre-
dominantly market-based for a relatively long time,
the  tests  strongly  rejected  the  hypothesis  of  an
operative lending channel. Finally, heterogeneity in
bank  characteristics  was  found  to  be  useful  in
accounting for loan supply shifts only in the case of
France, suggesting that it represents a less impor-
tant element on which the search for a bank lending
channel could be based. Working Papers
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The narrative approach for the identification of monetary policy shocks 
in a small open economy
Working Paper ¡Ô. 55
Eleni Angelopoulou
In this paper the narrative methodology, which
uses  policy  record  to  identify  the  rationale
behind policy actions, is applied to the UK in
order to explore the transmission of monetary
policy.  The  period  studied  ranges  from  1971,
when  "Competition  and  Credit  Control"  was
introduced, to 1992, when the UK abandoned
the  Exchange  Rate  Mechanism.  This  period,
which  was  characterised  by  monetary  control
arrangements through intermediate targets, ends
before  the  shift  to  direct  inflation  targeting,
introduced in 1992 and still in place. 
The effects of monetary policy are usually exam-
ined with the use of structural VAR models. This
methodology is appealing because results in the
form of impulse responses of variables to a policy
shock provide many insights in an easily readable
form. However, it comes at the cost of the impo-
sition of disputable restrictions for the identifica-
tion of policy shocks. The narrative approach aims
to circumvent "statistical" identification problems
faced by the structural VAR literature, while keep-
ing  the  expositional  framework.  Identification  of
policy episodes relies exclusively on the study of
monetary policy record. A policy dummy captur-
ing systematic shifts of policy is constructed and
an unrestricted VAR framework is used to estimate
the effects of a policy shock on other variables.
This  paper  develops  the  narrative  approach
framework in three ways. The first is its extension
to a small open economy, in contrast with exist-
ing studies which apply the narrative approach to
the  United  States,  i.e.  a  large  closed  economy
whose monetary policy decisions are not guided
by external goals. 
The  second  contribution  relates  to  the  attempt 
to improve the narrative approach methodology
by  choosing  a  transparent  definition  of  policy
episodes, consisting of four clear and easily verifi-
able  preconditions.  The  aim  here  is  to  deflect
some of the usual criticism about the approach,
namely that it is too judgmental. 
Finally, the use of a step-dummy, instead of an
impulse dummy, for monetary policy episodes is
a technical improvement to the framework, which
allows for the duration of an episode to be taken
into account – central banks rarely enact a policy
change in one go.
Restrictive monetary policy shocks (identified as
shocks to the interest rate which are orthogonal
to shocks to the systematic policy dummy) appear
to give theory-consistent results (persistent fall in
prices and money, hump-shaped response of out-
put with a slow recovery pace). Monetary policy
appears to cause substantial fluctuations in output
at a four-year horizon. The exchange rate, which
shows persistent appreciation in the aftermath of
a policy shock, appears to be the major source of
fluctuations in output at a four-year-horizon.ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 29  10/07 112
Foreign exchange intervention and equilibrium real exchange rates 
Working Paper No. 56
Dimitrios Sideris
In  this  paper  we  examine  the  effects  of  official
intervention  on:  (i)  the  short-run  dynamics  of
nominal  exchange  rates  and  (ii)  the  estimated
long-run  behaviour  of  the  real  exchange  rate
(more precisely, the long-run behaviour of nomi-
nal exchange rates in relation to the behaviour of
relative  prices).  Our  main  argument  is  that,  by
identifying and "isolating" the effects coming from
intervention operations on the short-run exchange
rate dynamics, we can detect a long-run equilib-
rium  relationship  connecting  domestic  and  for-
eign prices to nominal exchange rates, as formed
by market forces alone.
The paper presents empirical findings for the valid-
ity of the above argument by drawing on the expe-
rience  of  Bulgaria,  Poland,  Romania,  Russia,
Slovenia and Ukraine during the period following
their transition to a market economy at the begin-
ning of the 1990s. In the analysis, exchange rate
data  for  the  domestic  currencies  of  the  six
economies against the US dollar are used. The six
economies seem ideal candidates for evaluating the
above argument as they share a number of com-
mon features: they all adopted flexible or managed
floating exchange rate regimes, whereas their mon-
etary authorities made frequent interventions in the
foreign markets in order to smooth exchange rate
volatility or pursue various monetary targets. 
The  results  confirm  our  theoretical  postulate:
Effects due to authorities’ interventions in the for-
eign  market  turn  out  to  be  significant  for  the
dynamic behaviour of all nominal exchange rates
under  consideration.  The  results  related  to  the
behaviour of exchange rates and relative prices in
equilibrium  change  dramatically  once  interven-
tion effects are taken into account in the empiri-
cal modelling of the short-run dynamics and indi-
cate that omission of intervention effects would
lead to mistakenly rejecting a long-run exchange
rate  pattern  based  on  Purchasing  Power  Parity
(PPP). In other words, allowing for intervention
effects, we indicate that PPP has enough content
about the behaviour of the real exchange rates in
equilibrium.  In  addition,  the  estimated  equilib-
rium  relationships  indicate  that  the  nominal
exchange rates moved towards their equilibrium
values in a constant pattern, which nevertheless
implied  a  constant  appreciation  of  the  real
exchange rates. This finding indicates the pres-
ence of strong Balassa-Samuelson effects which
have  been  in  place  for  long  periods  of  time.
Nevertheless,  the  stationarity  of  the  real
exchange rates is not accepted in five out of the
six economies, and this may also be due to pro-
ductivity shocks and the impact that productivity
has  on  the  pricing  of  traded  and  non-traded
goods and services sectors.Working Papers
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The New Keynesian Phillips Curve and lagged inflation: a case of spurious correlation?
Working Paper ¡Ô. 57
George Hondroyiannis, P.A.V.B. Swamy and George S. Tavlas
The New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) specifies
a relationship between inflation and a forcing vari-
able and the current period’s expectation of future
inflation.  Most  empirical  estimates  of  the  NKPC,
typically based on Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM) estimation, have found a significant role for
lagged inflation, producing a "hybrid" NKPC. Using
US quarterly data for the period 1970:1-2000:4, this
paper examines whether the role of lagged inflation
in the NKPC might be due to the spurious outcome
of specification biases. In line with previous papers,
we employ GMM estimation and we find a signifi-
cant effect for lagged inflation. 
We also use time varying coefficient (TVC) estima-
tion, a procedure that allows us to directly confront
specification  biases  and  spurious  relationships.
Specifically, employing TVC estimation, each slope
coefficient of both the pure and hybrid NKPCs is
interpreted as the sum of three components: (i) a
bias-free component, (ii) an omitted-variables bias
component,  and  (iii)  a  measurement-error  bias
component. By separately identifying the bias-free
component,  we  are  able  to  distinguish  between
spurious and non-spurious regressions. If the bias-
free component of the coefficient of a regressor is
zero,  then  the  coefficient  is  considered  spurious
even if the components representing the omitted-
variables bias and measurement-error bias of the
coefficient are non-zero.
TVC estimation has the advantage of taking struc-
tural  changes  into  account.  Unlike  fixed-coeffi-
cient estimation, under which the dummy vari-
able is added to the regression, in TVC estimation
the dummy variable first appears as a coefficient
driver.  The  coefficient  driver  can  affect  all  the
estimated  coefficients  of  the  NKPC  and  the
hybrid  Phillips  curve  and  also  affects  the  vari-
ances and covariances of the errors. Intuitively,
the coefficient drivers, which may be thought of
as variables, but not part of the explanatory vari-
ables  of  the  NKPC,  serve  two  purposes.  First,
they  deal  with  the  correlations  between  the
included  explanatory  variables  and  their  coeffi-
cients. Second, they allow us to decompose the
coefficients of the TVC models into their respec-
tive components. 
Under  GMM,  incorporating  lagged  inflation  and,
alternatively,  one  of  three  measures  of  expected
inflation in the Phillips relation, the coefficients on
the lagged inflation variable and expected inflation
sum  to  near  unity,  yielding  a  long-run  vertical
Phillips relation. TVC estimation suggests that the
role found by previous researchers for lagged infla-
tion in the NKPC is the spurious outcome of spec-
ification  biases.  Moreover,  our  results  are  not
dependent  on  a  particular  measure  of  inflation
expectations. Each of the three measures used pro-
vided a similar set of results.ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 29  10/07 114
The interaction between mortgage financing and housing prices in Greece
Working Paper ¡o. 58
Sophocles N. Brissimis and Thomas Vlassopoulos
The interaction of credit and property prices is
of  particular  relevance  to  central  bank  policy.
The  financial  accelerator  mechanism  which  is
part of the nexus of this interaction is central to
the  monetary  policy  transmission  mechanism.
Moreover,  fluctuations  in  asset  prices,  and
housing prices in particular, pose challenges to
monetary  policy  makers  in  calibrating  the
appropriate  response.  Finally,  this  interaction
can  have  important  implications  for  financial
stability.
The aim of this paper is to empirically investigate
the pattern of causality between credit and prop-
erty prices, focusing on housing loans and hous-
ing prices in the case of Greece. This is of par-
ticular  interest  given  that  the  deregulation  of
mortgage lending in Greece, which was followed
by a rapid increase in housing loans, went hand-
in-hand with a continuous increase in housing
prices that, in nominal terms, averaged 11% per
annum between 1995 and 2005. This develop-
ment raises the question whether the growth in
residential property valuations was spurred by
the  increased  availability  of  mortgage  lending.
Moreover, the issue of housing prices is of great
importance in Greece, since residential property
represents  more  than  80%  of  total  household
wealth,  a  share  far  greater  than  that  in  other
comparable countries.
In order to analyse the interaction between housing
loans and housing prices, multivariate cointegration
techniques are employed in this paper. The results of
the long-run analysis indicate that statistically hous-
ing prices are weakly exogenous and hence do not
react to disequilibria in the mortgage lending market.
This suggests that in the long run a line of causality
running from housing loans to housing prices is not
confirmed empirically. The short-run analysis, how-
ever, provides clear indications of a contemporane-
ous bi-directional dependence among housing loans
and housing prices.
The absence of long-run causation running from
housing loans to housing prices implies that other
factors need to be examined in order to account
for the developments in residential property valu-
ations during the latter part of the sample period
in  Greece.  These  factors  include:  the  improve-
ment in households’ expectations regarding their
future income, related to some extent to the fact
that Greece has joined the euro area; the reduc-
tion  in  interest  rates,  also  partly  related  to  the
process of EMU accession; demographic factors,
in particular the influx and gradual integration of
immigrants as well as the reduction in the average
size of households, as single-person households
become more common; and, finally, the low or
negative  real  returns  offered  by  most  financial
assets during this period.Working Papers
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Home bias and Purchasing Power Parity: evidence from the G-7 countries
Working Paper ¡Ô. 59
Dimitrios Sideris
Home bias is associated either with international
trade costs in goods markets – costs which may
include transportation and information costs, bor-
der costs such as tariffs and non-tariff barriers and
other trade impeding factors – or with the behav-
iour of consumers, who are presumed to differen-
tiate their spending between domestic goods and
their imported substitutes. Some recent studies in
the international economics literature emphasise
the role of home bias in explaining a number of
empirical puzzles in international macroeconom-
ics,  one  of  which  is  the  inability  to  detect
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) in the long run. 
In  the  present  paper,  we  empirically  investigate
the influence of home bias on the long-run rela-
tionship between nominal exchange rates and rel-
ative prices as formed in the goods markets and
which  should  express  a  PPP-type  relationship. 
In  particular,  we  test  the  following  hypotheses:
(i) That there exists a home bias effect that influ-
ences the relationship between nominal exchange
rates, and domestic and foreign prices, and that
this  effect  diminishes  over  time  as  trade  costs
decrease (as a result of diminishing transportation
costs  and  the  abolition  of  a  number  of  tariffs),
owing to the increased integration of traded goods
markets and the growing similarity of consumption
patterns  across  developed  countries.  (ii)  That
incorporating the time pattern of home bias into
the empirical specification of PPP enhances the
robustness of the theory.
The hypotheses are tested for the US economy
vis-à-vis the rest of the G-7 economies (Germany,
Japan,  France,  Italy,  Canada  and  the  UK)  for 
the  post-Bretton  Woods  period  1973:1-2006:1.
Quarterly  observations  on  exchange  rates  and
price indices are used in the analysis. The form of
the long-run relationship of interest, which could
express a PPP relationship, is investigated using
panel cointegration techniques.
The empirical findings support both tested hypothe-
ses: Home bias is shown to exert a low, but signifi-
cantly negative effect on the relative price-exchange
rate relationship, a result that indicates that there
exists a home bias effect which is marginally falling
over time. In addition, when the time pattern of the
home bias effect is accounted for in the empirical
modelling, we are able to accept long-run PPP in
both the weak and the strong form.ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 29  10/07 116
Short-term capital flows and growth in developed and emerging markets
Working Paper ¡o. 60
Pavlos Petroulas
Much  attention  has  focused  on  recent  financial
crises around the world. Empirical studies of these
crises  have  found  that  short-term  capital  inflows
increase a country’s financial fragility, as well as the
likelihood  of  a  financial  crisis.  As  a  rule,  financial
crises are neither rare nor isolated incidents in finan-
cial markets. They seem to pop up every decade or
so, as do the models that try to explain them. 
Two  recent  theoretical  models,  by  Chang  and
Velasco (2000) and Aghion et al. (2004), form the
basis for our empirical investigation. While the two
models have quite a different setup, they share cer-
tain similarities. Firstly, financial market problems
seem to be a problem for emerging markets and
not  developed  ones.  Secondly,  the  problems  for
emerging  markets  arise  from  reversals  in  capital
flows. Thirdly, in both models, the reversal comes
from  capital  which  is  deemed  short-term.  While
short-term capital flows as such do not pose any
intrinsic  threat  to  an  economy  and  while  some
short-term capital is essential for any economy to
run, there are some good arguments for thinking
that such flows may not only provide benefits. 
Following  certain  theoretical  predictions,  we
construct  a  volatility  measure  for  short-term
capital  flows  which  is  expressed  either  as  a
share of reserves and/or as a share of GDP in
order  to  conform  to  the  theoretical  models.
This measure is incorporated in growth regres-
sions  for  a  panel  of  countries  for  the  years
1970-2000. 
The  results  of  this  macro-oriented  approach
show  that,  while  large  and  volatile  short-term
flows have no effect on growth in rich countries,
they are growth-inhibiting in emerging markets.
These results are robust to a large variety of esti-
mation  methods  and  pass  stringent  extreme
bound analysis criteria. Moreover, their magni-
tude proves to be of economic importance. More
specifically, a one standard deviation increase in
the  short-term  volatility  of  capital  flows
decreases  growth  by  around  one  percentage
point per year. The analysis indicates that open-
ing up emerging markets’ capital accounts, which
implies increased short-term capital flows, is not
a clear-cut way to prosperity.Monetary policy and
financial system 
supervision measures
(January - September 2007)
Monetary policy measures of the
Eurosystem
11 January, 8 February 2007
The Governing Council of the ECB decides that
the minimum bid rate on the main refinancing
operations  and  the  interest  rates  on  the  mar-
ginal lending facility and the deposit facility will
remain unchanged at 3.50%, 4.50% and 2.50%
respectively.
8 March 2007
The Governing Council of the ECB decides, with
effect from 14 March 2007, to increase:
1. the minimum bid rate on the main refinanc-
ing operations by 25 basis points to 3.75%;
2. the  interest  rate  on  the  marginal  lending
facility by 25 basis points to 4.75%; and
3. the interest rate on the deposit facility by 25
basis points to 2.75%.
12 April, 10 May 2007
The Governing Council of the ECB decides that
the minimum bid rate on the main refinancing
operations  and  the  interest  rates  on  the  mar-
ginal lending facility and the deposit facility will
remain unchanged at 3.75%, 4.75% and 2.75%
respectively.
6 June 2007
The Governing Council of the ECB decides, with
effect from 13 June 2007, to increase:
1. the minimum bid rate on the main refinanc-
ing operations by 25 basis points to 4%;
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 29  10/07 1172. the  interest  rate  on  the  marginal  lending
facility by 25 basis points to 5%; and
3. the interest rate on the deposit facility by 25
basis points to 3%.
5 July, 2 August, 6 September 2007
The Governing Council of the ECB decides that
the minimum bid rate on the main refinancing
operations and the interest rates on the marginal
lending facility and the deposit facility will remain
unchanged at 4%, 5% and 3% respectively.
9,  10,  13,  14,  20,  22,  27  August,  3  and  6
September 2007
The Governing Council of the ECB decides to
conduct  additional  liquidity-providing  opera-
tions for the normalisation of the functioning of
the euro money market.
Bank of Greece decisions on the estab-
lishment and operation of credit institu-
tions and the supervision of the finan-
cial system
1 January 2007
The  Greek  branch  of  the  Italy-based  bank
“Sanpaolo  IMI  S.p.A.”  changes  its  registered
name to “Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A.”.
24 January 2007
— “Piraeus Bank” is authorised to increase its
qualifying  holding  in  the  share  capital  of  the
Belgrade-based “Piraeus Bank AD, Beograd”.
— “Proton Bank S.A.” is authorised to increase
its qualifying holding in the share capital of the
Cyprus-based “Interfund Investments Ltd”.
1 February 2007
The branch of the Poland-based “DaimlerChrysler
Bank  Polska  SA”  commences  its  operation  in
Greece.
13 February 2007
The Greek branch of “Société Générale”, which
is under liquidation, is authorised to prolong its
administrative, accounting and tax-related oper-
ations.
20 February 2007
The framework for the processing and re-circula-
tion of euro banknotes by credit institutions and
professional cash handlers is determined.
1 March 2007
— “EFG Eurobank Ergasias SA” is authorised to
increase its qualifying holding in the share capital
of  its  Serbia-based  subsidiary  “Eurobank  EFG
Stedionica AD Beograd”.
— “EFG Eurobank Ergasias SA” is authorised to
establish a new branch in Cyprus.
— “Alpha Bank SA” is authorised to acquire: (i) a
direct qualifying holding in the share capital of a
holding company under establishment and (ii) an
indirect qualifying holding in the share capital of
the Turkey-based “Alternatif Bank AS” and of the
companies  “Alternatif  Financial  Kiralama  AS”,
“Alternatif  Yatirim  AS”  and  “Alternatif  Yatirim
Orkaligi AS”.
— The  Russia-based  “Kedr  Close  Joint  Stock
Company  Commercial  Bank”  is  authorised  to
establish and operate a branch in Greece.
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“Piraeus Bank SA” is authorised to acquire a qual-
ifying holding in the share capital of the insurance
company “Europaiki Pisti AEGA”.
2 April 2007
— It  is  stipulated  that  the  previously  granted
authorisation of a financial leasing company con-
cerns  the  already  operating  company  “Piraeus
Coastal  Transportation  Services  SA”,  to  be
renamed “Piraeus Leasing SA”.
— “EFG Eurobank Ergasias SA” is authorised to
increase  its  indirect  qualifying  holding  in  the
share  capital  of  the  Belgrade-based  “Prospera
Securities AD Beograd”.
— “Piraeus Bank SA” is authorised to acquire
100% of the share capital of its Sofia-based sub-
sidiary “Piraeus Bank Bulgaria AD”.
— “Alpha Bank SA” is authorised to establish
six new branches in Albania.
3 May 2007
The authorisation of “Famanet Hellas SA Financial
Information Services” is revoked.
4 May 2007
An amendment is made to Annex 4 of Bank of
Greece  Governor’s  Act  2577/9  March  2006,
which specifies the basic principles and criteria
for the evaluation of the organisational structure
of credit institutions’ Internal Audit Systems, in
relation to the prevention of money-laundering
and terrorist financing.
16 May 2007
Banking and Credit Committee Decision 178/3/
2004  on  the  collection  of  management  fees
related to savings deposit accounts is supple-
mented.
30 May 2007
The change in the name of “Laiki Factoring SA”
to “Marfin Factors & Forfaiters SA” is approved.
8 June 2007
— The merger of “Investment Bank of Greece
SA” with “Egnatia Finance Investment Services
SA” by absorption of the latter by the former is
approved.
— The merger of “Egnatia Bank SA”, “Laiki Bank
(Hellas) SA” and “Marfin Bank SA” by absorption
of the latter two by the first one is approved.
— A specific shareholder is authorised to increase
his  qualifying  holding  in  the  share  capital  of
“Aegean Baltic Bank SA”.
— The  merger  of  “Egnatia  Leasing  SA”  and
“Laiki Leasing SA” by absorption of the latter by
the former is approved.
28 June 2007
— The  amendment  to  the  Statute  of  “Egnatia
Bank SA”, relating to the change of its name to
“Marfin Egnatia Bank SA”, is approved.
— Turkey-based  “TC  Ziraat  Bankasi  AS”  is
authorised to establish and operate a branch in
Greece.
24 July 2007
— The merger of “National Bank of Greece SA”
with  “National  Management  and  Organisation
SA” by absorption of the latter by the former is
approved.
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to establish twelve new branches in Albania.
— “National Bank of Greece SA” is authorised to
acquire a qualifying holding in the share capital
of  the  Cayman  Islands-based  company  under
establishment  “Portfolio  Investment  Company
Limited”.
— “EFG Eurobank Ergasias SA” is authorised
to acquire an indirect qualifying holding in the
share capital of the Romania-based company
under establishment “Bancpost Fond de Pensii
SA”.
— “Cooperative Bank of Trikala Ltd.” is autho-
rised to change its name to “Cooperative Bank
of Thessalia Ltd.”.
20 August 2007
Ten Bank of Greece Governor’s Acts are issued
on  the  transposition  of  Directives  2006/48/EC
and 2006/49/EC concerning the capital adequacy
of credit institutions and the control of their large
exposures. Specifically, these Acts concern:
– the definition of own funds of credit institu-
tions based in Greece,
– the  calculation  of  capital  requirements  for
credit  risk  according  to  the  standardised
approach,
– the  calculation  of  capital  requirements  for
credit risk according to the internal ratings
based approach,
– credit institutions’ minimum capital require-
ments for operational risk,
– the calculation of credit institutions’ capital
requirements for market risk,
– the  credit  institutions’  disclosure  of  data  and
information on their capital adequacy, the risks
they assume and the management thereof,
– the  calculation  of  weighted  exposures  for
securitisation positions,
– the counterparty risk,
– the establishment of the criteria that must gov-
ern the credit institutions’ Internal Capital Ade-
quacy  Assessment  Process  (ICAAP)  and  the
Supervisory Review Process (SRP) by the Bank
of Greece,
– the supervision and control of credit institu-
tions’ large financing exposures.
28 August 2007
— Provision  of  sanctions  against  issuers  of
uncovered cheques is suspended in the context
of implementation of general favourable arrange-
ments for residents of fire-stricken areas.
— “Egnatia Leasing SA” is authorised to change
its name to “Marfin Leasing SA”.
13 September 2007
— The merger of “Attica Bank SA” with “Attica
Leasing SA” by absorption of the latter by the
former is approved.
— “Piraeus Bank SA” is authorised to acquire a
qualifying  holding  in  the  share  capital  of  a
Cyprus-based  credit  institution  under  estab-
lishment.
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— “Alpha Bank” is authorised to acquire 100%
of the share capital of the company under estab-
lishment “AlphaLife Insurance Company SA”.
— Moody’s Investors Service, Standard & Poor’s
Ratings Services and Fitch Ratings are recognised
as eligible External Credit Assessment Institutions
(ECAIs), in order for credit institutions to use the
credit assessment of these entities for calculating
capital requirements.
28 September 2007
The  branch  of  Italy-based  “Banca  IMI”  com-
mences its operation in Greece.
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Issuance of ten Bank of Greece Governor’s Acts
for the transposition to domestic law of the pro-
visions of Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC
on the capital adequacy of credit institutions and
the control of their large financing exposures
Bank  of  Greece  Governor’s  Acts  2587,  2588,
2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595 and
2596/20 August 2007 complete the transposition
to  Greek  law  of  the  provisions  of  Directives
2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC concerning the capi-
tal adequacy of credit institutions and investment
firms. This new framework, known as “Basel II”,
establishes the following three fundamental axes
of supervision (Pillars):
ñ Pillar 1 establishes new methods for calculating
capital requirements for the credit risk banks
typically  face  in  pursuing  their  activities  and
introduces capital requirements for operational
risk.
ñ Pillar  2  lays  down  the  principles,  procedures
and  criteria  whereby  credit  institutions  and
then  the  supervisory  authority  (the  Bank  of
Greece)  assess  the  capital  adequacy  and  the
soundness of the risk management system of
each credit institution, in relation to all kinds of
risks to which it is or may be exposed in addi-
tion to those addressed under Pillar 1.
ñ Pillar  3  establishes  disclosure  requirements
with  a  view  to  enhancing  transparency  and
market discipline by allowing the parties con-
cerned to compare both the credit institutions’
risk  management  policies  and  capital  and
organisational  adequacy  (thus  offering  incen-
tives  for  improvement),  and  the  supervisory
authorities’ methods and practices.
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law  the  general  provisions  of  the  above
Directives, while at the same time it replaced
and  revised  earlier  banking  legislation  (Laws
5076/1931, 1665/1951 and 2076/1992; Presi-
dential Decree 267/1995), taking into account
market  developments  and  the  experience
gained so far. Moreover, the consolidation of
all  related  provisions  into  a  single  law
enhances legal certainty, facilitating the task of
both  supervised  institutions  and  supervisory
authorities.
ñ By authority of the aforementioned law, the fol-
lowing Bank of Greece Governor’s Acts trans-
posed  to  domestic  law  the  specialised  provi-
sions  of  the  above  Directives  that  concern
credit institutions. These Acts are:
Pillar 1
1. Act 2588/20 August 2007: calculation of cap-
ital  requirements  for  credit  risk  according  to
the Standardised Approach
This  Act  establishes  the  method  for  calculating
capital  requirements  for  credit  risk  by  the
Standardised Approach, which is the simpler one
of  the  new  alternative  relevant  approaches  and
improves the earlier framework by establishing a
more  proportionate  correlation  between  own
funds and risk assumed, as it:
(a) Enlarges the scale of the weights assigned to
each category of bank financing or other bank
exposure.
(b)Takes into account additional parameters, such
as the borrower’s credit assessment by recog-
nised  External  Credit  Assessment  Institutions
(ECAIs); risk dispersion, which allows a reduc-
tion  from  100%  to  75%  of  the  risk  weight
assigned to loans of up to €1 million to natural
persons  or  small–  and  medium-sized  enter-
prises;  the  existence  of  real  estate  collateral,
which allows a reduction from 50% to 35% of
the risk weight assigned to the loans, while, in
contrast, a repayment delay of more than 90
days leads to an increased weight; etc.
(c) Recognises  other  types  of  collateral  as  well,
plus more advanced techniques for credit risk
mitigation, such as credit derivatives.
2. Act 2589/20 August 2007: calculation of cap-
ital  requirements  for  credit  risk  according  to
the Internal Ratings Based Approach
Lays down the Internal Ratings Based Approach
(IRB  Approach),  which  introduces  a  completely
new  methodology  for  the  calculation  of  capital
requirements, based on risk parameters such as
the  borrower’s  probability  of  default  and  the
credit institution’s loss given default, allowing for
the first time credit institutions to use their own
internal management systems and models in esti-
mating these parameters.
Employment  of  the  above  approach  and  its
improved version (the advanced IRB Approach) is
subject to approval by the Bank of Greece, or, in
case of a subsidiary bank based in the European
Union, by the supervisory authority of the country
in which the parent bank is based, following a con-
sultation in which the Bank of Greece participates.
Approval is granted upon ascertained fulfilment of
certain  requirements  with  reference  to  the  ade-
quacy of the internal systems having been devel-
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quantifying risk parameters, confirming the relevant
results  and  utilising  them  in  the  decision-making
process as regards the granting and pricing of loans.
3.  Act  2593/20  August  2007:  calculation  of
weighted exposures for securitisation positions
Determines the alternative methods for the calcu-
lation of the banks’ capital requirements in rela-
tion to their exposures associated with securitisa-
tions, with a view to ensuring that credit institu-
tions hold adequate funds to cover the risks to
which  they  are  or  may  be  exposed  within  the
scope of the technique in question.
4.  Act  2591/20  August  2007:  calculation  of
credit  institutions’  capital  requirements  for
market risk
Imposes adjustments in the calculation of capital
requirements for market risk, i.e. the risk resulting
from any volatility of interest rates or exchange
rates, or prices of debt securities, commodities
tradable in regulated markets, etc. Most impor-
tant among these adjustments are those related to
the additional risk factors each bank must take
into account in order to apply its own models for
calculating its capital requirements.
5. Act 2594/20 August 2007: counterparty risk
Provides to credit institutions the additional pos-
sibility of using new advanced methods for cal-
culating the value of their exposures, particularly
from repurchase type transactions (repos) and
derivative contracts, with a view to calculating
their capital requirements for counterparty risk.
This risk relates to the credit institution’s loss in
case  of  counterparty  default,  also  taking  into
account any volatility of the market values of the
financial instruments involved in the transaction.
6. Act 2590/20 August 2007: credit institutions’
minimum capital requirements for operational
risk
The  establishment  of  capital  requirements  for
operational risk constitutes a major innovation of
the new framework. The notion of this risk relates
to  potential  losses  resulting  from  inadequate  or
failed internal processes or people, and also covers
legal risk. This Act also enables credit institutions
to  select  between  standardised  and  advanced
approaches for the calculation of capital require-
ments for this risk.
Pillar 2
7. Act 2595/20 August 2007: establishment of the
criteria that must govern the credit institutions’
Internal  Capital  Adequacy  Assessment  Process
(ICAAP)  and  the  Supervisory  Review  Process
(SRP) by the Bank of Greece
This Act establishes, in addition to the provisions
under Pillar 1:
(a) Qualitative criteria for the calculation of each
credit institution’s capital adequacy, depend-
ing on its particular characteristics.
(b)The  notion  of  “internal  capital”,  which  is
broader than that of “supervisory capital” as cal-
culated following the methods of Pillar 1, since
internal capital relates to funds that the credit
institution must maintain in adequacy in terms
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ing the various risks to which it is or may be
exposed, including but not limited to those not
covered  or  adequately  addressed  within  the
framework  of  Pillar  1,  such  as  concentration
risk,  strategy  risk,  goodwill  risk,  as  well  as
exogenous  risks  stemming  from  the  institu-
tional, economic or business environment.
(c) The process of supervisory assessment by the
Bank of Greece of the credit institution’s over-
all compliance with its obligations, which will
be  the  subject  of  a  dialogue  with  the  credit
institution aimed at a mutual understanding of
the applied methods and procedures and the
timely remedy of their weaknesses. Within this
framework, the Bank of Greece may either take
the supervisory measures provided for by Law
3601/2007, which include the establishment of
additional provisions, or impose additional cap-
ital requirements in case it deems the relevant
corrective measures inadequate to address the
risks.  The  individual  matters  of  the  relevant
procedure, which, as regards its extent and fre-
quency, will be applied according to the princi-
ple of proportionality, will be further specified
within the framework of the consultations of
the Bank of Greece with credit institutions.
Pillar 3
8. Act 2592/20 August 2007: credit institutions’
disclosure  of  data  and  information  on  their
capital  adequacy,  the  risks  they  assume  and
the management thereof
Establishes  the  general  criteria  and  obligations
regarding the disclosure by credit institutions of
information related mainly to:
(a) the businesses of the credit institution’s group
(as  defined  for  supervisory  and  accounting
purposes);
(b)the credit institution’s own funds and its capi-
tal adequacy calculation method; and
(c) its exposure to each risk category, including
the strategic goals, assessment methods and
mitigation techniques related to these risks.
It also establishes the frequency, method and
means  of  information  disclosure  and  verifica-
tion. As a rule, the relevant data will be pub-
lished at least annually on the credit institution’s
website.
Other Acts
9. Act 2587/20 August 2007: definition of own
funds of credit institutions based in Greece
This Act:
(a) Adjusts the framework currently in force to the
provisions  of  Directives  2006/48/EC  and
2006/49/EC as regards the items and the com-
position of the credit institutions’ own funds
taken into account in the calculation of their
capital adequacy, and
(b)codifies the relevant earlier provisions, includ-
ing those related to the recognition of hybrids
as items of the banks’ own funds, as well as to
the deduction from the credit institutions’ own
funds  of  equity  participations  and  loans
granted for the purchase of its own shares, so
as to avoid “double gearing” in the calculation
of own funds.
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control  of  credit  institutions’  large  financing
exposures
This Act adjusts and codifies in a single text the
provisions currently in force regarding the control
of  large  financing  exposures.  The  main  adjust-
ments relate to:
(a) the recognition of collateral items that reduce
the level of the large financing exposures, cor-
respondingly  to  the  provisions  of  the  previ-
ously mentioned Bank of Greece Governor’s
Acts related to credit risk and market risk; and
(b)the establishment of a separate limit for the
bank’s total financing exposures to its major
shareholders  and  any  individuals  or  enter-
prises associated thereto.
The new institutional framework is expected to
decisively affect the shaping of the financial sys-
tem,  the  development  of  banks,  and  the  way
supervision  will  be  carried  out  in  the  coming
years, given that it:
(a) Takes  into  account  the  particularities  of  each
credit  institution  as  regards  its  size,  business
scale and scope of activities, providing it with
the possibility of selecting, for the calculation of
its  capital  requirements,  between  alternative
methods of different levels of sophistication and
sensitivity as regards the risks assumed, so that
the  minimum  capital  requirements  become
more proportionate to those risks.
(b)Encourages credit institutions to progressively
adopt the more advanced approaches, a fact
that  signals  the  transition  to  a  supervisory
framework not governed by inelastic, adminis-
tratively predetermined supervisory rules, but
based mainly on qualitative criteria and assess-
ments. Nevertheless, conclusion of this devel-
opment  will  depend  on  the  banks’  pace  of
adjustment.
(c) Adopts the guidelines issued by the Committee
of European Banking Supervision (CEBS), which
aim at a convergence of supervisory practices at
European level for purposes of competition and
more  efficient  supervision,  mainly  of  groups
with cross-border activities, while at the same
time they lead to a reduction of the supervision’s
administrative costs. Moreover, adopting super-
visory criteria compliant with the best interna-
tional practices is an objective towards which
the Bank of Greece remains steadily oriented.
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Table I . 1
Consumer price index
(Percentage changes over the corresponding period of the previous year)
Source: Calculations based on National Statistical Service of Greece (NSSG) data (CPI 2005=100).
2003  . . . . . . . 3.53.1 3.2 3.1 4.2 5.0 10.7 3.9
2004  . . . . . . . 2.9 3.2 3.3 2.3 3.8 0.5–11.9 7.5
2005  . . . . . . . 3.53.2 3.1 3.4 3.7 0.6 –8.1 18.0
2006  . . . . . . . 3.2 2.52.7 3.4 3.0 3.7 3.3 10.9
2006 I . . . . . . . 3.3 2.3 2.53.3 3.2 1.9 –5.8 19.6
II  . . . . . . 3.2 2.3 2.53.6 2.7 3.4 1.3 14.8
III . . . . . . 3.4 2.4 2.7 3.9 2.8 5.1 10.8 11.8
IV . . . . . . 2.9 2.8 3.0 2.7 3.1 4.6 9.4 –1.2
2007 I . . . . . . . 2.7 3.3 3.2 2.1 3.4 3.1 4.9 –4.9
II  . . . . . . 2.6 3.1 2.9 1.9 3.6 2.0 2.9 –1.5
2005 Jan. . . . . . 4.0 4.54.2 4.3 3.7 0.6 –8.9 10.3
Feb.  . . . . 3.1 3.2 3.0 2.8 3.6 –0.9 –12.1 16.4
March  . . 2.9 2.9 2.7 2.4 3.6 –1.3 –13.1 18.4
April . . . . 3.4 3.1 3.0 3.1 3.8 –0.1 –11.0 19.7
May  . . . . 3.2 3.3 3.2 2.7 4.0 –0.4 –12.3 14.9
June  . . . . 3.3 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.7 –0.5–14.1 19.9
July . . . . . 3.9 3.53.3 4.1 3.7 0.7 –7.9 20.0
Aug.  . . . . 3.7 3.0 2.9 3.8 3.6 1.4 –3.7 20.8
Sept. . . . . 3.9 2.9 2.8 4.2 3.6 2.0 –0.7 24.0
Oct.  . . . . 3.8 3.1 3.0 3.8 3.9 2.7 2.1 17.1
Nov. . . . . 3.53.0 3.0 3.4 3.7 2.6 1.2 12.5
Dec. . . . . 3.6 2.9 2.9 3.7 3.51.0 –8.9 22.1
2006 Jan. . . . . . 3.2 2.0 2.3 3.3 3.2 1.6 –6.3 24.9
Feb.  . . . . 3.2 2.3 2.53.3 3.2 2.0 –4.5 19.2
March  . . 3.3 2.6 2.9 3.3 3.3 2.1 –6.7 15.1
April . . . . 3.3 2.3 2.6 3.6 2.9 3.8 3.514.0
May  . . . . 3.1 2.1 2.4 3.6 2.6 2.9 –0.7 16.6
June  . . . . 3.2 2.3 2.6 3.6 2.7 3.50.9 13.8
July . . . . . 3.8 2.3 2.6 4.6 2.7 5.8 15.9 17.3
Aug.  . . . . 3.52.4 2.7 3.9 2.9 4.7 7.5 14.4
Sept. . . . . 2.9 2.52.7 3.0 2.8 4.7 9.4 4.0
Oct.  . . . . 2.8 2.8 3.0 2.7 3.0 5.1 10.1 –2.4
Nov. . . . . 2.9 2.8 3.0 2.8 3.2 4.58.6 –0.6
Dec. . . . . 2.9 2.9 3.0 2.7 3.2 4.3 9.5–0.6
2007 Jan. . . . . . 2.7 3.1 3.1 2.3 3.3 4.4 11.4 –6.4
Feb.  . . . . 2.7 3.53.3 2.0 3.4 2.3 –0.4 –4.7
March  . . 2.6 3.2 3.1 2.1 3.4 2.7 4.2 –3.6
April . . . . 2.53.2 3.0 1.8 3.5 1.7 –0.2 –2.6
May  . . . . 2.6 3.1 2.9 1.9 3.6 2.0 2.9 –1.1
June  . . . . 2.6 3.0 2.8 1.9 3.6 2.3 6.7 –0.7
July . . . . . 2.53.2 2.9 1.6 3.7 2.7 9.0 –4.7
Aug.  . . . . 2.53.1 2.9 1.7 3.6 3.3 13.0 –5.8






















2003  . . . . . . . 2.3 2.3 1.6 2.7 1.0 2.8 1.8 –1.8 2.5–0.3 –0.6
2004  . . . . . . . 3.53.2 4.56.0 2.0 6.2 4.0 4.3 4.7 5 .0 1.8
2005  . . . . . . . 5.9 3.8 2.6 2.5 4.2 2.4 13.2 25.1 3.0 3.7 0.3
2006  . . . . . . . 6.9 7.52.3 5 .9 3.56.0 8.1 12.9 6.3 4.2 2.7
2006 I  . . . . . . 9.2 4.7 1.58.8 3.8 9.0 15 .4 30.0 6.8 7.0 2.7
II . . . . . . 8.6 7.6 1.7 7.4 3.4 7.6 12.0 21.6 7.2 5.9 2.9
III  . . . . . 6.8 9.2 3.1 6.2 3.6 6.3 6.1 8.1 7.2 3.2 2.7
IV  . . . . . 3.0 8.6 2.7 1.6 3.2 1.50.0 –3.6 4.3 0.8 2.3
2007 I  . . . . . . 0.7 6.8 4.8 –2.2 4.6 –2.5–1.4 –6.9 1.6 –0.8 1.6
II . . . . . . 1.9 6.2 6.3 –2.0 4.2 –2.3 2.4 –1.1 1.6 0.9 2.0
2005 Jan. . . . . 3.9 5.3 5.8 0.7 3.3 0.6 7.1 12.5 2.7 2.0 0.1
Feb.  . . . 4.6 4.7 5.0 0.8 3.6 0.7 10.0 19.8 2.5 2.9 0.2
March . . 5.3 4.7 3.8 0.9 3.6 0.8 12.6 24.6 2.5 3.1 –0.3
April  . . . 5.1 3.8 2.7 1.0 4.3 0.9 12.8 24.9 2.2 2.4 –0.9
May  . . . 3.7 3.4 2.3 1.3 4.6 1.1 7.8 13.2 2.1 1.2 –0.6
June  . . . 5.7 3.5 1.7 1.8 4.7 1.7 14.3 28.0 2.4 3.3 –0.2
July . . . . 5 .6 3.50.51.8 4.7 1.7 13.9 26.9 2.4 3.9 0.2
Aug.  . . . 6.0 3.2 1.4 2.1 4.7 2.0 14.9 28.3 2.54.4 0.5
Sept. . . . 7.3 3.2 1.3 2.8 5.1 2.7 18.6 34.0 2.8 5.2 0.6
Oct.  . . . 7.0 2.9 2.1 4.9 4.4 4.9 14.524.3 4.0 4.4 0.8
Nov.  . . . 7.0 3.5 2.5 5.1 3.6 5.2 13.6 26.1 4.3 5.3 1.3
Dec.  . . . 9.1 4.1 2.57.1 3.6 7.2 17.9 36.9 5 .7 6.51.9
2006 Jan. . . . . 9.9 4.3 2.2 9.1 3.4 9.4 17.8 36.2 6.9 7.52.5
Feb.  . . . 9.55 .0 1.4 8.7 3.8 8.9 16.2 32.0 6.8 7.2 2.7
March . . 8.3 4.9 0.8 8.54.1 8.7 12.3 22.7 6.6 6.4 3.0
April  . . . 8.6 6.1 0.7 8.3 3.6 8.512.4 22.57.0 6.3 3.1
May  . . . 9.3 7.9 1.9 7.4 3.2 7.6 14.0 25.9 7.3 6.2 2.8
June  . . . 8.0 8.9 2.6 6.53.4 6.6 9.7 16.7 7.2 5 .2 2.7
July . . . . 8.3 9.0 3.2 6.6 3.4 6.8 10.6 18.2 7.3 4.3 2.4
Aug.  . . . 7.7 9.3 3.2 6.53.9 6.7 8.2 10.9 7.4 4.2 3.0
Sept. . . . 4.5 9.2 3.1 5.5 3.4 5.6 –0.3 –3.8 6.8 1.0 2.9
Oct.  . . . 3.0 9.7 2.8 2.6 3.4 2.5–2.1 –7.4 5 .3 0.6 2.8
Nov.  . . . 3.4 8.4 2.6 1.6 3.2 1.51.3 –1.2 4.3 0.8 2.5
Dec.  . . . 2.7 7.8 2.6 0.6 3.0 0.51.0 –1.9 3.4 0.9 1.7
2007 Jan. . . . . 0.4 7.4 3.1 –2.0 4.7 –2.3 –2.7 –9.4 1.8 –1.3 1.7
Feb.  . . . 0.6 6.6 5.1 –2.4 4.7 –2.7 –1.4 –6.8 1.4 –0.6 1.5
March . . 1.1 6.6 6.2 –2.1 4.4 –2.4 –0.2 –4.6 1.7 –0.51.7
April  . . . 1.7 7.57.1 –2.4 4.2 –2.6 1.1 –3.6 1.9 0.7 2.1
May  . . . 1.9 6.1 6.4 –2.0 4.4 –2.3 2.6 –0.7 1.6 0.8 1.8
June  . . . 2.0 5.1 5.3 –1.6 4.1 –1.9 3.4 1.1 1.4 1.1 2.0
July . . . . 1.7 5.7 4.9 –1.7 4.1 –2.0 2.2 –1.1 1.5 1.2 2.1
Aug.  . . . 1.7 6.2 4.6 –1.7 3.6 –2.0 1.8 –0.51.7 –0.2 1.4
Source: Calculations based on NSSG data.
Table π . 2
Industrial producer price index (PPI) for the domestic and the external market
(Percentage changes over the corresponding period of the previous year)
Period
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* “Energy” data for 2004 are not comparable with those for 2003 because of changes in the relevant index coverage, which prior to 2004 did not include “carbon and lig-
nite mining”, “crude oil and gas pumping” and “electricity”.





2003  . . . . . . . 0.7 –1.1 0.8 0.9 –1.4 1.4 11.0 . . . 0.6
2004  . . . . . . . 3.1 4.4 –0.1 0.6 –1.1 1.0 40.7 . . . 0.8
2005  . . . . . . . 8.8 2.7 –0.3 1.4 –0.8 1.9 51.2 57.1 1.2
2006  . . . . . . . 4.4 5.7 0.6 2.0 0.4 2.3 10.5 10.8 2.8
2006 I  . . . . . . 7.7 2.50.7 2.3 0.5 2.7 33.1 35 .0 1.8
II . . . . . . 6.8 5.1 0.9 2.1 0.7 2.4 23.1 23.9 2.7
III  . . . . . 2.7 7.0 0.6 1.8 0.4 2.1 1.3 0.9 3.1
IV  . . . . . 0.7 8.2 0.3 1.7 0.0 2.1 –8.4 –8.8 3.4
2007 I  . . . . . . –0.4 8.50.7 1.4 0.0 1.7 –13.4 –14.0 3.5
II . . . . . . 1.2 7.3 1.2 1.4 0.2 1.7 –5.8 –6.2 3.3
2005 Jan. . . . . 6.6 4.7 –0.6 0.4 –1.3 0.8 40.0 44.51.4
Feb.  . . . 9.0 4.3 –1.0 1.4 –1.1 1.9 59.9 67.9 1.5
March . . 9.1 3.7 –0.6 1.2 –1.0 1.7 58.0 65.2 1.4
April  . . . 8.4 2.8 –0.6 1.0 –1.2 1.55 3.8 60.2 1.1
May  . . . 6.52.3 –0.6 1.1 –1.2 1.6 39.1 43.7 0.9
June  . . . 10.3 2.5–0.3 1.5 –1.1 2.1 63.9 72.51.2
July . . . . 10.3 2.2 –0.4 1.6 –1.0 2.2 60.8 68.4 1.1
Aug.  . . . 10.7 1.9 –0.3 1.7 –0.7 2.2 61.6 68.7 1.1
Sept. . . . 8.52.1 –0.1 1.6 –0.52.0 44.8 49.0 1.2
Oct.  . . . 7.9 1.9 –0.1 1.6 –0.7 2.0 39.4 43.0 1.1
Nov.  . . . 9.1 2.1 0.3 1.8 –0.2 2.3 46.6 51.9 1.4
Dec.  . . . 9.8 2.0 0.5 2.2 0.6 2.6 51.4 56.0 1.6
2006 Jan. . . . . 8.8 2.0 0.3 2.8 0.53.3 42.2 45 .1 1.7
Feb.  . . . 7.4 2.6 0.8 2.0 0.52.3 31.6 33.1 1.8
March . . 6.8 3.0 0.9 2.0 0.4 2.3 26.6 28.1 2.0
April  . . . 7.4 3.9 1.1 2.1 0.52.528.2 29.7 2.4
May  . . . 8.1 5.3 0.9 2.1 0.8 2.4 30.3 31.7 2.7
June  . . . 5.0 6.2 0.8 2.1 0.7 2.4 12.3 12.1 3.0
July . . . . 3.8 6.6 0.7 1.9 0.8 2.2 6.55 .6 3.0
Aug.  . . . 2.3 7.3 0.7 1.8 0.52.1 –1.1 –2.2 3.3
Sept. . . . 2.1 7.1 0.4 1.7 0.0 2.1 –1.2 –0.6 3.1
Oct.  . . . 1.2 7.9 0.2 1.8 0.0 2.2 –5.9 –5.7 3.3
Nov.  . . . 0.6 8.3 0.3 1.6 –0.1 2.0 –8.8 –9.3 3.4
Dec.  . . . 0.2 8.4 0.3 1.6 –0.1 2.0 –10.6 –11.3 3.4
2007 Jan. . . . . –1.0 8.9 0.51.3 0.0 1.6 –16.3 –16.8 3.6
Feb.  . . . –0.4 8.3 0.6 1.3 0.0 1.5–13.2 –13.9 3.4
March . . 0.3 8.3 1.0 1.50.1 1.8 –10.7 –11.3 3.6
April  . . . 0.8 8.0 0.8 1.3 0.1 1.6 –7.6 –8.1 3.4
May  . . . 1.3 7.3 1.2 1.50.2 1.8 –5 .6 –6.0 3.4
June  . . . 1.56.8 1.4 1.4 0.3 1.7 –4.2 –4.5 3.3
July . . . . 2.6 6.8 1.4 1.4 0.0 1.7 0.6 1.0 3.3
Aug.  . . . 2.6 5.8 1.4 1.6 0.1 1.9 1.4 2.3 3.0
Table π . 3
Import price index in industry
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Table I . 4
Industrial production index (2000=100)
(Percentage changes over the corresponding period of the previous year)
Period




















2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . 
2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . 
2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . 
2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . 
2005 III . . . . . . . . . . 
IV . . . . . . . . . . 
2006 I . . . . . . . . . . . 
II. . . . . . . . . . . 
III . . . . . . . . . . 
IV . . . . . . . . . . 
2007 I . . . . . . . . . . . 
II. . . . . . . . . . . 
2004 July. . . . . . . . . 
Aug. . . . . . . . . 
Sept.. . . . . . . . 
Oct. . . . . . . . . 
Nov. . . . . . . . . 
Dec. . . . . . . . . 
2005 Jan.. . . . . . . . . 
Feb. . . . . . . . . 
March. . . . . . . 
April . . . . . . . . 
May . . . . . . . . 
June . . . . . . . . 
July. . . . . . . . . 
Aug. . . . . . . . . 
Sept.. . . . . . . . 
Oct. . . . . . . . . 
Nov. . . . . . . . . 
Dec. . . . . . . . . 
2006 Jan.. . . . . . . . . 
Feb. . . . . . . . . 
March. . . . . . . 
April . . . . . . . . 
May . . . . . . . . 
June . . . . . . . . 
July. . . . . . . . . 
Aug. . . . . . . . . 
Sept.. . . . . . . . 
Oct. . . . . . . . . 
Nov. . . . . . . . . 
Dec. . . . . . . . . 
2006 Jan.. . . . . . . . . 
Feb. . . . . . . . . 
March. . . . . . . 
April . . . . . . . . 
May . . . . . . . . 
June . . . . . . . . 
July. . . . . . . . . 
Aug.* . . . . . . . 
0.3 –0.4 –5.2 5.8 2.9 –0.4 0.8 –3.6 –1.4
1.2 1.2 0.3 1.4 0.3 1.0 –0.51.8 2.7
–0.9 –0.8 –6.2 0.6 0.6 –1.7 –5.1 11.4 –0.9
0.50.8 –2.2 0.1 1.3 0.7 1.3 2.0 –1.0
–0.6 –0.8 –1.1 0.1 1.4 –1.9 –10.0 6.3 0.7
1.3 2.3 –1.0 –1.8 4.2 –0.3 –0.3 21.5–0.7
0.9 0.9 –0.51.53.6 1.1 –6.2 2.0 –0.2
0.4 1.1 –4.0 –0.9 3.1 0.0 4.0 –4.6 –2.3
0.0 0.2 1.1 –1.0 –0.6 2.7 0.2 6.3 –2.4
0.6 1.0 –5.2 1.0 –0.6 –0.7 6.2 5.0 1.4
2.9 3.4 6.1 0.2 –0.9 5.7 –0.3 3.3 5.3
0.7 0.2 –5.7 5.4 3.4 –2.5 –2.1 2.0 2.5
2.3 2.8 3.9 0.0 0.0 1.3 7.9 12.2 3.5
0.52.2 –13.8 –0.4 –3.1 –3.6 –4.7 6.5 9.4
–0.2 –0.4 –7.3 3.8 1.7 –0.1 –8.4 –8.1 1.1
–3.7 –5.1 –2.2 1.9 –3.5 –3.4 –8.3 –13.8 –2.2
2.1 2.3 –9.1 5.6 1.8 1.4 1.7 –14.7 4.8
–0.5–0.8 –11.7 4.3 1.4 1.2 –12.1 –8.9 0.8
0.4 0.3 –5.1 2.2 1.4 3.7 –8.9 26.0 –3.2
1.3 3.2 –9.8 –2.6 –4.7 0.6 21.6 19.0 2.3
–5.5 –6.0 –19.6 2.2 –3.5 –5.6 –12.1 –1.7 –5.4
–3.2 –3.7 –14.1 3.9 –7.7 –1.8 –5.8 23.1 –1.5
–2.1 –3.0 –8.1 5.0 3.4 –5.0 –2.7 2.1 –4.1
–2.4 –3.1 –8.52.8 1.6 –3.8 –18.7 –2.3 0.6
–5.1 –6.4 –9.3 2.0 1.2 –7.7 –15.0 –7.0 –5.4
3.5 4.1 4.1 1.5 1.9 5.7 –11.2 18.7 5.8
0.51.2 3.2 –3.2 1.0 –1.2 –3.6 14.7 2.2
3.7 5.5 1.5 –3.1 10.8 0.0 –1.3 18.8 1.7
1.4 2.0 –2.0 0.1 3.7 0.8 1.4 30.3 –2.0
–1.1 –0.6 –3.0 –2.6 –0.9 –1.8 –0.9 16.0 –2.0
1.4 1.4 –3.9 2.7 1.0 1.8 –8.6 2.3 4.0
–1.8 –3.2 –1.6 4.4 6.0 –1.7 –12.4 –4.9 –6.3
3.3 4.7 3.7 –2.8 3.9 3.2 2.3 8.8 2.5
–3.4 –1.7 –12.6 –7.7 4.6 –6.6 11.4 –12.8 –10.3
1.9 1.0 4.8 4.6 2.3 3.8 –7.0 –1.3 2.1
2.7 3.9 –4.6 0.3 2.6 2.59.0 0.9 1.4
1.3 3.2 8.7 –7.8 –2.1 6.5–0.9 7.8 –0.2
2.3 1.7 –2.1 5.6 2.4 2.7 11.5 20.7 –0.4
–3.2 –3.9 –3.2 –0.3 –2.1 –1.0 –4.7 –2.8 –6.4
1.9 3.1 –11.0 1.9 1.7 –0.2 12.8 9.51.0
–2.5–3.3 2.0 –0.2 –3.1 –3.7 –2.8 1.4 –0.6
2.6 3.4 –5.5 1.5 –0.2 2.1 8.9 4.2 4.1
4.9 6.0 9.9 0.1 2.4 4.9 14.4 0.3 6.4
3.0 3.6 5.4 0.2 –0.9 6.6 –2.5 0.1 5.5
1.1 1.1 3.4 0.4 –4.2 5.4 –7.4 8.0 4.1
0.2 –1.7 5.8 7.4 4.9 –1.8 –17.9 –1.6 4.0
0.6 1.7 –15.3 1.4 1.1 –4.3 9.8 4.8 2.9
1.3 0.4 –5.3 7.4 4.3 –1.5 2.4 2.7 1.0
4.8 2.9 8.1 17.1 7.7 –3.9 5.8 –0.6 11.4
–0.4 –0.2 –4.7 0.2 2.1 –2.7 –6.1 –20.8 0.7
* Provisional data.
Source: NSSG.Statistical section
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 29  10/07 137
Source: NSSG. Revised index of retail sales volume (on the basis of a new NSSG sample for the year 2000).
Table I . 5
Retail sales volume (retail trade turnover at constant prices)












2003  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2004  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2005  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2006  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2005 III  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2006 I  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2007 I  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2004 July  . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Aug.  . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sept.  . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oct. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nov.  . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dec.  . . . . . . . . . . . .
2005 Jan.  . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feb. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
March  . . . . . . . . . . .
April  . . . . . . . . . . . .
May . . . . . . . . . . . . .
June  . . . . . . . . . . . .
July  . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Aug.  . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sept.  . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oct. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nov.  . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dec.  . . . . . . . . . . . .
2006 Jan.  . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feb. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
March  . . . . . . . . . . .
April  . . . . . . . . . . . .
May . . . . . . . . . . . . .
June  . . . . . . . . . . . .
July  . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Aug.  . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sept.  . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oct. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nov.  . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dec.  . . . . . . . . . . . .
2006 Jan.  . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feb. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
March  . . . . . . . . . . .
April  . . . . . . . . . . . .
May . . . . . . . . . . . . .
June  . . . . . . . . . . . .
July  . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3 5.3 0.9 3.8 7.5
4.57.1 1.4 3.9 4.7
3.0 5.6 1.3 0.6 –1.1
8.0 9.0 0.8 17.7 3.7
3.3 7.3 –0.6 0.4 –1.1
1.8 3.1 3.6 0.9 0.7
4.1 8.7 –5.6 2.2 9.0
9.0 11.6 0.8 18.4 –1.5
11.0 11.8 –2.3 25.4 1.4
7.7 4.4 8.1 23.7 6.7
4.3 –0.8 9.518.6 12.4
2.0 1.9 –1.3 6.7 1.6
6.4 13.6 2.52.2 3.6
3.3 3.4 4.9 4.7 7.9
4.3 7.6 2.53.4 5 .2
6.3 9.9 7.9 3.4 4.7
2.7 6.1 0.4 –0.4 4.6
2.0 4.2 1.8 –0.1 0.1
–2.8 6.7 –17.6 –14.8 –8.2
4.7 7.4 14.8 –3.0 –4.3
6.7 10.7 3.8 4.2 –2.0
3.6 2.9 0.55 .0 –4.6
4.9 5.1 3.5 9.1 5.5
4.0 4.7 0.4 4.6 0.2
4.1 9.3 –2.8 0.5–1.3
3.8 9.3 –0.2 –1.9 –2.6
2.1 3.6 1.4 2.4 0.3
2.4 2.9 6.1 1.3 –1.5
1.6 3.50.9 1.6 –2.0
1.52.8 3.7 –0.1 4.4
0.3 4.0 0.4 –8.1 4.0
5.9 14.3 –9.6 0.0 8.6
6.0 8.0 –5.8 14.0 14.3
9.9 13.3 11.2 11.8 7.2
7.0 10.3 –5.9 14.4 –7.7
10.1 11.0 –4.6 29.0 –4.0
10.7 10.3 –4.8 27.6 –0.3
10.512.0 –4.1 21.9 0.6
11.9 13.1 2.1 26.4 3.5
5.1 3.9 5.1 14.6 –5.8
6.9 1.2 7.8 27.9 1.5
10.6 7.3 10.528.1 19.9
6.0 –0.515 .2 28.3 8.4
3.9 –0.4 2.1 18.9 17.3
3.3 –1.514.0 11.3 11.4
–1.5–1.3 –9.9 9.3 –5 .4
3.2 2.2 3.9 8.0 3.3
4.5 5.0 5.2 3.4 8.3
2.1 –0.8 3.55 .54.5
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Table I . 6
Demand and gross domestic product at market prices
(1995 constant prices)
Annual percentage changes
Source: Ministry of Economy and Finance, April 2007.
Private consumption 3.6 4.54.7 3.4 3.9
Public consumption  6.5–1.3 2.5 1.0 0.6
Gross fixed capital formation: 5.7 13.7 5.7 –1.4 12.7
Housing 8.8 7.3 –0.6 –1.4 32.3
Other construction 0.7 13.2 6.0 –6.1 15.3
Equipment 6.9 18.3 8.0 0.53.5
Other 21.0 3.4 7.0 14.510.9
Stocks and statistical discrepancy (% of GDP) 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.7 0.9
Domestic final demand 5.0 5.5 4.7 2.3 5.7
Exports of goods and services –7.7 1.0 11.53.0 5.1
Exports of goods –7.1 4.2 –2.58.2 11.0
Exports of services –8.1 –1.3 21.8 –0.1 1.4
Final demand 2.7 4.8 5.8 2.4 5.6
Imports of goods and services –0.8 4.8 9.3 –1.2 9.8
Imports of goods 3.7 7.7 9.0 –0.1 9.8
Imports of services –18.7 –10.0 11.0 –7.6 9.8
GDP at market prices 3.8 4.8 4.7 3.7 4.3
2005 2004 2003 2002 2006Statistical section
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Table I I . 1
Balance of payments
(Million euro)
1 (+) net inflow, (–) net outflow.
2 (+) decrease, (–) increase.
3 Reserve assets, as defined by the European Central Bank, comprise monetary gold, the reserve position in the IMF, special drawing rights and Bank of Greece claims in
foreign currency on non-euro area residents. Excluded are euro-denominated claims on non-euro area residents, claims in foreign currency and in euro on euro area res-
idents and the Bank of Greece share in the capital and reserves of the ECB.
* Provisional data.
Source: Bank of Greece.
January – July July
2004 20052006* 2004 20052006*
π CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE (I.A+I.B+I.C+I.D)




Trade balance excluding oil and ships
























I.D.  CURRENT TRANSFERS BALANCE (1.D.1–1.D.2)
π.D.1 Receipts
General government (mainly EU transfers)
Other (emigrants' remittances, etc.)
π.D.2 Payments
General government (mainly to the EU)
Other
πI CAPITAL TRANSFERS BALANCE  (πI.1–II.2)
πI.1 Receipts
General government (EU transfers)
Other 
πI.2 Payments
General government (mainly to the EU)
Other
III CURRENT ACCOUNT AND CAPITAL TRANSFERS 
BALANCE (π+ππ)
IV FINANCIAL ACCOUNT BALANCE  (πV.∞+πV.µ+πV.C+πV.D)
IV.∞ DIRECT INVESTMENT1
By residents abroad








IV.D CHANGE IN RESERVE ASSETS2
V ERRORS AND OMISSIONS
RESERVE ASSETS3
–8,380.5 –14,824.5 –19,020.9 –435.9 –481.3 –2,349.0
–15,446.7 –20,210.6 –23,279.3 –2,330.1 –2,482.8 –4,247.9
–3,250.6 –4,882.8 –4,971.2 –529.7 –547.5 –959.2
–12,196.1 –15,327.8 –18,308.1 –1,800.4 –1,935.3 –3,288.7
–247.9 –1,838.1 –2,900.3 14.2 –114.7 –636.5
–11,948.2 –13,489.7 –15,407.8 –1,814.6 –1,820.6 –2,652.2
7,832.2 9,434.6 9,766.9 1,252.4 1,398.6 1,527.2
1,078.1 1,880.0 1,604.9 248.4 276.9 282.9
1,193.5987.0 1,206.4 138.2 144.1 225 .8
5,560.6 6,567.6 6,955.6 865.8 977.6 1,018.5
23,278.9 29,645.2 33,046.2 3,582.5 3,881.4 5,775.2
4,328.7 6,762.8 6,576.1 778.1 824.4 1,242.1
1,441.4 2,825.1 4,106.7 124.0 258.8 862.3
17,508.8 20,057.3 22,363.4 2,680.4 2,798.2 3,670.8
8,354.6 7,851.8 8,442.1 2,366.0 2,612.8 2,648.9
15,063.1 15,249.4 16,614.9 3,425.4 3,698.8 4,067.9
5,290.5 5,566.4 5,705.9 1,997.0 2,241.4 2,275.3
8,247.9 8,193.2 9,199.8 1,173.0 1,200.1 1,508.8
1,524.6 1,489.8 1,709.2 255.4 257.2 283.7
6,708.5 7,397.6 8,172.8 1,059.3 1,086.0 1,419.0
1,407.7 1,335.1 1,402.1 250.0 215.9 222.0
3,485.4 3,987.9 4,303.7 510.8 549.1 727.9
1,815.4 2,074.5 2,467.0 298.5 321.0 469.2
–3,327.4 –4,294.2 –5,584.2 –793.4 –756.7 –1,140.5
1,854.6 1,942.4 2,663.9 255.7 335.0 363.8
160.6 181.3 210.5 25.2 25.7 35.9
1,694.0 1,761.1 2,453.5 230.5 309.3 327.9
5,182.0 6,236.7 8,248.1 1,049.1 1,091.7 1,504.4
121.3 160.6 186.4 20.9 21.526.4
5,060.7 6,076.0 8,061.7 1,028.2 1,070.2 1,477.9
2,039.1 1,828.4 1,400.5 321.5 145.3 390.7
4,422.5 3,868.8 3,775.8 546.7 388.8 676.7
3,174.4 2,482.0 2,533.7 311.3 171.1 490.2
1,248.2 1,386.8 1,242.1 235.5 217.7 186.5
2,383.4 2,040.4 2,375.3 225.2 243.5 286.0
1,920.4 1,569.9 1,792.0 145.4 171.2 185.1
463.0 470.55 83.3 79.8 72.3 100.9
1,025.4 2,002.9 2,490.4 –21.9 494.6 153.1
1,190.2 2,159.3 2,679.0 38.1 520.2 192.6
1,084.7 2,050.2 2,540.3 21.6 503.1 167.3
105.5 109.1 138.8 16.5 17.1 25.3
164.7 156.4 188.7 60.0 25.7 39.4
11.6 18.2 16.8 1.8 6.4 2.3
153.2 138.2 171.9 58.2 19.3 37.1
–7,355.0 –12,821.6 –16,530.6 –457.8 13.2 –2,195.8
7,371.4 12,747.9 16,453.3 265.3 –499.0 1,842.0
15.0 969.5 –2,002.5 –129.7 –40.4 189.5
–791.3 –494.5 –2,894.9 –228.9 –152.9 –155.2
806.3 1,463.9 892.4 99.2 112.6 344.7
8,149.4 2,541.7 15,432.9 3,210.4 427.8 2,222.1
–10,854.1 –6,197.2 –9,567.8 176.6 –1,024.6 –1,188.6
19,003.5 8,738.9 25,000.7 3,033.8 1,452.4 3,410.7
–891.0 9,475.7 3,072.9 –2,735.4 –910.4 –446.6
–13,583.5 –4,070.8 –9,917.9 –2,515.4 –4,370.0 –1,148.2
12,692.6 13,546.5 12,990.8 –220.0 3,459.6 701.6
688.3 –148.2 –1,884.4 306.7 218.4 –117.1
98.0 –239.0 –50.0 –80.0 24.0 –123.0
–16.4 73.8 77.3 192.5 485.7 353.9
1,896.0 2,184.0 2,219.0ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 29  10/07 140
* The nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) is the value of a representative basket of foreign currencies, each of which is weighted on the basis of its importance in
the country's external trade. Up to end-2000, the NEER of the drachma was calculated by weighting the individual bilateral exchange rates of the drachma against the
other currencies, as these rates evolved in the foreign exchange market. Since 1 January 2001, when Greece adopted the euro, the revised NEER index comprises
Greece's 28 major trading partners (including the other 12 euro area countries, including Slovenia) and the weights are calculated on the basis of imports and exports
of manufacturing goods (categories 5-8 of the Standardised International Trade Classification – SITC 5-8) during the period 1999-2001, also taking account of com-
petition in third countries. This index should not be confused with the effective exchange rate of the euro, which is calculated on the basis of the external trade of the
euro area as a whole.
1 Positive values indicate an appreciation of the euro, negative ones a depreciation.
Source: Bank of Greece.
Table I π . 2







2002  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94.7 1.9 1.9
2003  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98.9 4.54.5
2004  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.3 1.4 1.4
2005  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99.6 –0.7 –0.7
2006  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99.7 0.1 0.1
2005 I  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.5–0.4 0.1
II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99.7 –0.9 0.0
III  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99.2 –0.5–0.8
IV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99.0 –0.2 –1.9
2006 I  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98.9 –0.1 –1.6
II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99.8 0.9 0.1
IIπ  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.1 0.3 0.9
IV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.1 0.0 1.1
2007 I  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.4 0.3 1.5
II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.9 0.6 1.2
IIπ  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101.1 0.1 1.0
2005 Jan.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.7 –0.5–0.1
Feb. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.3 –0.4 –0.3
March  . . . . . . . . . . . 100.6 0.3 0.6
April  . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.3 –0.3 0.9
May . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99.8 –0.4 0.0
June  . . . . . . . . . . . . 98.9 –0.9 –0.9
July  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99.1 0.2 –0.9
Aug.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 99.3 0.2 –0.7
Sept.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 99.2 –0.1 –1.0
Oct. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99.1 0.0 –1.4
Nov.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 98.9 –0.2 –2.0
Dec.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 98.9 0.0 –2.3
2006 Jan.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99.0 0.1 –1.7
Feb. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98.7 –0.3 –1.6
March  . . . . . . . . . . . 98.9 0.3 –1.6
April  . . . . . . . . . . . . 99.3 0.4 –1.0
May . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99.8 0.50.0
June  . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.1 0.2 1.2
July  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.1 0.0 1.0
Aug.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.1 0.0 0.8
Sept.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.0 –0.1 0.9
Oct. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99.8 –0.2 0.7
Nov.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.0 0.2 1.2
Dec.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.4 0.4 1.5
2007 Jan.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.2 –0.2 1.2
Feb. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.3 0.2 1.7
March  . . . . . . . . . . . 100.6 0.3 1.7
April  . . . . . . . . . . . . 101.0 0.3 1.7
May . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101.0 0.0 1.2
June  . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.9 –0.1 0.8
July  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101.0 0.2 0.9
Aug.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.9 –0.1 0.8
Sept.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 101.3 0.4 1.3
Previous
period PeriodStatistical section













Table I I . 3
Bilateral exchange rates of the euro*
(Units of national currency per euro, period averages)
* Positive values indicate an appreciation of the euro, negative ones a depreciation. 
Sources: Bank of Greece and European Central Bank (ECB). 
2002  . . . . . . 0.9456 5.6  5.6  118.06 8.6  8.6  7.4305 –0.3  –0.3  0.62883 1.1  1.1 
2003  . . . . . . 1.1312 19.6  19.6  130.97 10.9  10.9  7.4307 0.002  0.002  0.69199 10.0  10.0 
2004  . . . . . . 1.2439 10.0  10.0  134.44 2.7  2.7  7.4399 0.1  0.1  0.67866 –1.9  –1.9 
2005  . . . . . . 1.2441 0.02  0.02  136.851.8  1.8  7.45 18 0.2  0.2  0.68380 0.8  0.8 
2006  . . . . . . 1.2556  0.9  0.9  146.02 6.7  6.7  7.4591 0.1  0.1  0.68173 –0.3  –0.3 
2004 I  . . . . . 1.2497 5.1  16.5  133.97 3.5  5.0  7.4495 0.2  0.3  0.67987 –2.5  1.5 
II . . . . . 1.2046 –3.6  5.9  132.20 –1.3  –1.9  7.4393 –0.1  0.2  0.66704 –1.9  –4.9 
III  . . . . 1.2220 1.4  8.6  134.38 1.6  1.7  7.4367 –0.03  0.1  0.67216 0.8  –3.8 
IV  . . . . 1.2977 6.2  9.1  137.11 2.0  5.9  7.4343 –0.03  –0.03  0.69507 3.4  –0.4 
2005 I  . . . . . 1.3113 1.0  4.9  137.01 –0.1  2.3  7.4433 0.1  –0.1  0.69362 –0.2  2.0 
II . . . . . 1.2594 –4.0  4.5  135.42 –1.2  2.4  7.4463 0.04  0.1  0.67856 –2.2  1.7 
III  . . . . 1.2199 –3.1  –0.2  135.62 0.1  0.9  7.4588 0.2  0.3  0.68344 0.7  1.7 
IV  . . . . 1.1884 –2.6  –8.4  139.41 2.8  1.7  7.4586 –0.004  0.3  0.67996 –0.5  –2.2 
2006 I  . . . . . 1.2023 1.2  –8.3  140.51 0.8  2.6  7.4621 0.05  0.3  0.68625 0.9  –1.1 
II . . . . . 1.2582 4.7  –0.1  143.81 2.3  6.2  7.4581 –0.1  0.2  0.68778 0.2  1.4 
III  . . . . 1.2743 1.3  4.5  148.09 3.0  9.2  7.4604 0.03  0.02  0.67977 –1.2  –0.5 
IV  . . . . 1.2887 1.1  8.4  151.72 2.5  8.8  7.4557 –0.1  –0.04  0.67314 –1.0  –1.0 
2007 I  . . . . . 1.3106 1.7  9.0  156.43 3.1  11.3  7.4524 –0.04  –0.1  0.67062 –0.4  –2.3 
II . . . . . 1.3481 2.9  7.1  162.89 4.1  13.3  7.4500 –0.03  –0.1  0.67880 1.2  –1.3 
III  . . . . 1.3738 1.9 7.8 161.90 –0.6 9.3 7.4446 –0.1 –0.2 0.68001 0.2 0.03
2005 Jan.  . . . 1.3119 –2.2  4.0 135.63 –2.5  1.1 7.4405 0.1  –0.1 0.69867 0.5  0.9
Feb. . . . 1.3014 –0.8  2.9 136.55 0.7  1.3 7.4427 0.03  –0.1 0.68968 –1.3  1.9
March  . 1.3201 1.4  7.7 138.83 1.7  4.3 7.4466 0.1  –0.04 0.69233 0.4  3.1
April  . . 1.2938 –2.0  7.9 138.84 0.002  7.6 7.4499 0.04  0.1 0.68293 –1.4  2.6
May . . . 1.2694 –1.9  5.7 135.37 –2.5  0.7 7.4443 –0.1  0.1 0.68399 0.2  1.8
June  . . 1.2165–4.2  0.2 132.22 –2.3  –0.57.4448 0.01  0.1 0.66895 –2.2  0.7
July  . . . 1.2037 –1.0  –1.9 134.75 1.9  0.5 7.4584 0.2  0.3 0.68756 2.8  3.3
Aug.  . . 1.2292 2.1  1.0 135.98 0.9  1.1 7.4596 0.02  0.3 0.68527 –0.3  2.4
Sept.  . . 1.2256 –0.3  0.3 136.06 0.1  1.2 7.4584 –0.02  0.3 0.67760 –1.1  –0.5
Oct.  . . 1.2015 –2.0  –3.8 138.05 1.5  1.5 7.4620 0.05  0.3 0.68137 0.6  –1.5
Nov.  . . 1.1786 –1.9  –9.3 139.59 1.1  2.6 7.4596 –0.03  0.4 0.67933 –0.3  –2.8
Dec.  . . 1.1856 0.6  –11.6 140.58 0.7  1.0 7.4541 –0.1  0.3 0.67922 –0.02  –2.3
2006 Jan.  . . . 1.2103 2.1  –7.7 139.82 –0.5  3.1 7.4613 0.1  0.3 0.68598 1.0  –1.8
Feb. . . . 1.1938 –1.4  –8.3 140.77 0.7  3.1 7.4641 0.04  0.3 0.68297 –0.4  –1.0
March  . 1.2020 0.7  –8.9 140.96 0.1  1.57.4612 –0.04  0.2 0.68935 0.9  –0.4
April  . . 1.2271 2.1  –5.2 143.59 1.9  3.4 7.4618 0.01  0.2 0.69463 0.8  1.7
May . . . 1.2770 4.1  0.6 142.70 –0.6  5.4 7.4565 –0.07  0.2 0.68330 –1.6  –0.1
June  . . 1.2650 –0.9  4.0 145.11 1.7  9.8 7.4566 0.001  0.2 0.68666 0.5  2.6
July  . . . 1.2684 0.3  5.4 146.70 1.1  8.9 7.4602 0.05  0.02 0.68782 0.2  0.04
Aug.  . . 1.2811 1.0  4.2 148.53 1.3  9.2 7.4609 0.01  0.02 0.67669 –1.6  –1.3
Sept.  . . 1.2727 –0.7  3.8 148.99 0.3  9.57.4601 –0.01  0.02 0.675 11 –0.2  –0.4
Oct.  . . 1.2611 –0.9  5.0 149.65 0.4  8.4 7.4555 –0.06  –0.1 0.67254 –0.4  –1.3
Nov.  . . 1.2881 2.1  9.3 151.11 1.0  8.2 7.4564 0.012  –0.04 0.67397 0.2  –0.8
Dec.  . . 1.3213 2.6  11.4 154.82 2.5  10.1 7.4549 –0.02  0.01 0.67286 –0.2  –0.9
2007 Jan.  . . . 1.2999 –1.6  7.4 156.56 1.1  12.0 7.4539 –0.01  –0.1 0.66341 –1.4  –3.3
Feb. . . . 1.3074 0.6  9.5 157.60 0.7  12.0 7.4541 0.003  –0.1 0.66800 0.7  –2.2
March  . 1.3242 1.3  10.2 155.24 –1.5  10.1 7.4494 –0.1  –0.2 0.68021 1.8  –1.3
April  . . 1.3516 2.1  10.1 160.68 3.5  11.9 7.4530 0.05  –0.1 0.67934 –0.1  –2.2
May . . . 1.3511 –0.04  5.8 163.22 1.6  14.4 7.4519 –0.01  –0.1 0.68136 0.3  –0.3
June  . . 1.3419 –0.7  6.1 164.55 0.8  13.4 7.4452 –0.1  –0.2 0.67562 –0.8  –1.6
July  . . . 1.3716 2.2  8.1 166.76 1.3  13.7 7.4410 –0.1  –0.3 0.67440 –0.2  –2.0
Aug.  . . 1.3622 –0.7 6.3 159.05 –4.6 7.1 7.4429 0.03 –0.2 0.67766 0.5 0.1
Sept.  . . 1.3896 2.0 9.2 159.82 0.5 7.3 7.4506 0.1 –0.1 0.68887 1.7 2.0
Period






























Table I I . 3(continued)
Bilateral exchange rates of the euro*
(Units of national currency per euro, period averages)
* Positive values indicate an appreciation of the euro, negative ones a depreciation.
Sources: Bank of Greece and European Central Bank (ECB). 
2002  . . . . . . 9.16 –1.0  –1.0  1.467 –2.9  –2.9  7.51 –6.7  –6.7  1.738 0.3  0.3  1.484 7.0  7.0 
2003  . . . . . . 9.12 –0.4  –0.4  1.521 3.7  3.7  8.00 6.6  6.6  1.738 0.02  0.02  1.582 6.6  6.6 
2004  . . . . . . 9.12 0.001  0.001  1.544 1.5  1.5  8.37 4.6  4.6  1.690 –2.7  –2.7  1.617 2.2  2.2 
2005  . . . . . . 9.28 1.7  1.7  1.548 0.3  0.3  8.01 –4.3  –4.3  1.632 –3.5  –3.5  1.509 –6.7  –6.7 
2006  . . . . . . 9.25 –0.3  –0.3  1.573 1.6  1.6  8.05 0.5  0.5  1.667 2.1  2.1  1.424 –5.6  –5.6 
2004 I  . . . . . 9.18 1.9  0.02  1.569 1.0  7.0  8.63 5.0  14.0  1.634 –1.7  –9.7  1.648 5.3  1.7 
II . . . . . 9.14 –0.4  0.03  1.537 –2.0  1.3  8.26 –4.3  3.9  1.691 3.5  –4.7  1.637 –0.7  3.1 
III  . . . . 9.16 0.1  –0.1  1.536 –0.1  –0.6  8.39 1.5  1.7  1.723 1.9  0.8  1.600 –2.3  3.0 
IV  . . . . 9.01 –1.6  0.04  1.533 –0.2  –1.3  8.20 –2.3  –0.3  1.713 –0.5  3.1  1.584 –1.0  1.1 
2005 I  . . . . . 9.07 0.7  –1.2  1.549 1.0  –1.3  8.24 0.5  –4.5  1.688 –1.5  3.3  1.608 1.6  –2.4 
II . . . . . 9.21 1.5  0.7  1.544 –0.3  0.4  8.05 –2.3  –2.6  1.639 –2.9  –3.1  1.568 –2.5  –4.3 
III  . . . . 9.37 1.7  2.3  1.553 0.6  1.1  7.88 –2.1  –6.0  1.605 –2.0  –6.8  1.467 –6.4  –8.3 
IV  . . . . 9.47 1.1  5.1  1.547 –0.4  0.9  7.88 –0.04  –3.9  1.598 –0.4  –6.7  1.396 –4.9  –11.9 
2006 I  . . . . . 9.35 –1.3  3.1  1.559 0.8  0.7  8.02 1.8  –2.6  1.627 1.8  –3.6  1.389 –0.4  –13.6 
II . . . . . 9.30 –0.6  1.0  1.563 0.3  1.3  7.83 –2.4  –2.7  1.684 3.5  2.7  1.411 1.5  –10.0 
III  . . . . 9.23 –0.7  –1.4  1.577 0.9  1.5  8.06 2.9  2.3  1.683 –0.04  4.8  1.428 1.2  –2.6 
IV  . . . . 9.14 –1.0  –3.6  1.593 1.0  2.9  8.27 2.6  5.0  1.674 –0.5  4.7  1.467 2.7  5.1 
2007 I  . . . . . 9.19 0.6  –1.7  1.616 1.5  3.7  8.17 –1.2  1.8  1.667 –0.4  2.4  1.536 4.7  10.5 
II . . . . . 9.26 0.7  –0.4  1.648 2.0  5.4  8.11 –0.8  3.5  1.621 –2.7  –3.7  1.479 –3.7  4.8
III  . . . . 9.26 0.1 0.4 1.647 –0.03 4.57.92 –2.3 –1.8 1.623 0.1 –3.6 1.437 –2.8 0.6  
2005 Jan.  . . . 9.050.7  –1.0 1.5 47 0.7  –1.2 8.21 –0.1  –4.4 1.715 –1.8  4.7 1.606 –1.7  –1.8
Feb. . . . 9.09 0.4  –1.0 1.550 0.2  –1.5 8.32 1.3  –5.2 1.667 –2.8  2.5 1.613 0.4  –4.1
March  . 9.09 0.04  –1.6 1.549 –0.05  –1.1 8.19 –1.6  –4.1 1.681 0.8  2.7 1.606 –0.4  –1.5
April  . . 9.17 0.9  0.02 1.547 –0.1  –0.5 8.18 –0.1  –1.5 1.674 –0.4  3.7 1.599 –0.5  –0.5
May . . . 9.19 0.3  0.7 1.545 –0.2  0.3 8.08 –1.2  –1.5 1.657 –1.0  –2.7 1.594 –0.3  –3.6
June  . . 9.26 0.8  1.3 1.539 –0.4  1.3 7.89 –2.3  –4.7 1.587 –4.2  –9.2 1.511 –5.2  –8.4
July  . . . 9.43 1.8  2.5 1.558 1.2  2.0 7.92 0.3  –6.5 1.600 0.8  –6.6 1.473 –2.5  –9.2
Aug.  . . 9.34 –0.9  1.7 1.553 –0.3  0.9 7.92 –0.05  –5.0 1.614 0.9  –5.8 1.482 0.6  –7.4
Sept.  . . 9.33 –0.1  2.7 1.550 –0.2  0.4 7.81 –1.4  –6.6 1.601 –0.8  –8.0 1.445 –2.5  –8.3
Oct.  . . 9.42 0.9  4.0 1.549 –0.04  0.4 7.83 0.3  –4.9 1.594 –0.4  –6.5 1.415 –2.1  –9.3
Nov.  . . 9.56 1.5  6.3 1.545 –0.3  1.5 7.83 –0.1  –3.8 1.603 0.6  –5.0 1.394 –1.4  –10.3
Dec.  . . 9.43 –1.4  5.0 1.548 0.2  0.7 7.97 1.8  –3.0 1.598 –0.3  –8.5 1.378 –1.2  –15.6
2006 Jan.  . . . 9.31 –1.3  2.9 1.549 0.1  0.2 8.04 0.8  –2.1 1.615 1.1  –5.8 1.402 1.8  –12.7
Feb. . . . 9.34 0.3  2.8 1.558 0.6  0.5 8.06 0.3  –3.1 1.610 –0.3  –3.4 1.372 –2.2  –14.9
March  . 9.40 0.6  3.4 1.569 0.7  1.3 7.98 –1.0  –2.6 1.654 2.7  –1.6 1.392 1.4  –13.4
April  . . 9.33 –0.7  1.8 1.575 0.4  1.8 7.84 –1.7  –4.1 1.666 0.7  –0.5 1.405 1.0  –12.1
May . . . 9.33 –0.04  1.5 1.556 –1.2  0.7 7.80 –0.5  –3.5 1.671 0.3  0.9 1.417 0.9  –11.1
June  . . 9.23 –1.0  –0.3 1.560 0.2  1.4 7.86 0.7  –0.5 1.710 2.3  7.7 1.409 –0.6  –6.8
July  . . . 9.22 –0.2  –2.2 1.569 0.5  0.7 7.94 1.1  0.2 1.687 –1.4  5.4 1.430 1.5  –2.9
Aug.  . . 9.21 –0.1  –1.4 1.578 0.6  1.6 7.99 0.7  1.0 1.679 –0.5  4.0 1.434 0.2  –3.2
Sept.  . . 9.27 0.6  –0.7 1.584 0.4  2.2 8.26 3.3  5.7 1.684 0.3  5.2 1.420 –0.9  –1.7
Oct.  . . 9.25 –0.1  –1.8 1.590 0.4  2.6 8.40 1.7  7.2 1.673 –0.6  5.0 1.424 0.2  0.6
Nov.  . . 9.10 –1.6  –4.8 1.592 0.2  3.1 8.24 –1.8  5.3 1.668 –0.3  4.1 1.463 2.8  5.0
Dec.  . . 9.04 –0.7  –4.2 1.597 0.3  3.2 8.16 –1.1  2.3 1.681 0.8  5.2 1.521 3.9  10.4
2007 Jan.  . . . 9.08 0.5  –2.5 1.615 1.2  4.3 8.28 1.5  3.0 1.660 –1.3  2.8 1.528 0.5  9.0
Feb. . . . 9.19 1.2  –1.6 1.621 0.4  4.1 8.09 –2.3  0.4 1.671 0.6  3.8 1.531 0.2  11.6
March  . 9.30 1.2  –1.1 1.612 –0.5  2.8 8.13 0.6  2.0 1.670 –0.02  1.0 1.547 1.1  11.2
April  . . 9.24 –0.7  –1.0 1.637 1.6  4.0 8.12 –0.2  3.51.634 –2.2  –2.0 1.5 33 –0.9  9.1
May . . . 9.21 –0.3  –1.3 1.651 0.8  6.1 8.14 0.2  4.4 1.638 0.3  –2.0 1.480 –3.5  4.4
June  . . 9.33 1.3  1.0 1.654 0.2  6.0 8.06 –1.0  2.6 1.593 –2.7  –6.9 1.429 –3.4  1.4
July  . . . 9.18 –1.6  –0.4 1.657 0.1  5.6 7.94 –1.5  –0.01 1.581 –0.8  –6.3 1.442 0.9  0.8
Aug.  . . 9.32 1.51.2 1.638 –1.1 3.9 7.97 0.4 –0.2 1.644 4.0 –2.1 1.442 0.02 0.6
Sept.  . . 9.28 –0.4 0.2 1.647 0.6 4.0 7.83 –1.8 –5.2 1.644 0.01 –2.3 1.427 –1.0 0.5
Period
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2002  . . . . . . . 341.2  2,158.3  2,499.4  1,075.7  1,406.3  4,981.4  226.9  470.5  127.6  5,806.4 
2003  . . . . . . . 397.9  2,329.2  2,727.1  1,039.2  1,529.6  5,295.8  208.7  581.5  92.7  6,178.7 
2004  . . . . . . . 468.4  2,480.5  2,948.9  1,040.5  1,642.9  5,632.2  229.7  604.9  102.3  6,568.2 
2005  . . . . . . . 532.8  2,946.8  3,479.6  1,123.7  1,549.6  6,152.9  221.9  615.8  126.2  7,116.8 
2006  . . . . . . . 592.2  3,164.3  3,756.5  1,414.8  1,557.1  6,728.4  248.0  614.1  198.7  7,789.3 
2005 Jan. . . . . . 459.9  2,506.1  2,966.0  1,015.4  1,655.9  5,637.3  228.7  616.4  99.2  6,581.6 
Feb.  . . . . 463.6  2,506.6  2,970.7  1,013.0  1,660.3  5,643.4  227.0  615.4  114.1  6,599.9 
March  . . 471.8  2,525.8  2,997.6  1,017.7  1,665.2  5,680.4  227.0  614.5  106.0  6,627.8 
April . . . . 481.1  2,550.0  3,031.1  1,034.8  1,672.5  5,738.4  226.3  627.8  121.0  6,713.4 
May  . . . . 485.8  2,578.3  3,064.1  1,035.7  1,678.7  5,778.4  239.2  634.8  113.5  6,766.0 
June  . . . . 496.6  2,807.8  3,304.4  1,027.4  1,520.2  5,851.9  238.8  621.1  118.8  6,830.7 
July . . . . . 506.4  2,815.3  3,321.8  1,042.5  1,525.7  5,890.0  238.6  635.1  119.2  6,882.9 
Aug.  . . . . 500.9  2,767.7  3,268.6  1,054.3  1,530.0  5,852.9  249.2  639.7  121.0  6,862.8 
Sept. . . . . 507.1  2,815.4  3,322.5  1,078.4  1,532.0  5,933.0  234.4  631.5  119.9  6,918.7 
Oct.  . . . . 510.5  2,838.8  3,349.3  1,088.7  1,532.2  5,970.3  241.4  629.0  121.4  6,962.0 
Nov. . . . . 514.5  2,864.0  3,378.5  1,085.9  1,531.3  5,995.7  239.3  629.6  130.0  6,994.7 
Dec. . . . . 532.8  2,946.8  3,479.6  1,123.6  1,549.6  6,152.9  221.9  615.8  126.2  7,116.8 
2006 Jan. . . . . . 520.8  2,922.2  3,443.1  1,113.7  1,565.7  6,122.5  237.0  608.4  143.4  7,111.3 
Feb.  . . . . 524.8  2,917.2  3,442.0  1,134.8  1,569.2  6,146.1  235.0  610.2  152.7  7,143.9 
March  . . 532.3  2,936.0  3,468.2  1,162.0  1,570.9  6,201.2  235.9  603.1  163.1  7,203.3
April . . . . 540.3  2,992.0  3,532.3  1,201.5  1,569.3  6,303.1  249.7  613.1  163.9  7,329.7 
May  . . . . 543.6  3,006.5  3,550.1  1,189.1  1,568.5  6,307.7  258.2  621.6  173.7  7,361.2 
June  . . . . 553.7  3,044.4  3,598.1  1,208.7  1,565.7  6,372.5  245.1  616.5  161.8  7,395.9 
July . . . . . 562.7  3,009.8  3,572.5  1,232.9  1,562.6  6,368.0  250.5  627.4  160.3  7,406.2 
Aug.  . . . . 559.0  2,956.9  3,515.9  1,267.8  1,562.6  6,346.3  264.9  639.7  179.1  7,430.0 
Sept. . . . . 563.2  3,018.2  3,581.4  1,304.8  1,558.9  6,445.1  263.8  645.6  178.7  7,533.2 
Oct.  . . . . 567.1  2,996.5  3,563.5  1,341.7  1,551.8  6,457.1  261.2  644.7  194.3  7,557.3 
Nov. . . . . 571.5  3,038.2  3,609.7  1,367.3  1,543.5  6,520.5  260.8  636.9  199.4  7,617.6 
Dec. . . . . 592.2  3,164.3  3,756.5  1,414.8  1,557.1  6,728.4  248.0  614.1  198.7  7,789.3 
2007 Jan. . . . . . 575.6  3,106.1  3,681.8  1,446.4  1,558.4  6,686.5  262.3  641.5  220.8  7,811.1 
Feb.  . . . . 578.7  3,095.3  3,674.0  1,469.6  1,547.0  6,690.6  268.8  652.5  231.9  7,843.7 
March  . . 588.3  3,146.9  3,735.3  1,534.1  1,544.8  6,814.2  282.0  666.3  240.1  8,002.5 
April . . . . 594.7  3,157.9  3,752.7  1,572.7  1,537.2  6,862.5  281.8  682.3  242.4  8,069.0 
May  . . . . 597.6  3,178.7  3,776.3  1,599.7  1,533.4  6,909.4  285.2  702.5  255.0  8,152.0 
June  . . . . 604.9  3,239.2  3,844.1  1,634.1  1,526.6  7,004.8  282.1  699.6  241.6  8,228.2
July . . . . . 612.9 3,213.53,826.3 1,694.8 1,5 16.4 7,037.5 287.7 712.6 240.0 8,277.9
Aug.*  . . . 610.5 3,141.9 3,752.5 1,764.3 1,508.8 7,025.6 298.1 706.1 260.4 8,290.1
1 Monetary aggregates comprise monetary liabilities of MFIs and central government (Postal Savings Bank, Ministry of Finance) vis-à-vis non-MFI euro area residents
excluding central government. 
2 M3 and its components exclude non-euro area residents' holdings of money market fund units, money market paper and debt securities with an initial maturity of
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2002  . . . . . . .
2003  . . . . . . .
2004  . . . . . . .
2005  . . . . . . .
2006  . . . . . . .
2005 Jan. . . . . .
Feb.  . . . .
March  . .
April . . . .
May  . . . .
June  . . . .
July . . . . .
Aug.  . . . .
Sept. . . . .
Oct.  . . . .
Nov. . . . .
Dec. . . . .
2006 Jan. . . . . .
Feb.  . . . .
March  . .
April . . . .
May  . . . .
June  . . . .
July . . . . .
Aug.  . . . .
Sept. . . . .
Oct.  . . . .
Nov. . . . .
Dec. . . . .
2007 Jan. . . . . .
Feb.  . . . .
March  . .
April . . . .
May  . . . .
June  . . . .
July . . . . .
Aug.  . . . .
71.7 15.2 56.5 28.9 2.3 20.0 10.7 0.2 133.8
79.517.6 61.9 32.3 2.0 10.8 15 .7 0.5140.8
91.7 20.7 71.0 33.4 1.9 9.5 15.2 0.5 152.3
99.2 24.8 74.4 51.8 4.4 2.7 4.9 0.4 163.4
100.1 26.0 74.1 69.3 2.9 1.6 5.8 0.5 180.2
90.4 19.8 70.6 37.8 2.0 5.6 14.9 0.5 151.2
91.9 20.8 71.1 39.4 2.0 4.4 14.6 0.515 2.8
90.9 20.4 70.6 41.0 2.0 4.2 14.2 0.4 152.6
91.1 20.2 70.9 42.3 2.6 3.8 13.0 0.515 3.4
91.520.2 71.2 42.6 2.8 4.1 12.5 0.515 3.9
96.8 23.9 72.9 42.2 3.1 3.7 10.9 0.4 157.2
93.8 21.8 72.0 44.4 3.3 3.3 10.7 0.4 155.9
93.5 21.2 72.3 45.6 3.6 3.3 10.1 0.3 156.4
94.8 22.5 72.3 46.2 3.9 3.3 7.3 0.4 155.9
95.5 23.2 72.3 49.2 4.1 2.6 6.2 0.4 158.0
94.9 23.1 71.8 50.6 4.5 2.7 5.5 0.4 158.6
99.2 24.8 74.4 51.8 4.4 2.7 4.9 0.4 163.4
95.8 22.7 73.1 53.8 4.4 2.6 4.7 0.4 161.7
95.3 22.6 72.7 55.1 4.5 2.5 4.7 0.4 162.5
95.3 22.7 72.6 56.8 4.1 2.5 4.6 0.5 163.9
95.6 22.3 73.3 57.9 4.0 2.4 4.6 0.6 165.1
95.8 22.6 73.2 59.0 3.7 2.4 4.9 0.6 166.5
99.2 25.1 74.0 60.4 3.6 2.5 5.2 0.6 171.5
98.0 24.2 73.8 61.7 3.52.1 5 .3 0.6 171.1
97.0 23.4 73.6 63.3 3.4 2.0 5.4 0.6 171.7
96.8 23.4 73.3 63.7 3.3 2.1 5.5 0.5 171.9
95.3 23.1 72.3 65.4 3.2 1.9 5.6 0.5 171.9
95.3 23.4 71.9 66.8 3.0 1.6 5.7 0.5 173.0
100.1 26.0 74.1 69.3 2.9 1.6 5.8 0.5 180.2
95.5 23.9 71.7 72.9 2.9 1.5 5.9 0.4 179.1
95.0 24.0 71.0 73.7 2.8 1.4 6.2 0.3 179.5
96.7 25.3 71.4 76.0 2.7 1.2 6.5 0.3 183.4
96.2 24.4 71.8 77.3 2.7 1.1 6.7 0.2 184.2
94.3 24.4 69.8 79.4 2.7 1.3 7.0 –0.5184.2
99.8 27.6 72.2 80.8 2.7 1.4 7.5–1.1 191.0
96.7 25.3 71.4 87.8 2.6 1.0 7.6 –1.8 194.0
96.525 .4 71.1 88.4 2.6 0.9 7.8 –1.9 194.3
1 Including savings deposits in currencies other than the euro.
2 This aggregate is calculated on a consolidated basis with the other euro area countries. Consequently, domestic MFIs’ holdings of debt securities with maturity up to
two years issued by euro area MFIs are deducted from debt securities with maturity up to two years issued by the former MFIs.
3 ∆he Greek M3 (as any other euro area national M3) can no longer be accurately calculated, since part of the quantity of the euro banknotes and coins that have been
put into circulation in a euro area country is held by residents of other euro area countries and/or by non-residents. Due to these technical problems, the compilation of
the Greek M0, M1, M2 and M3 was interrupted in January 2003.
Source: Bank of Greece.
Table III.2
Greek contribution to the main monetary aggregates of the euro area
(Outstanding balances in billion euro, not seasonally adjusted)
End of period
Debt securi-
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2002  . . . . . . . . . . .
2003  . . . . . . . . . . .
2004  . . . . . . . . . . .
2005  . . . . . . . . . . .
2006  . . . . . . . . . . .
2005 Jan. . . . . . . . .
Feb.  . . . . . . .
March . . . . . .
April  . . . . . . .
May  . . . . . . .
June  . . . . . . .
July . . . . . . . .
Aug.  . . . . . . .
Sept. . . . . . . .
Oct.  . . . . . . .
Nov.  . . . . . . .
Dec.  . . . . . . .
2006 Jan. . . . . . . . .
Feb.  . . . . . . .
March . . . . . .
April  . . . . . . .
May  . . . . . . .
June  . . . . . . .
July . . . . . . . .
Aug.  . . . . . . .
Sept. . . . . . . .
Oct.  . . . . . . .
Nov.  . . . . . . .
Dec.  . . . . . . .
2007 Jan. . . . . . . . .
Feb.  . . . . . . .
March . . . . . .
April  . . . . . . .
May  . . . . . . .
June  . . . . . . .
July . . . . . . . .
Aug.  . . . . . . .
104,761.1 87,732.3 17,028.8 13,367.3 60,406.1 30,987.7
115,750.1 98,119.3 17,630.8 15,395.8 65,141.1 35,213.2
128,424.6 110,206.7 18,217.9 18,274.2 73,954.2 36,196.1
156,857.7 135,797.3 21,060.4 22,180.2 79,800.8 54,876.1
173,370.4 151,321.5 22,048.9 23,525.0 77,858.2 71,987.2
131,749.7 114,232.0 17,517.7 17,586.6 73,515.5 40,647.6
134,088.9 116,771.1 17,317.8 17,866.2 74,096.0 42,126.7
134,801.8 116,303.2 18,498.7 17,521.9 73,527.1 43,752.9
136,854.8 118,087.9 18,766.9 17,333.7 74,453.1 45,068.0
137,472.3 118,223.8 19,248.5 17,189.9 75,046.6 45,235.8
142,951.8 123,548.2 19,403.6 20,868.4 77,036.6 45,046.9
142,705.3 122,700.2 20,005.1 19,144.9 76,318.4 47,241.9
143,733.0 123,239.3 20,493.7 18,436.6 76,764.9 48,531.5
146,180.7 125,211.8 20,968.9 19,789.0 77,143.1 49,248.6
150,136.2 129,055.6 21,080.6 20,542.2 77,351.8 52,242.2
151,140.9 129,736.1 21,404.8 20,228.8 77,297.6 53,614.4
156,857.7 135,797.3 21,060.4 22,180.2 79,800.8 54,876.7
155,334.6 134,509.7 20,824.9 20,097.8 78,361.8 56,875.1
156,125.0 134,733.6 21,391.4 19,797.5 78,114.4 58,213.2
157,740.9 136,352.9 21,388.0 20,229.3 77,611.2 59,900.5
158,730.2 137,689.9 21,040.3 19,707.4 78,160.7 60,862.1
159,942.6 138,812.0 21,130.6 20,063.9 77,829.2 62,049.5
164,328.2 143,200.2 21,128.0 22,398.2 78,543.2 63,386.8
164,473.3 143,231.3 21,242.0 21,667.6 78,137.8 64,667.9
164,706.1 143,088.1 21,618.0 20,710.577,844.8 66,150.8
164,750.2 143,309.9 21,440.3 20,693.0 77,479.1 66,578.1
164,848.2 143,096.0 21,752.2 20,410.6 76,266.5 68,171.1
166,195.3 144,335.6 21,859.7 21,116.2 75,520.4 69,558.6
173,370.4 151,321.5 22,048.9 23,525.0 77,858.2 71,987.2
171,937.9 149,321.7 22,616.2 20,943.4 75,322.8 75,671.7
172,166.2 150,424.2 21,742.0 21,109.9 74,619.3 76,437.1
176,068.3 154,217.8 21,850.522,393.574,931.578,743.4
177,261.9 155,599.4 21,662.5 21,878.6 75,236.8 80,146.5
177,486.2 154,859.0 22,627.2 21,160.9 73,954.4 82,370.9
184,148.2 161,027.9 23,120.2 24,695.0 75,647.6 83,805.6
188,181.4 164,079.4 24,102.0 22,986.3 74,519.2 90,675.9
188,054.4 163,993.2 24,061.2 22,398.6 74,358.8 91,297.0
1 Other Monetary Financial Institutions (OMFIs) comprise credit institutions (other than the Bank of Greece) and money market funds.
2 Including blocked deposits.
Source: Bank of Greece.
Table πππ.3
Greece: deposits of domestic firms and households with OMFIs,1 by currency and type
(Outstanding balances in million euro, not seasonally adjusted)
Total
deposits
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1 Comprising manufacturing and mining.
Source: Bank of Greece.
Table πππ.4
Domestic MFI loans to domestic enterprises and households, by branch of economic activity
(Balances in million euro)
2002 . . . . . . . . 
2003 . . . . . . . . 
2004 . . . . . . . . 
2005 . . . . . . . . 
2006 . . . . . . . . 
2005 Jan. . . . . . 
Feb.. . . . . 
March . . . 
April . . . . 
May  . . . . 
June . . . . 
July . . . . . 
Aug. . . . . 
Sept. . . . . 
Oct. . . . . 
Nov. . . . . 
Dec. . . . . 
2006 Jan. . . . . . 
Feb.. . . . . 
March . . . 
April . . . . 
May  . . . . 
June . . . . 
July . . . . . 
Aug. . . . . 
Sept. . . . . 
Oct. . . . . 
Nov. . . . . 
Dec. . . . . 
2007 Jan. . . . . . 
Feb.. . . . . 
March . . . 
April . . . . 
May  . . . . 
June . . . . 
July . . . . . 
Aug. . . . . 
86,510.5 55,012.2 3,224.7 14,364.0 15,670.8 2,903.2 18,849.5 31,498.3 21,224.7 9,755.4 518.2
101,178.1 60,979.3 3,082.7 15,865.1 16,514.4 3,488.2 22,028.9 40,198.8 26,534.2 12,409.6 1,255.0
117,201.7 65,566.3 3,248.0 15,675.6 18,821.6 4,040.0 23,781.1 51,635.4 33,126.8 17,053.8 1,454.8
136,981.1 71,282.9 2,954.0 15,753.8 19,958.4 4,189.8 28,426.9 65,698.2 43,199.4 20,850.0 1,648.8
156,896.4 76,659.8 3,051.0 16,371.4 20,572.0 4,194.1 32,471.3 80,236.6 52,502.5 25,599.2 2,134.9
118,387.3 65,985.6 3,237.8 15,645.2 18,921.1 4,079.3 24,102.2 52,401.7 33,672.4 17,275.8 1,453.5
118,906.4 65,521.9 3,161.6 15,623.8 19,104.7 4,129.9 23,501.9 53,384.5 34,281.6 17,610.7 1,492.2
120,704.9 66,096.9 3,079.3 15,565.9 19,309.8 4,180.8 23,961.1 54,608.0 35,091.5 17,995.6 1,520.9
123,037.2 67,097.9 3,059.3 15,926.1 19,565.9 4,211.2 24,335.4 55,939.3 35,878.7 18,550.0 1,510.6
124,228.8 67,257.5 3,038.1 15,872.9 19,520.5 4,225.7 24,600.3 56,971.3 36,610.2 18,896.4 1,464.7
125,452.3 68,474.1 3,096.1 15,918.8 20,142.8 4,293.7 25,022.7 56,978.2 36,102.8 19,386.6 1,488.8
127,215.3 69,613.6 3,119.2 16,123.2 20,352.3 4,135.7 25,883.2 57,601.7 37,238.6 18,897.0 1,466.1
127,788.5 69,212.3 3,123.3 15,838.2 20,027.5 4,110.4 26,112.9 58,576.2 37,850.0 19,245.1 1,481.1
129,507.9 69,305.5 2,939.4 15,674.2 19,985.6 4,073.7 26,632.6 60,202.4 39,022.1 19,628.5 1,551.8
131,111.7 69,462.4 2,884.1 15,757.2 19,905.6 4,089.4 26,826.1 61,649.3 40,000.4 20,080.7 1,568.2
133,136.0 69,791.5 2,919.6 15,712.5 19,717.1 4,184.2 27,258.1 63,344.5 41,244.2 20,511.7 1,588.6
136,981.1 71,282.9 2,954.0 15,753.8 19,958.4 4,189.8 28,426.9 65,698.2 43,199.4 20,850.0 1,648.8
137,731.3 70,999.2 2,948.7 15,690.0 19,672.8 4,205.7 28,482.0 66,732.1 44,010.6 21,047.7 1,673.8
139,714.7 71,491.8 2,957.3 15,747.6 19,389.1 4,248.8 29,149.0 68,222.9 44,873.8 21,637.5 1,711.6
142,633.3 72,960.5 3,086.1 15,955.2 19,843.2 4,356.4 29,719.6 69,672.8 45,919.6 22,045.2 1,708.0
144,593.1 73,944.8 3,098.7 16,399.3 20,160.3 4,352.3 29,934.2 70,648.3 46,612.7 22,344.3 1,691.3
145,477.5 74,372.3 3,105.7 16,661.9 19,876.8 4,377.7 30,350.2 71,105.2 46,539.9 22,815.5 1,749.8
148,322.9 76,259.8 3,192.4 16,900.2 20,531.4 4,416.8 31,219.0 72,063.1 46,929.0 23,275.7 1,858.4
150,012.0 76,374.7 3,203.6 16,706.6 20,573.2 4,350.0 31,541.3 73,637.3 48,165.4 23,610.7 1,861.2
150,031.2 76,033.8 3,204.1 16,658.0 20,371.5 4,301.8 31,498.4 73,997.4 48,138.4 23,956.0 1,903.0
152,943.1 77,450.6 3,239.2 16,769.4 20,916.6 4,337.6 32,187.8 75,492.5 49,140.0 24,394.4 1,958.1
153,584.8 76,893.8 3,226.8 16,627.6 20,662.5 4,346.0 32,030.9 76,691.0 49,923.5 24,709.6 2,057.9
152,551.9 74,519.8 3,141.2 16,223.8 19,823.8 4,213.5 31,117.5 78,032.1 50,672.3 25,283.7 2,076.1
156,896.4 76,659.8 3,051.0 16,371.4 20,572.0 4,194.1 32,471.3 80,236.6 52,502.5 25,599.2 2,134.9
157,445.6 75,917.1 3,021.6 16,099.9 20,119.0 4,218.6 32,458.0 81,528.5 53,517.4 25,881.3 2,129.8
159,987.8 77,080.3 3,039.1 16,168.8 20,500.8 4,327.7 33,043.9 82,907.5 54,619.9 26,114.4 2,173.2
164,281.1 79,285.9 3,049.5 16,366.8 21,120.2 4,355.7 34,393.7 84,995.2 56,200.1 26,572.7 2,222.4
165,479.2 79,008.3 3,005.9 16,364.7 21,008.8 4,361.1 34,267.8 86,470.9 57,218.4 27,071.9 2,180.6
168,128.9 79,941.2 3,034.2 16,706.6 21,238.3 4,380.6 34,581.5 88,187.7 58,277.3 27,714.2 2,196.2
173,093.9 84,391.7 3,206.8 17,077.7 22,083.4 4,439.4 37,584.4 88,702.2 58,156.5 28,101.5 2,444.2
173,441.0 84,073.0 3,216.2 16,876.8 22,117.2 4,388.6 37,474.2 89,368.0 58,169.6 28,596.5 2,601.9
175,889.4 85,133.8 3,276.4 16,979.5 22,211.6 4,346.8 38,319.5 90,755.6 59,067.4 29,055.8 2,632.4
End of period Total
Agri-
culture Industry1 Trade Tourism
Households Enterprises 
Other Total Housing Consumer Other
Grand
totalStatistical section
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Table πππ.5
ECB and Bank of Greece interest rates
(Percentages per annum)
1999 1 Jan. 2.00 3.00 4.50 1999 14 Jan. 11.50 9.75 12.00 13.50
4 Jan.2 2.753.00 3.25 21 Oct. 11.00 9.75 11.5 0 13.00
22 Jan. 2.00 3.00 4.50 16 Dec. 10.25 9.25 10.75 12.25
9 April 1.50 2.50 3.50 27 Dec. 10.25 9.00 10.75 11.50
5Nov. 2.00 3.00 4.00
2000 4 Feb. 2.253.254.25 2000 27 Jan. 9.50 8.50 9.75 11.00
17 March 2.50 3.50 4.50 9 March 8.75 8.00 9.25 10.25
28 April 2.75 3.75 4.75 20 April  8.00 7.50 8.75 9.50
9 June 3.254.255 .25 29 June  7.25 – 8.259.00
28 July3 3.25 4.25 5.25 6 Sept. 6.50 – 7.50 8.25
1 Sept. 3.50 4.50 5.50 15 Nov.  6.00 – 7.00 7.75
6 Oct. 3.75  4.75  5.75  29 Nov.  5.50 – 6.50 7.25
13 Dec.  4.75 – 5.75 6.50
27 Dec.  3.75– 4.75 5 .75
2001 11 May  3.50  4.50  5.50 
31 Aug.  3.25  4.25  5.25 
18 Sept. 2.753.754.75
9 Nov. 2.253.254.25
2002 6 Dec. 1.752.753.75
2003 7 March 1.50 2.50 3.50
6 June 1.00 2.00 3.00
2005 6 Dec. 1.252.253.25
2006 8 March 1.50 2.50 3.50
15June 1.75 2.75 3.75
9 Aug. 2.00 3.00 4.00
11 Oct. 2.253.254.25
13 Dec. 2.50 3.50 4.50
2007 14 March 2.753.754.75
13 June 3.00 4.00 5.00
With
effect from:1
























1 From 1 January 1999 to 9 March 2004, the date refers to the deposit and marginal lending facilities. For main refinancing operations, changes in the rate are effective from
the first operation following the date indicated. The change on 18 September 2001 was effective on that same day. From 10 March 2004 onwards, the date refers to the
deposit and marginal lending facilities and to the main refinancing operations (changes effective from the first main refinancing operation following the Governing Council
decision), unless otherwise indicated.
2 On 22 December 1998 the ECB announced that, as an exceptional measure between 4 and 21 January 1999, a narrow corridor of 50 basis points would be applied between
the interest rate for the marginal lending facility and that for the deposit facility, aimed at facilitating the transition of market participants to the new monetary regime.
3 On 8 June 2000, the ECB announced that, starting from the operation to be settled on 28 June 2000, the main refinancing operations of the Eurosystem would be conducted
as variable rate tenders. The minimum bid rate refers to the minimum interest rate at which counterparties may place their bids. 
4 On 29 June 2000 the second tier of the deposit facility was abolished; the interest rate thereafter applies to the unified deposit acceptance account.
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2002  . . . . . . . . . . .
2003  . . . . . . . . . . .
2004  . . . . . . . . . . .
2005  . . . . . . . . . . .
2006  . . . . . . . . . . .
2005 Jan.  . . . . . . . .
Feb. . . . . . . . .
March  . . . . . .
April  . . . . . . .
May . . . . . . . .
June . . . . . . . .
July  . . . . . . . .
Aug.  . . . . . . .
Sept.  . . . . . . .
Oct. . . . . . . . .
Nov.  . . . . . . .
Dec.  . . . . . . .
2006 Jan.  . . . . . . . .
Feb. . . . . . . . .
March  . . . . . .
April  . . . . . . .
May . . . . . . . .
June . . . . . . . .
July  . . . . . . . .
Aug.  . . . . . . .
Sept.  . . . . . . .
Oct. . . . . . . . .
Nov.  . . . . . . .
Dec.  . . . . . . .
2007 Jan.  . . . . . . . .
Feb. . . . . . . . .
March  . . . . . .
April  . . . . . . .
May1  . . . . . . .
June1  . . . . . . .
July1 . . . . . . . .
Aug.1  . . . . . . .
Sept.1 . . . . . . .
3.50 4.06 4.45 4.78 5.12 5.24 5.52 . . . 
2.34 2.82 3.37 3.83 4.27 4.32 4.91 . . . 
2.27 2.87 3.37 3.81 4.26 4.53 4.77 . . . 
2.33 2.652.92 3.22 3.5 9 3.80 3.92 4.14
3.44 3.58 3.72 3.87 4.07 4.16 4.23 4.42
2.31 2.72 2.96 3.29 3.69 3.99 4.12 . . . 
2.31 2.80 2.97 3.34 3.69 3.94 4.04 . . . 
2.34 2.88 3.06 3.56 3.92 4.12 4.24 4.49
2.27 2.70 3.06 3.37 3.76 3.98 4.11 4.38
2.19 2.5 52.89 3.21 3.60 3.82 3.954.21
2.10 2.352.70 3.02 3.44 3.66 3.79 4.05
2.17 2.42 2.753.06 3.46 3.71 3.84 4.10
2.22 2.49 2.79 3.07 3.47 3.69 3.82 4.08
2.22 2.42 2.66 2.92 3.30 3.52 3.64 3.91
2.41 2.66 2.88 3.11 3.453.64 3.754.00
2.69 2.91 3.153.36 3.67 3.84 3.94 4.14
2.78 2.953.14 3.31 3.5 7 3.73 3.82 4.02
2.84 2.99 3.17 3.32 3.60 3.71 3.79 3.98
2.91 3.09 3.30 3.50 3.77 3.86 3.94 4.14
3.11 3.38 3.50 3.74 3.95 4.02 4.11 4.29
3.22 3.61 3.72 4.01 4.23 4.32 4.41 4.60
3.31 3.63 3.80 4.054.30 4.38 4.48 4.69
3.41 3.70 3.93 4.07 4.31 4.41 4.50 4.72
3.54 3.78 3.98 4.10 4.33 4.42 4.50 4.72
3.61 3.72 3.88 3.98 4.19 4.29 4.37 4.58
3.72 3.71 3.81 3.89 4.06 4.154.21 4.39
3.80 3.77 3.87 3.93 4.08 4.154.21 4.35
3.87 3.77 3.82 3.86 3.98 4.054.09 4.23
3.92 3.84 3.89 3.93 4.04 4.12 4.17 4.30
4.06 4.01 4.08 4.13 4.28 4.33 4.38 4.51
4.09 4.03 4.09 4.14 4.30 4.354.40 4.5 4
4.11 4.00 4.04 4.08 4.20 4.27 4.33 4.49
4.254.17 4.24 4.28 4.40 4.46 4.5 2 4.70
4.37 4.31 4.37 4.40 4.51 4.59 – 4.77
4.51 4.52 4.65 4.68 4.80 4.97 – 5.05
4.56 4.54 4.64 4.67 4.79 4.96 – 5.02
4.67 4.28 4.41 4.47 4.62 4.85– 4.91
4.72 4.20 4.34 4.39 4.56 4.82 – 4.92
1 In the market there is no bond with a residual maturity close to 20 years.
Source: Bank of Greece.
Table πππ.6
Greek government paper yields
(Percentages per annum, period averages)
Yield on government bonds
20-year 15-year 10-year 7-year 5-year 3-year
Yield on
one-year
Treasury bills 32-year PeriodStatistical section
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Period Savings2 Overnight1,2
2003  . . . . . . . . . . .
2004  . . . . . . . . . . .
2005  . . . . . . . . . . .
2006  . . . . . . . . . . .
2005 Jan.  . . . . . . . .
Feb. . . . . . . . .
March  . . . . . .
April  . . . . . . .
May . . . . . . . .
June . . . . . . . .
July  . . . . . . . .
Aug. . . . . . . . .
Sept.  . . . . . . .
Oct. . . . . . . . .
Nov.  . . . . . . .
Dec.  . . . . . . .
2006 Jan.  . . . . . . . .
Feb. . . . . . . . .
March  . . . . . .
April  . . . . . . .
May . . . . . . . .
June . . . . . . . .
July  . . . . . . . .
Aug. . . . . . . . .
Sept.  . . . . . . .
Oct. . . . . . . . .
Nov.  . . . . . . .
Dec.  . . . . . . .
2007 Jan.  . . . . . . . .
Feb. . . . . . . . .
March  . . . . . .
April  . . . . . . .
May . . . . . . . .
June . . . . . . . .
July  . . . . . . . .
Aug. . . . . . . . .
0.93 0.92 2.48 0.63 2.49 2.24
0.91 0.90 2.29 0.55 2.17 1.98
0.91 0.88 2.23 0.60 2.09 2.00
1.02 0.98 2.86 0.79 2.81 2.67
0.96 0.952.250.5 6 2.08 1.97
0.950.94 2.19 0.552.07 1.97
0.93 0.91 2.22 0.55 2.02 1.97
0.89 0.86 2.22 0.55 2.07 1.98
0.89 0.87 2.20 0.56 2.04 1.99
0.89 0.86 2.21 0.58 2.07 1.99
0.88 0.86 2.20 0.60 2.07 1.98
0.89 0.86 2.19 0.59 2.08 1.98
0.89 0.87 2.19 0.70 2.09 1.98
0.89 0.87 2.22 0.652.10 1.97
0.90 0.87 2.27 0.652.11 1.99
0.91 0.88 2.39 0.71 2.32 2.18
0.93 0.90 2.44 0.69 2.33 2.23
0.93 0.90 2.450.652.352.25
0.99 0.95 2.58 0.73 2.57 2.42
0.98 0.952.63 0.73 2.61 2.50
0.98 0.952.66 0.73 2.57 2.47
1.02 0.98 2.76 0.752.70 2.60
1.02 0.98 2.84 0.74 2.79 2.60
1.04 1.00 2.950.83 2.96 2.74
1.051.00 3.03 0.83 2.97 2.85
1.11 1.06 3.24 0.93 3.153.02
1.09 1.04 3.26 0.89 3.24 3.09
1.14 1.09 3.47 0.92 3.48 3.30
1.16 1.10 3.50 0.91 3.49 3.32
1.16 1.10 3.51 0.87 3.54 3.35
1.18 1.11 3.64 0.99 3.73 3.53
1.20 1.13 3.74 0.98 3.81 3.60
1.20 1.13 3.74 1.053.81 3.63
1.24 1.153.951.054.01 3.80
1.24 1.16 4.00 1.154.05 3.86
1.24 1.16 4.09 1.12 4.13 3.87
1 Weighted average of the current account rate and the savings deposit rate.
2 End-of-month rate.





maturity of up to
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Greece: bank rates on new euro-denominated deposits of euro area residents






2003  . . . . . . . . . . .
2004  . . . . . . . . . . .
2005  . . . . . . . . . . .
2006  . . . . . . . . . . .
2005 Jan.  . . . . . . . .
Feb. . . . . . . . .
March  . . . . . .
April  . . . . . . .
May . . . . . . . .
June . . . . . . . .
July  . . . . . . . .
Aug.  . . . . . . .
Sept.  . . . . . . .
Oct. . . . . . . . .
Nov.  . . . . . . .
Dec.  . . . . . . .
2006 Jan.  . . . . . . . .
Feb. . . . . . . . .
March  . . . . . .
April  . . . . . . .
May . . . . . . . .
June . . . . . . . .
July  . . . . . . . .
Aug.  . . . . . . .
Sept.  . . . . . . .
Oct. . . . . . . . .
Nov.  . . . . . . .
Dec.  . . . . . . .
2007 Jan.  . . . . . . . .
Feb. . . . . . . . .
March  . . . . . .
April  . . . . . . .
May . . . . . . . .
June . . . . . . . .
July  . . . . . . . .
Aug.  . . . . . . .
14.41 10.57 10.47 4.51 4.78 6.86 5.29 3.98
13.81 9.55 9.86 4.30 4.51 7.01 4.98 3.67
13.36 8.47 9.06 4.06 4.156.90 5 .08 3.62
13.45 7.89 8.58 4.20 4.28 7.18 5.76 4.37
13.42 8.859.39 4.23 4.39 6.954.89 3.5 4
13.72 8.99 9.62 4.20 4.34 6.95 5.08 3.53
13.51 8.53 9.43 4.15 4.27 6.94 5.00 3.70
13.74 8.58 9.37 4.13 4.23 6.94 5.09 3.58
13.63 8.88 9.13 4.12 4.21 6.89 4.96 3.47
13.48 8.16 8.78 4.07 4.18 6.87 4.82 3.46
13.14 8.45 9.35 4.06 4.14 6.82 5.01 3.50
13.16 8.48 9.39 4.11 4.18 6.84 5.12 3.50
13.23 8.36 8.79 3.99 4.05 6.82 5.06 3.57
13.07 8.32 8.68 3.94 4.01 6.855 .06 3.79
13.09 8.28 8.56 3.88 3.93 6.93 5.41 3.84
13.07 7.78 8.26 3.86 3.91 7.00 5.41 3.93
13.18 7.77 8.30 3.92 4.00 6.94 5.26 3.70
13.18 8.06 8.51 3.89 3.97 6.99 5.44 3.74
13.22 8.09 8.44 3.92 4.02 7.13 5.50 4.15
13.24 7.82 8.48 3.93 4.08 7.09 5.57 3.92
13.22 7.84 8.66 4.00 4.157.10 5 .61 4.17
13.458.09 8.754.22 4.32 7.18 5 .654.41
13.41 7.85 8.59 4.28 4.36 7.19 5.70 4.40
13.60 7.99 8.77 4.51 4.53 7.26 5.88 4.27
13.58 8.03 8.85 4.50 4.54 7.26 5.91 4.72
13.72 8.158.87 4.66 4.62 7.37 6.14 4.83
13.81 8.19 8.86 4.69 4.5 2 7.256.154.94
13.80 6.82 7.82 4.36 4.26 7.356.30 5 .16
13.87 7.358.30 3.92 4.19 7.32 6.27 5 .22
13.85 7.53 8.40 3.80 4.09 7.34 6.36 5.01
13.88 7.60 8.23 4.00 4.09 7.456.38 5 .08
13.97 7.72 8.36 4.45 4.23 7.50 6.45 5.12
13.92 8.18 8.74 4.46 4.25 7.47 6.51 5.06
14.09 7.82 8.61 4.90 4.52 7.56 6.48 5.32
14.12 8.00 8.70 5.01 4.53 7.56 6.44 5.12
14.15 8.38 8.78 5.00 4.58 7.74 6.76 5.48
1 Charges are not included.
2 Weighted average of interest rates on loans to households through credit cards, open loans and current account overdrafts.
3 End-of-month rate.
4 Weighted average of interest rates on corporate loans through credit lines and sight deposit overdrafts.
Source: Bank of Greece.
Table πππ.8
Greece: bank rates on new euro-denominated loans to euro area residents
(Percentages per annum, period averages, unless otherwise indicated)
Consumer loans
Loans to households1 Loans to non-financial corporations1
With a floating rate or an initial

























up to 1 yearStatistical section
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Central government 14,424 10,467 11,223 7,384 8,916
– State budget 14,793 11,500 12,600 8,685 9,633
(Ordinary budget)2 10,0334 7,0205 10,4886 7,1517 7,1098
(Public investment budget) 4,760 4,480 2,112 1,534 2,524
– OPEKEPE3 –369 –1,033 –1,377 –1,301 –717
Percentage of GDP 8.0 5.4 6.2 3.8 4.3
1 As shown by the respective accounts with the Bank of Greece and other credit institutions.
2 Including movements in public debt management accounts.
3 Payment and Control Agency for Guidance and Guarantee Community Aid. It replaced DIDAGEP (Agricultural Markets Management Service) as from 3
September 2001.
4 Including a grant of about €2,586 million to hospitals, an expenditure of €1,239.3 million for the capital increase of the Agricultural Bank of Greece (ATE), pro-
ceeds of €1,090 million from the sale of 16.4% of OPAP (the Greek soccer pools organisation) shares and €826 million from the sale of 10% of OTE (Hellenic
Telecommunications Organisation) shares, as well as an expenditure for a grant of €425 million to the Farmers’ Insurance Fund (OGA).
5Including €149.7 million from a Hellenic Telecommunications and Post Commission (EETT) revenue settlement, €299.3 million from a reduction in the Postal
Savings Bank’s capital, €34 million from a reduction in ATE’s capital, €290 million from additional dividends of the Deposits and Loans Fund, €323 million
from the sale of ATE shares, €597.4 million from the sale of Postal Savings Bank shares, €364.4 million from the sale of Emporiki Bank shares, as well as an
expenditure for a grant of €422.9 million to OGA.
6 Including a grant of €1,800 million to hospitals and an expenditure of €402.1 million for the payment of liabilities to ATE, as well as an expenditure of €1,028.5
million for the capital increase of the ATE. Also including proceeds of €1,090 million from the sale of 16.4% of OPAP shares.
7 Including receipts of €323 million from the sale of ATE shares, €597.4 million from the sale of Postal Savings Bank shares and  €364.4 million from the sale
of Emporiki Bank shares. Also including extraordinary proceeds of €149.7 million from an EETT revenue settlement and €299.3 million from a reduction in the
Postal Savings Bank’s capital and an expenditure for a grant of €422.9 million to OGA.
8 Including receipts of €1,107.5 million from the sale of OTE shares and €502.8 million from the sale of Postal Savings Bank shares, as well as an expenditure
of €174 million for aid to the fire-stricken. 
* Provisional data. 
Source: Bank of Greece.
Table IV.1
Net borrowing requirement of central government on a cash basis1
(Million euro)
2006 2005 2006 2005
Annual data January - August
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Table IV.2
Financing of the central government borrowing requirement 
(Million euro)
1 Comprising domestically issued Treasury bills and government bonds, as well as bonds convertible into equity.
2 Comprising changes in central government accounts with the Bank of Greece and other credit institutions, as well as the change in the OPEKEPE account.
3 Comprising government borrowing abroad and securities issuance abroad and excluding non-residents' holdings of domestically issued government bonds. Also
including changes in government deposits abroad.
* Provisional data.







Greek Treasury bills and 
government bonds1 15,325 106.2 11,342 108.4 11,942 106.4 8,840 119.7 11,653 130.7
Change in balances of central 
government accounts with 
the credit system2 –1,224 –8.5 –1,145 –10.9 –2,396 –21.3 –2,502 –33.9 –1,566 –17.6
External borrowing3 323 2.2 270 2.6 1,677 14.9 1,046 14.2 –1,171 –13.1
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1 For comparability purposes, tax refunds are included in expenditure and have not been deducted from revenue. This practice has been adopted by the Ministry of
Economy and Finance in recent years.
2 From 2003 onwards, interest and amortisation payments are recorded in the off-budget item “Ministry of National Defence Programmes for the procurement of
military equipment”.
3 Including a grant of €330 million to OTE's personnel insurance fund (TAP-OTE) and the settlement of a €345 million liability of the Greek State to ATE. These expendi-
tures were not included in the estimates of the Ministry of Economy and Finance for 2005, as published in the Introductory Report on the 2006 Budget.
4 Comprising €149.7 million from an EETT revenue settlement, €299.3 million (not included in the budget for 2006) from a reduction in the Greek Postal Savings
Bank’s capital, €34 million from a reduction in ATE’S capital and €290 million from additional dividends paid by the Deposits and Loans Fund.
* Provisional data.










π. REVENUE1 47,446   52,399   55,260   10.4 5.5 26,190   29,544   31,512   12.8 6.7
1. Ordinary budget 44,760   48,685   51,370   8.8 5.5 24,964   27,293   28,668   9.3 5.0
(of which: extraordinary revenue) 0   7734 0   0   482 0  
2. Public investment budget 2,686   3,714   3,890   38.3 4.7 1,226   2,251   2,844   83.6 26.3
– Own revenue 63   . . .  140   . . .  . . .  . . . 
– Revenue from the EU 2,623   . . .  3,750   . . .  . . .  . . . 
ππ. EXPENDITURE1 58,763 60,770   64,310   3.4 5.8 34,321   35,635   39,436   3.8 10.7
1.1 Ordinary budget 51,239   52,586   55,560   2.6 5.7 31,431   32,389   34,901   3.0 7.8
(Interest payments)2 9,774   9,589   9,750   –1.9 1.7 8,576   8,040   8,127   –6.3 1.1
1.2 Ordinary budget primary expenditure 41,465   42,997   45,810   3.7 6.5 22,855   24,349   26,774   6.5 10.0
(of which: tax refunds) 2,554   2,392   2,200   –6.3 –8.0 1,506   1,343   1,729   –10.8 28.7
2. Public investment budget 7,524   8,184   8,750   8.8 6.9 2,890   3,246   4,535   12.3 39.7
πππ. STATE BUDGET RESULTS  –11,317   –8,371   –9,050   –8,131   –6,091   –7,925  
Percentage of GDP –6.2 –4.3 –4.3 –4.5–3.1 –3.8
1. Ordinary budget –6,479   –3,901   –4,190   –6,467   –5,096   –6,233  
2. Public investment budget –4,838   –4,470   –4,860   –1,664   –995   –1,691  
IV. PRIMARY DEFICIT (–)/
SURPLUS (+) –1,543   1,218   700   445   1,949   202  
Percentage of GDP –0.9 0.6 0.3 0.2 1.0 0.1
AMORTISATION PAYMENTS2 21,752   17,856   24,247   –17.9 35.8 16,852   15,779   20,385   –6.4 29.2
MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENCE 
PROGRAMMES FOR THE PROCUREMENT
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